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Preface 
 
We are proud to be able to present this book, the first volume of what we intend to 
become an annual book series. This year’s edition contains eleven papers. Each paper is 
based on a thesis in the field of Accounting, Auditing and Control, on which these students 
received a Master’s degree in Economics & Business from the Erasmus School of Economics 
in 2008. 
 
Each year at the section Accounting, Auditing and Control, approximately 150 master 
students experience that writing a master thesis is hard work. It is even harder to notice 
that despite all efforts that students put into the thesis, just a few people will read the 
final result. As thesis supervisors we have noticed over the years that many theses deserve 
a wider audience, and may help students from our master streams in writing their theses.  
 
That is why we have planned this new annual book series.  In this series, we intend to 
publish a collection of master theses each year that meet the following four criteria: 
 
1. The thesis was defended in the specific calendar year; 
2. The thesis was supervised by one of the staff members from the Accounting, 
Auditing and Control group; 
3. The topic of the thesis is relevant for master students in the streams of Accounting 
& Finance or Accounting, Auditing, and Control; 
4. The thesis is of high quality, based on the usual criteria that apply for master 
theses at the Erasmus School of Economics. 
 
By publishing papers from these theses, we aim to achieve the two purposes described 
above: first, to provide a wider audience for theses that deserve that, and second, to offer 
some help to current and future master students in the streams of Accounting & Finance or 
Accounting, Auditing, and Control in writing their theses by presenting “good practices”.  
 
The title of the book, “Accountability”, needs some explanation, which we are happy to 
provide here. Accountability in essence means that an individual or group of individuals 
(e.g., team, department, organisation) has “the duty to provide an account (by no means 
necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held 
responsible” (Gray et al, 1996, p. 38). Thus, accountability involves providing reasons and 
justifying actions for which one is responsible to another individual or group of individuals. 
As such, accountability also involves “the potential to be blamed for not doing the task 
properly” (Sillince & Mueller, 2007, p. 158). These definitions of accountability can easily 
be applied to different principal-agent settings that are important in financial or 
management accounting, such as shareholders-companies, stakeholders-companies, 
society-organisations, board of directors-CEO, manager-employee, etc. In the context of 
financial accounting and reporting, accountability is more than just providing (financial) 
accounts, but also involves transparency about future prospects of the organisation. These 
prospects involve financial prospects, but also environmental, economic and social 
 iv 
prospects. Furthermore, accountability is not just the provision of accounts in itself, but 
also refers to the value of providing this information to users (principals) of this 
information. Therefore, it is not surprising that accountability has been an important 
concept in different fields of financial accounting research in the last few decades: from 
corporate social responsibility reporting and corporate governance issues to the 
information value of voluntary/ mandatory disclosures and earnings management. Topics 
which are also reflected in the financial accounting papers included in this volume. 
 
Although the relevance of accountability seems rather clear for financial accounting, the 
relevance for management accounting and control may not be that obvious. In a recent 
review of the literature on control and accountability, Merchant & Otley (2007) explicitly 
deal with accountability-oriented control systems. These are control systems that “are 
intended first and foremost to hold individuals (or sometimes groups of individuals) 
accountable either for their actions or for the results they or their organisations produce. 
Being held accountable means that the individuals are rewarded when good things happen 
and punished when bad things happen” (Merchant & Otley, 2007, p. 791). Examples of 
control systems that are accountability-oriented are performance measurement and 
budgeting systems that are used for performance measurement, evaluation and rewarding 
of managers. These are exactly the kind of control systems that we focus on in the master 
seminars Advanced Management Accounting and Control. Accountability from this 
perspective deals with issues as the choice of performance measures, the use of targets, 
and the design of incentive systems. Although these topics are not directly reflected in the 
management accounting papers in this volume, the more general description of 
accountability above makes clear that control and accountability in general are 
intertwined. In designing a good control system, whether within one organisation or for 
inter-firm relationships, management control involves the assignment of responsibilities to 
individuals or groups of individuals. And with the assignment of responsibilities 
organisations also need to consider how these individuals or groups of individuals will 
account for their actions, or lack thereof, based on these responsibilities. 
  
By publishing this book, we realise that -to some degree- we also give account of the 
quality of the curriculum of the two master streams in general that involve accounting, 
and the quality of thesis supervision in particular. The master seminar and master thesis 
are the final courses of these streams. If anywhere, the quality of the streams should 
become visible in the quality of the seminars and master theses. But to apply 
“accountabillity” in this sense to the publication of this volume, it is important to take 
into account some limitations to this “accountability”. First, our aim in publishing the book 
was not “accountability”, but, as explained above, to provide a wider audience for the 
theses of “our” graduates, and to offer examples of good practices to our current and 
future master students. Second, to serve the two purposes, we selected theses that reflect 
the wide variety of topics with which we and our master students deal with at our 
department. For this reason, we selected theses from as many different thesis supervisors 
as possible. Third, we did not collect all theses that met the four criteria explained above, 
nor did we make a selection of the “best” theses. Rather, we asked each thesis supervisor 
to contribute one or two theses that, in his opinion, met the criteria. Fourth, the papers 
 v
published in this book have not been reviewed or edited by us in any way. As such, the 
book is meant as a collection of papers of former students for current and future students. 
 
But notwithstanding these limitations, we are confident that this book will achieve its 
purposes. We want to thank the contributors to this book, as they made this book possible 
in the first place. We also want to thank the Erasmus School of Accounting & Assurance 
(ESAA) for providing the (financial) resources that were needed to get this book published. 
 
 
February 2009 
 
Chris Knoops 
Jan Noeverman 
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Accounting conservatism in Europe 
 
Insights in the degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings 
conservatism in financial statements of European companies during 
the period 1991-2005 
 
Remco Brouwer1 
 
 
Executive summary 
This study investigates how the degree of accounting conservatism in the financial 
statements of European companies evolves over time during period 1996-2005. This study 
concludes that the financial statement information of European companies shows a certain 
degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism during period 1991-2005; 
this degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism evolves over time. 
The research findings do not indicate that the introduction of IFRS has reduced the 
differences in the degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism 
between European companies reporting according to IFRS. Finally, the research findings 
indicate that IAS/IFRS based accounting standards have their own characteristics; this 
cause that the degree of accounting conservatism in financial statements differ 
importantly per accounting regulation. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
This study aims to deliver a contribution to the discussion whether IFRS - as a uniform set 
of accounting standards – harmonizes the degree of accounting conservatism in the 
financial statement information of European companies. The study has the following 
research question:   
 
 ‘How does the degree of accounting conservatism in financial statements of European 
companies evolve over time during period 1991-2005 and what is the impact of the 
introduction of IAS/IFRS based accounting standards on the differences in the degree of 
accounting conservatism between European companies?’ 
 
This article presents the result of the study. First, the prior literature is elaborated 
(section 2). Next, the hypotheses (section 3) and the study’s methodology (section 4) are 
presented. Third, the results (section 5) and the conclusions are discussed (section 6). 
Finally, the limitations of the study and three suggestions for further research are 
elaborated (section 7). 
                                             
1  Remco Brouwer studied ‘Business Administration’ and ‘Economics’ at Erasmus University Rotterdam and is 
currently working as accountant at KPMG Accountants N.V. The study is supervised by drs. C.D. Knoops, 
assistant professor at the department of Business Economics at Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
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2.  Prior literature 
For making investment decisions investors use various types of information. Investors’ 
decision making is generally based on information about a firm’s competitive environment 
and future outlook, and on a firm’s financial statement information.  
 
Analysis of the usefulness of the financial statement information is a broad subject in 
market-based accounting research. The usefulness of the financial statement information 
can be analyzed through studying the value relevance of financial statement information. 
Value relevance of financial statement information is in literature defined as the type of 
research that examines the empirical relationship between particular accounting numbers 
and stock market values (or changes in values) (Deegan and Unerman 2006, 377; Scott 
2006, 170).  
The value relevance of financial statement information is affected by conservatism in 
accounting, since this has a negative effect on the role of financial statement proper in 
assisting investors in predicting the firm’s fundamental value.  
 
Conservatism is an inherent property of accounting (Huijgen and Lubberink 2003). The 
conservatism principle is defined as the differential verifiability required for recognition of 
profits versus losses (Basu 1997). In financial reporting bad news tends to be incorporated 
faster in the financial statements than good news; this asymmetry is called the differential 
timeliness of earnings. This means that companies recognize bad news much faster in their 
earnings than good news (Basu 1997). The extreme form of the differential timeliness of 
earnings is the traditional adage: ‘anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses’ (Watts 
2003a). 
 
Many empirical studies show evidence that the degree of accounting conservatism in 
financial statements varies over time (Basu 1997; Givoly and Hayn 2000) and differ per 
country (Ball et al. 2000; Giner and Rees 2001) and company type (Lubberink and Huijgen 
2001). Despite criticism, empirical evidence suggests that conservatism has survived in 
accounting for many centuries, and appears to have increased in the last 30 years (Watts 
2003a).  
Watts (2003a) provides four explanations for accounting conservatism:  
1. Contracting. According to Watts (2003a) contracting is one of the main explanations for 
conservatism. Conservatism in accounting is able to reduce the opportunistic behavior 
of the firm’s management, which is a significant risk for the principals of the firm. 
Problems associated with opportunistic behavior by the firm’s management are 
primarily due to asymmetric information, asymmetric payoffs, limited horizons and 
limited liability. Conservative accounting can be used as a means of addressing these 
moral hazard problems (Watts, 2003a).  
2. Shareholder litigation. Litigation also produces asymmetric payoffs in that overstating 
the firm’s net assets is more likely to generate litigation costs for the firm than 
understating net assets. By understating net assets conservatism reduces the firm’s 
expected litigation costs (Watts, 2003a).  
3. Taxations. Since taxation and reporting are linked, it can also generate conservatism in 
financial reporting. Asymmetric recognition of gains and losses enables managers of 
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profitable firms to reduce the present value of taxes and increase the value of the 
firm. Delaying the recognition of revenues and accelerating the recognition of expense 
defers tax payments (Watts, 2003a). 
4. Accounting regulation. Financial reporting standard-setters and regulators have their 
own incentives to favor conservative accounting and reporting. Just as there is an 
asymmetry in litigation costs, there is an asymmetry in regulators’ costs. Standard-
setters and regulators are likely to face more criticism if firms overstate net assets 
than if they understate net assets. In this way, conservatism in accounting reduces the 
political costs imposed on standard-setters and regulators (Watts, 2003a).  
 
In literature two types of accounting conservatism are distinguished: balance sheet 
conservatism and earnings conservatism (García Lara and Mora 2004). Balance sheet 
conservatism is defined as a persistent understatement of book value of shareholders’ 
equity (Feltham and Ohlson 1995). Balance sheet conservatism can be measured by the 
market-to-book ratio (Givoly and Hayn 2004). Earnings conservatism is defined as a 
timelier recognition of bad news in earnings relative to good news (Basu 1997). Earnings 
conservatism in financial statements can be measured by the accumulation of non-
operating accruals, the timeliness of earnings with respect to bad and good news, and the 
skewness of earnings (Givoly and Hayn 2000; García Lara and Mora 2004).  
 
The outline of factors that are related to accounting conservatism is presented in figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Outline of factors related to conservatism 
 
Please note that in literature the term ‘accounting conservatism’ is not generally adopted; 
in numerous studies the briefer term ‘conservatism’ is used. In this study the term 
‘conservatism’ will also be used more often in favor of the term ‘accounting 
conservatism’, nevertheless the same phenomenon is mentioned. 
 
 
Conservatism
Contracting 
Accounting regulation 
Taxation 
Shareholder litigation 
Explanation of conservatism
Measures of conservatism
Book-to-market ratio
Skewness of earnings
Good news/bad news
Accruals
Earnings 
conservatism
Value relevance 
of earnings
Balance sheet 
conservatism
Value relevance 
of book values
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3.  Hypotheses 
This study aims to gain insight into the degree of accounting conservatism in the financial 
statements of European companies. Empirical evidence of other studies indicates that both 
balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism exists in Europe, and that the 
degree of accounting conservatism differs per country, per industry, and per company. 
Literature indicates that several factors affect the degree of accounting conservatism. 
Based on the results of a conducted literature study this section will present five 
hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis concerns the degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings 
conservatism in financial statements. According to Watts (2003a) accounting conservatism 
is explained by contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation, and accounting regulation. 
Taking the entire set of factors that drive accounting conservatism into account, one can 
conclude that it is likely that the financial statements of European companies will have a 
particular degree of balance sheet conservatism. Furthermore, since empirical evidence of 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) indicates that the degree of balance sheet conservatism in the 
financial statements of a large sample of international companies has increased 
importantly during period 1951-1998, it is reasonable to expect that this also the case in an 
European setting. Therefore the following hypothesis is stated: 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  The degree of balance sheet conservatism in the financial statements 
of European companies increases during period 1991-2005. 
Hypothesis 1b:  The degree of earnings conservatism in the financial statements of 
European companies increases during period 1991-2005. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis concerns the impact of country differences on the degree of 
balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism in financial statements of European 
companies.  
Literature indicates that the degree of accounting conservatism in the financial statements 
of companies differs per country. Empirical evidence of Bushman and Piotroski (2006) 
indicates that bad news is faster reflected in the financial statement of firms located in 
countries with high quality judicial systems than firms located in countries with low quality 
judicial systems. Since the characteristics of the judicial systems differ for each Europe 
(Bushman and Piotroski 2006), one can expect that the degree of balance sheet 
conservatism and earnings conservatism the in financial statements of European companies 
is likely to differ per country in Europe. Therefore the following hypotheses are stated: 
 
Hypothesis 2a:  During period 1991-2005 the degree of balance sheet conservatism in 
  the financial statements of European companies differ significantly 
  per country. 
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Hypothesis 2b:  During period 1991-2005 the degree of earnings conservatism in the 
  financial statements of European companies differ significantly per 
  country. 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis concerns the impact of industry differences on the degree of balance 
sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism in financial statements of European 
companies.  
Since the findings of Pae and Easton (2004) indicate that the degree of both balance sheet 
conservatism and earnings conservatism in financial statements of European companies 
differ per industry, the following hypotheses are stated. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: During period 1991-2005 the degree of balance sheet conservatism in 
  the financial statements of European companies differ significantly 
  per industry. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: During period 1991-2005 the degree of earnings conservatism in the 
  financial statements of European companies differ significantly per 
  industry. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
The fourth hypothesis concerns the impact of company differences on the degree of 
balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism in financial statements of European 
companies.  
Pae and Easton (2004) examined the differences in the degree of accounting conservatism 
across samples with different market to book ratios. Pae and Easton (2004) find that 
accounting tends to be less conservative for firms with negative returns than for firms with 
non-negative returns, but they find no difference in accounting conservatism between 
firms reporting profits and firms reporting losses (Pae and Easton 2004). Since these 
findings indicate that the degree of both balance sheet conservatism and earnings 
conservatism in financial statements of European companies differ for company’s 
profitability, the following hypotheses are stated. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: During period 1991-2005 the degree of balance sheet conservatism in 
  the financial statements of European companies differ significantly for 
  companies with negative returns on share price and companies with 
  non-negative returns on share price. 
  
Hypothesis 4b: During period 1991-2005 the degree of earnings conservatism in the 
  financial statements of European companies differ significantly for 
  companies with negative returns on share price and companies with 
  non-negative returns on share price. 
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Empirical evidence of Pae and Easton (2004) indicates also that firm size does not have a 
significant impact on the degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism. 
Therefore the following hypothesis is stated. 
 
Hypothesis 4c: During period 1991-2005 the degree of balance sheet conservatism in 
  the financial statements of European companies does not significantly 
  for companies’ firm size.  
Hypothesis 4d:  During period 1991-2005 the degree of earnings conservatism in the 
  financial statements of European companies does not differ  
  significantly for companies’ firm size.  
 
Hypothesis 5 
Lastly, the fifth hypothesis concerns the impact of the introduction of IFRS on the degree 
of balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism in financial statements of 
European companies. Since the introduction of several IAS standards during period 1991 - 
2004 and the introduction of IFRS as approved by the European Union in 2005 are expected 
to harmonize the differences in the degree of accounting conservatism in financial 
statements of European companies, the following hypotheses are stated. 
 
Hypothesis 5a: In 2005 the degree of balance sheet conservatism in the financial  
  statements of European companies, which report their financial  
  statements according to IFRS, will reduce significantly. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: In 2005 the degree of earnings conservatism in the financial  
  statements of European companies, which report their financial  
  statements according to IFRS, will reduce significantly.  
 
 
4.  Methodology  
In this section the research design and the research sample are discussed. The research 
design is discussed in section 4.1 and the research sample is discussed 4.2. 
 
4.1  Research design  
To gain insight in how the degree of accounting conservatism in financial statements of 
European companies evolves over time during period 1991-2005 the research model of 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) is used.  
 
This model consists of a regression model and four measures of conservatism. These 
measures are ‘accumulation of non-operating accruals’, ‘differential timeliness of earnings 
with respect to bad and good news’, and ‘skewness of the earnings distribution’, and 
‘market-to-book ratio’. With these four measures it is possible to quantify the level of 
conservatism.  
 
The measures ‘accumulation of non-operating accruals’, ‘differential timeliness of earnings 
with respect to bad and good news’, ‘skewness of the earnings distribution’ function as 
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proxy for measuring the degree of earnings conservatism, while the measure ‘market-to-
book ratio’ functions as proxy for balance sheet conservatism. The four measures are 
elucidated in the next four sections. 
 
4.1.1  Accumulation of accruals 
The proxy ‘accumulation of accruals’ measures the relationship between the earnings and 
cash flow from operations. Whereas earnings are affected by accrual accounting2, cash 
flows from operations is unaffected. Therefore, one may ask whether the losses and 
deterioration in the reported earnings are a reflection of a real fall in the economic 
performance or whether accounting issues drive them.  
Since accrual accounting affects the timeliness of reporting of earnings and cash flows, it 
is important to focus on the timeliness between earnings and cash flows. Earnings can be 
recognized more timely than cash flows. This is the case when contractual performance is 
recorded before cash has been exchanged due to accruals. Then, some discretion exists in 
estimating the appropriate amounts. (Basu 1997; Collins et al 1997; Givoly and Hayn 2000; 
Ball and Shivakumar 2005; García Lara and Mora 2004).  
 
4.1.2  Differential timeliness of earnings with respect to bad and good news  
The proxy ‘differential timeliness of earnings with respect to bad and good news’ measures 
the incremental response to bad news relative to good news. Conservatism leads to 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings with respect to good news and bad news (Basu 1997; 
Givoly and Hayn 2000). Since accountants anticipate future losses but not future profits, 
conservatism results in earnings being more timely and more sensitive concurrently to 
publicly available bad news than good news (Basu 1997). So, financial reporting is 
conservative since it defers recognition of good news and accelerates the recognition of 
bad news (Givoly and Hayn 2000). 
 
The timeliness of earnings with respect to good news and bad news is measured by a cross-
sectional regression analysis:  
  
EPSit/Pi,t-1 = α0 + α1DRit + β0Rit + β1DRit*Rit + εit 
 
Where 
EPSit  = earnings per share of firm i in fiscal year t; 
Pi,t-1  = price per share at the beginning of the fiscal year; 
Rit   = return of firm i over the twelve months beginning nine months prior to the 
  end of fiscal year t; 
DRit  = dummy variable set equal to 1 if Rit is negative and 0 otherwise. 
 
The beta’s (β) from this regression model can be used to measure the relative sensitivity of 
earnings to bad news compared with their sensitivity to good news. The ratio is measured 
by the following formula: (β0+β1)/β0. This ratio is expected to be greater than 1 under 
conservatism (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). 
                                             
2 The net accruals and cash flows sum up to reported earnings. 
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4.1.3  Skewness of earnings distribution 
The proxy ‘skewness of earnings’ measures the relative explanatory power of the 
regression in periods of bad news (negative returns) and good news (positive returns). As 
mentioned in the previous section, the declining profitability is not corresponding with the 
trend of cash flows (Collins et al 1997; Givoly and Hayn 2000). This results in negatively 
skewed earnings, compared to cash flows.  
 
The proxy ‘skewness of earnings’ is defined as E(x-μ)³/σ³, where x is the ROA, and μ and σ 
are estimated by the mean and standard deviation of the ROA distribution; the skewness 
measure of cash flows is defined as E(x-μ)³/σ³, where x is the CFO/Assets, and μ and σ are 
estimated by the mean and standard deviation of the CFO/Assets distribution (Givoly and 
Hayn 2000).  
 
The skewness of earnings distribution can be used to gain insight in the relative change of 
earnings compared to the relative change in cash flows. 
 
4.1.4  Market-to-book ratio 
The proxy ‘market-to-book ratio’ measures the average downward bias in the earning-to-
price ratio due to conservatism. The ratio expresses the difference between the market 
value and the book value of a firm's equity. The gap between the market value and the 
book value of equity is a measure of the degree of reporting conservatism (Givoly and Hayn 
2000; Watts 2003a; Watts, 2003b; Roychowdhury and Watts 2004; García Lara and Mora 
2004). To the extent that equity valuation by investors is based on the present value of 
future cash flows, the market-to-book ratio as well as the earnings multiples would tend to 
be higher when accounting measurement is more conservative (Givoly and Hayn 2000).  
 
The market-to-book ratio is calculated by dividing the market value of the firm (expressed 
by Pi,t-1 multiplied by the number of shares outstanding) divided by the book value of the 
firm (expressed by the value of shareholders’ equity).  
 
4.2  Research sample 
The sample used for the empirical analysis consists of annual financial statement 
information of European companies, which are listed on a European stock exchange during 
period 1991-2005. The period 1991-2005 has been chosen, because the data from the 
Compustat database (2007) consists of data from 1991 till 2005.  
 
The sample is constructed according to the constant sample technique. The sample 
consists of commercial and industrial firms with financial statement information about the 
fiscal year 2004. Financial institutions, like banks, insurance companies, and investment 
funds, are excluded from the sample, because these firms incorporate – on large scale - 
unrealized stock earnings as earnings in their profit and loss account. The exclusion of 
financial institutions from the sample is common for accounting conservatism studies.  
 
Outliers, defined as unusual data values or extreme observations, are excluded from the 
sample, because they may bias the results of the analyses.  
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The sample corrected for outliers consists of 3.978 companies and contains in total 28.920 
firm years.  
 
The financial statement information in the sample is presented in the local currency. To 
allow for a cross-sectional aggregation all of the flow variables (like earnings and cash 
flows) are for each year deflated by the total assets at the beginning of that year.  
 
 
5.  Results 
This section will present the empirical results of the conducted analyses. Section 3 has 
presented the hypotheses of this study. This section will discuss whether these stated 
hypotheses are valid. The section will close with a summary. 
 
5.1  Overview of development in the degree of accounting conservatism in Europe 
This section will discuss in general the development of the degree of accounting 
conservatism in the financial statements of European companies.  
 
Development in the degree of balance sheet conservatism in European companies 
Analysis of the development in the market-to-book ratios suggests that the market-to-book 
ratio has on average a value of 2.4. Next, the analysis shows that the market-to-book ratio 
is increasing during period 1996 till 1999, sharply decreasing during period 2000 till 2002, 
and increasing again in period 2002-2005 to its position of 1999. The developments in the 
market-to-book ratio are displayed in table 5.1 and figure 5.1. The development in the 
return on share price is displayed in figure 5.2.  
 
Table 5.1. Mean and standard deviation of the market-to-book ratio, by subperiod and 
year  
 
 
Mean
Standard 
deviation Mean
Standard 
deviation
Subperiod
1991-1995 2,40 4,03 2,48 5,17
1996-2000 3,19 6,80 3,02 6,96
2001-2005 2,43 5,17 2,38 5,22
Year
1991 2,11 3,13 2,35 4,88
1992 2,17 2,99 2,01 2,74
1993 2,79 4,35 2,74 5,03
1994 2,36 4,00 2,75 6,74
1995 2,47 4,75 2,41 4,95
1996 2,94 6,41 2,65 6,58
1997 3,17 7,00 3,05 7,49
1998 3,47 7,06 3,37 7,58
1999 3,55 8,09 3,35 7,56
2000 2,84 5,41 2,67 5,57
2001 2,30 4,77 2,31 5,05
2002 1,61 3,30 1,58 3,76
2003 2,40 5,71 2,37 5,60
2004 2,73 5,46 2,73 5,46
2005 3,71 6,66 3,71 6,66
Market-to-book-ratio Market-to-book-ratio
 
Constant Sample Total Sample
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Figure 5.1. Development of the average market-to-book ratio (mean market-to-book: 
2.67) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Development of the average return on share price (mean return on share 
price: 0.16) 
 
 
The empirical results of the conducted tests indicate that all companies show on average 
balance sheet conservatism during period 1991-2005; all the companies have on average a 
market-to-book ratio greater than 1. However the findings do not indicate a trend that the 
balance sheet conservatism increases over time during period 1991-2005.  Therefore, the 
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empirical findings do not support the hypothesis 1a, which state that the degree of balance 
sheet conservatism in the financial statements of European companies increases during 
period 1991-2005.  
 
Development in the degree of earnings conservatism in European companies 
This section discusses the development in the degree of earnings conservatism in the 
financial statements of European companies during 1991-2005. The scores on the measures 
‘accumulation of accruals’, ‘differential timeliness of earnings with regard to good news 
and bad news’, and ‘skewness of earnings’ indicate that the financial reporting of 
European companies show during period 1991-2005 a certain degree of accounting 
conservatism. Next, the empirical results indicate that during period 1995-2001 the degree 
of accounting conservatism is on average at the same level. During period 1995-1997 and 
period 1999-2003 the scores on the three measures are volatile; this indicates that the 
degree of earnings conservatism changes over time. Despite of these strong mutations, the 
scores on the three measures at year 1991 are (on average) equal to the scores at year 
2005 (see table 5.2, figure 5.3, figure 5.4, and figure 5.5).  
 
Consequently, the empirical findings do not support hypotheses 1b, which state that the 
degree of earnings conservatism in the financial statements of European companies 
increases during period 1991-2005.  
 
Table 5.2 Accumulation of accruals per year 
 
Year Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation
1991 0.092 0.067 0.011 0.126 0.038 0.060
1992 0.084 0.073 0.013 0.063 0.030 0.066
1993 0.084 0.079 0.019 0.073 0.031 0.075
1994 0.096 0.067 0.019 0.066 0.043 0.063
1995 0.096 0.077 0.016 0.065 0.042 0.073
1996 0.091 0.142 0.016 0.140 0.040 0.138
1997 0.088 0.187 0.013 0.178 0.035 0.202
1998 0.083 0.142 0.014 0.145 0.032 0.138
1999 0.075 0.147 0.023 0.138 0.023 0.144
2000 0.049 0.225 0.021 0.143 -0.004 0.243
2001 -0.008 0.542 0.014 0.225 -0.073 0.556
2002 -0.030 1.033 0.004 0.901 -0.113 1.094
2003 0.019 0.809 0.025 0.683 -0.034 0.541
2004 0.034 0.917 0.013 0.711 -0.024 0.917
2005 0.079 0.118 0.014 0.073 0.038 0.119
Total 0.045 0.582 0.016 0.467 -0.012 0.562
Cash Flow of Operations-to-
Total Assets Total Accruals-to-Total Assets Net Income-to-Total Assets
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Figure 5.3. Mean of Cash Flow of Operations, Net Income, and Total Accruals (all 
variables are divided by total assets) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Scores on the measure ‘differential timeliness of earnings’ with regard to 
good news and bad news 
 
 
* The (β0+ β1)/β0  values from regression analysis EPSit/Pi,t-1 = α0 + α1DRit + β0Rit + β1DRit*Rit + εit  are used to 
measure the relative sensitivity of earnings to bad news compared with their sensitivity to good news.  
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Figure 5.5. Skewness of Net Income and Cash Flow from Operations (variables are 
ratios) 
 
 
 
5.2  The impact of country differences on the degree of accounting conservatism 
This section will discuss to what extend the development in the degree of accounting 
conservatism in the financial statements of European companies differs per country.  
 
Impact of country differences on the degree of balance sheet conservatism 
The market-to-book ratio scores indicate that the degree of balance sheet conservatism in 
the financial statements of European companies differs more than 10% from each other. 
Companies in more developed countries, like West-European countries, have a higher 
market-to-book ratio than companies in less developed countries, like the East-European 
countries (see figure 5.6).  
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Figure 5.6 Average market-to-book ratio per sub period per country 
 
 
These findings do support hypothesis 2a, which states that during period 1991-2005 the 
degree of balance sheet conservatism in the financial statements of European companies 
differ significantly per country. 
 
Impact of country differences on the degree of earnings conservatism 
The research results regarding the measure ‘differential timeliness of earnings with 
respect to the recognition of good news and bad news’ does not indicate that country 
differences do have an influence on the differential timeliness of earning with respect to 
the recognition of good news and bad news. However the two other measures 
‘accumulation of accruals’ and ‘the skewness of earnings’ indicate an important impact of 
country differences on the degree of earnings conservatism (see table 5.4, and table 5.5).  
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Table 5.4 Accumulation of accruals per industry 
 
Industry Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Agriculture 0.033 0.133 0.000 0.126 0.013 0.136
Mining and Construction 0.035 0.740 0.018 0.464 -0.006 0.785
Food 0.096 0.071 0.018 0.051 0.040 0.066
Textiles and Printing 0.081 0.105 0.021 0.071 0.025 0.108
Chemicals 0.100 0.132 0.031 0.120 0.034 0.073
Pharmaceuticals -0.009 0.289 0.022 0.089 -0.054 0.291
Extractive Industries 0.069 0.211 0.009 0.189 0.015 0.210
Durable Manufactures 0.066 0.631 0.009 0.564 0.011 0.632
Computers -0.052 0.737 0.024 0.668 -0.127 0.543
Transportation 0.077 0.142 0.032 0.129 0.010 0.142
Retail 0.065 0.177 0.008 0.078 0.020 0.183
Insurance and Real Estate -0.061 0.557 0.000 0.361 -0.089 0.619
Services 0.048 0.271 0.031 0.164 -0.024 0.287
Others -0.006 1.472 -0.024 1.069 -0.056 1.469
Total 0.045 0.582 0.016 0.467 -0.012 0.562
Cash Flow of Operations-to-
Total Assets Total Accruals-to-Total Assets Net Income-to-Total Assets
 
 
 
Table 5.5. Difference in skewness of earnings by industry 
Country
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Agriculture -0.06 0.61 -0.03 0.46 -0.02 0.14
Mining and Construction -0.09 1.60 -0.12 2.63 0.03 -1.03
Food 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.00
Textiles and Printing -0.03 0.67 0.00 0.44 -0.03 0.22
Chemicals 0.00 0.06 0.22 5.48 -0.22 -5.42
Pharmaceuticals -0.60 6.14 -0.44 5.21 -0.17 0.93
Extractive Industries -0.35 4.72 -0.27 3.96 -0.09 0.76
Durable Manufactures -0.12 3.26 -0.06 2.35 -0.06 0.91
Computers -3.47 38.00 -2.53 33.29 -0.94 4.70
Transportation -0.10 2.22 -0.04 1.89 -0.06 0.33
Retail -0.47 13.41 -0.35 11.59 -0.12 1.81
Insurance and Real Estate -5.21 51.44 -5.94 53.06 0.73 -1.62
Services -0.56 11.19 -0.32 7.82 -0.24 3.37
Others -0.47 11.23 -0.38 9.84 -0.09 1.39
Total -0.69 16.04 -0.52 14.42 -0.17 1.61
Skewness of Net Income 
(NI)
Skewness of Cash Flow of 
Operations (CFO)
Difference in Skewness 
between NI and CFO
 
 
These findings support hypothesis 2b, which states that during period 1991-2005 the 
degree of balance sheet conservatism in the financial statements of European companies 
differ significantly from each other. 
 
5.3  The impact of industry differences on the degree of accounting conservatism 
This section discusses to which extend the degree of accounting conservatism in financial 
statements of European countries differ per industry.  
 
Impact of industry differences on the degree of balance sheet conservatism 
Analysis of the average market-to-book ratio for period 1991-2005 indicates that the 
market-to-book ratio differs importantly per industry. The difference in market-to-ratios 
between industries is in many cases more than 10%. Companies operating in the 
pharmaceutical industry, computer industry, and service industry have the highest scores 
on balance sheet conservatism (see table 5.6).  
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Table 5.6 Market-to-book ratio by industry 
Industry
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Agriculture 2.32 6.58
Mining and Construction 1.76 2.26
Food 2.08 3.56
Textiles and Printing 2.22 5.44
Chemicals 2.67 6.72
Pharmaceuticals 4.59 9.37
Extractive Industries 2.69 4.58
Durable Manufactures 2.38 4.39
Computers 3.55 7.49
Transportation 2.82 4.60
Retail 2.48 4.84
Insurance and Real Estate 2.31 3.88
Services 3.38 7.95
Others 2.78 5.62
Total 2.69 5.68
Market-to-book ratio
 
 
These findings support hypothesis 3a, which states that during period 1991-2005 the 
degree of balance sheet conservatism in the financial statements of European companies 
differ significantly per industry.  
 
Impact of industry differences on the degree of earnings conservatism 
The scores with regard to the measure ‘accumulation of accruals’ and ‘the skewness of 
earnings’ indicate an important impact of country differences on the degree of earnings 
conservatism. However, the measure ‘differential timeliness of earnings with respect to 
the recognition of good news and bad news’ does not indicate that country differences 
have influence on the differential timeliness of earning with respect to the recognition of 
good news and bad news.  
 
The findings indicate that the differences between industries with respect to the degree of 
earnings conservatism in financial statements of European companies differ more than 
10%. An interesting finding is that the financial statements of European companies 
operating in the computer industry and the pharmaceutical industry have, in comparison 
with other industries, a relative high degree of earnings conservatism. The findings support 
hypothesis 3b, which states that during period 1991-2005 the degree of earnings 
conservatism in the financial statements of European companies differ significantly per 
industry. 
 
5.4  The impact of company differences on the degree of accounting conservatism 
This section discusses the impact of company differences on the degree of accounting 
conservatism in the financial statement of European companies. First, the impact of a 
firm’s profitability level on the degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings 
conservatism is discussed (section 5.4.1). Next, the impact of a firm’s size on the degree 
of earnings conservatism is discussed (section 5.4.2).  
 
5.4.1  Impact of company’s profitability level on the degree of accounting conservatism 
This section discusses the impact of a company’s profitability level on the degree of 
accounting conservatism in financial statement information.  
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Impact of company’s profitability level on the degree of balance sheet conservatism 
The market-to-book ratios indicate that the financial statement information of companies 
with a positive return on share price has a lower degree of balance sheet conservatism 
than companies with a negative return on share price (see table 5.7).  
 
Table 5.7. Market-to-book ratio per profitability level 
Profitability
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Profit 3.03 5.94
Loss 2.20 5.20
Total 2.63 5.60
Market-to-book ratio
 
 
This finding supports hypothesis 4a, which states that during period 1991-2005 the degree 
of balance sheet conservatism in the financial statements of European companies differ 
significantly for companies with negative returns on share price and companies with non-
negative returns on share price. 
 
Impact of company’s profitability level on the degree of earnings conservatism 
The measure ‘accumulation of accruals’ and ‘the skewness of earnings’ indicate that the 
degree of earnings conservatism differ importantly for profitable companies and non-
profitable companies.  The findings indicate that companies with an average positive 
return on share price have a higher degree of earnings conservatism in their financial 
statements than companies with on average a negative return on share price. The 
difference between profitable companies and non-profitable companies in the 
accumulation of accruals ratio and the skewness of earnings ratio is larger than 10%. 
 
The measure ‘differential timeliness of earnings with respect to the recognition of good 
news and bad news’ does not provide insight in the impact of the positive or negative 
returns, since the regression model has not the required number of cases for performing a 
valid regression analysis.  
 
The empirical findings regarding the relationship between the return on share price and 
the degree of earnings conservatism supports hypothesis 4b, which states that during 
period 1991-2005 the degree of earnings conservatism in the financial statements of 
European companies differs significantly for companies with negative returns on share 
price and companies with non-negative returns on share price. 
 
5.4.2  Impact of firm size on the degree of accounting conservatism 
This section discusses the impact of a company’s size on the degree of accounting 
conservatism in financial statement information.  
 
Impact of firm size on the degree of balance sheet conservatism 
The scores on the measure ‘market-to-book ratio’ indicate that the market-to-book ratios 
differ importantly for firm size (see table 5.8).  
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Table 5.8. Market-to-book ratio per firm size category 
 
Scale Mean
Standard 
Deviation
1 2,65                5,55                   
2 6,43                12,64                
Total 2,69                5,68                   
Explanation of used abbreviations:
1
2
Category of companies with a total assets value between 0 and 1 
million.
Category of companies with a total assets value between 1 million 
and 1 billion.
Market-to-book ratio
 
 
The differences in market-to-book ratio between small companies and large companies 
indicate that the differences in the degree of balance sheet conservatism between large 
companies and small companies are larger than 10%. This finding does not support 
hypothesis 4c, which states that during period 1991-2005 the degree of balance sheet 
conservatism in the financial statements of European companies does not differ 
significantly for companies’ firm size. 
 
Impact of firm size on the degree of earnings conservatism 
The scores on the measures ‘accumulation of accruals’ and ‘skewness of earnings’ indicate 
an important impact of firm size on the degree of earnings conservatism (see table 5.9 and 
table 5.10). However, the scores on the measure ‘differential timeliness of earnings with 
respect to the recognition of good news and bad news’ does not indicate that firm size 
influence the differential timeliness of earning with respect to the recognition of good 
news and bad news.  
 
Table 5.9. Accumulation of accruals per firm size category 
 
Code Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation
1 0,044 0,592 0,015 0,475 -0,014 0,572
2 0,073 0,080 0,024 0,068 0,022 0,073
Total 0,045 0,582 0,016 0,467 -0,012 0,562
Explanation of used abbreviations:
1
2
Cash Flow of Operations-to-Total 
Assets Total Accruals-to-Total Assets Net Income-to-Total Assets
Category of companies with a total assets value between 0 and 1 million.
Category of companies with a total assets value between 1 million and 1 billion.  
 
 
Table 5.10. Difference in skewness of earnings per firm size category 
Scale
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Mean Standard 
Deviation
1 0,72-                  16,31                   0,54-                  14,67                0,18-                   1,64                  
2 0,01-                  0,11                      0,01                  0,08                   0,02-                   0,03                  
Total 0,69-                  16,04                   0,52-                  14,42                0,17-                   1,61                  
Explanation of used abbreviations:
1
2
Skewness of Net Income (NI) Skewness of Cash Flow of 
Operations (CFO)
Difference in Skewness between 
NI and CFO
Category of companies with a total assets value between 0 and 1 million.
Category of companies with a total assets value between 1 million and 1 billion.  
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Based on the findings of the proxies ‘accumulation of accruals’ and ‘the skewness of 
earnings’, one can conclude that firm size influence the degree of earnings conservatism. 
This finding does not support hypothesis 4d, which state that during period 1991-2005 the 
degree of earnings conservatism in the financial statements of European companies does 
not differ significantly for companies’ firm size.  
 
5.5  The impact of the introduction of IFRS on the degree of accounting conservatism 
This section discusses to which extend the degree of balance sheet conservatism and 
earnings conservatism in financial statements of European countries is affected by the 
introduction of IFRS.  
 
Impact of the introduction of IFRS on the degree of balance sheet conservatism 
The market-to-book ratios indicate that the accounting standards which are in accordance 
with IAS/IFRS, have on average a lower market-to-book ratio than accounting standards 
based on US GAAP (see table 5.11). However, the market-to-book ratios indicate also that 
the domestic standards which are not based on IAS/IFRS or US GAAP show on average a 
lower market-to-book ratio than accounting standards, which are in accordance with 
IAS/IFRS.  
 
Table 5.11. Difference in market-to-book ratio between different accounting standards 
 
Code Description Mean Standard 
Deviation
DA Domestic standards generally in accordance with International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines
2.97 4.27
DI Domestic standards generally in accordance with IASC 
guidelines 
3.11 6.76
DO Domestic standards generally in accordance with OECD 
guidelines 
2.12 0.94
DS Domestic standards 2.56 5.35
DT Domestic standards in accordance with principles generally 
accepted in the in the United States 
2.86 3.92
DU Domestic Standards generally in accordance with United 
States GAAP
3.67 7.73
US United States’ standards 3.38 6.68
Total 2.69 5.68
Market-to-book ratio
 
Source: Compustat Database (2007) 
 
Based on these findings, one can conclude that that introduction of IFRS - as an accounting 
standard introduced by IAS/IFRS - has not significantly reduced the differences in the 
degree of balance sheet conservatism in financial statement information of European 
companies. Next, the analysis does not indicate that the difference in the degree of 
balance sheet conservatism between European companies reporting under IFRS is reduced 
in 2005 with more than 10%. Consequently, the findings do not support hypothesis 5a, 
which states that in 2005 the degree of balance sheet conservatism in the financial 
statements of European companies, which report their financial statements according to 
IFRS, will reduce significantly.  
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Impact of the introduction of IFRS on the degree of earnings conservatism 
The scores on the measures ‘accumulation of accruals’ and ‘skewness of earnings’ 
indicates an important impact of accounting methods and accounting standards on the 
degree of earnings conservatism (see table 5.12, and table 5.13) 
 
Table 5.12. Accumulation of accruals per accounting standard 
 
Code Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation
DA 0,0624 0,0622 0,0278 0,0438 0,0193 0,0439
DI 0,0587 0,1924 0,0278 0,1093 -0,0003 0,2150
DO 0,0908 0,0421 0,0406 0,1101 0,0168 0,0713
DS 0,0444 0,6456 0,0121 0,5213 -0,0117 0,6189
DT 0,1071 0,0544 0,0476 0,0723 0,0366 0,0782
DU 0,0690 0,1058 0,0245 0,0836 0,0104 0,1121
US -0,0467 0,3895 0,0387 0,2395 -0,1311 0,4685
Total 0,0449 0,5823 0,0157 0,4667 -0,0124 0,5621
Explanation of used abbreviations:
DA
DI
DO
DS
DT
DU
US United States’ standards.
Domestic standards generally in accordance with International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines.
Domestic standards generally in accordance with IASC guidelines.
Domestic standards generally in accordance with OECD guidelines 
Domestic standards.
Domestic standards in accordance with principles generally accepted in the in the United States.
Domestic Standards generally in accordance with United States GAAP.
Cash Flow of Operations-to-Total 
Assets Total Accruals-to-Total Assets Net Income-to-Total Assets
 
Source: Compustat Database (2007) 
  
Table 5.13. The difference in skewness of earnings between accounting standards 
 
Code Description Mean Standard 
Deviation
Mean Standard 
Deviation
DA Domestic standards generally in accordance with International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
DI Domestic standards generally in accordance with IASC 
guidelines 
-0.42 8.52 -0.21 5.35
DO Domestic standards generally in accordance with OECD 
guidelines 
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
DS Domestic standards -0.66 15.64 -0.55 15.44
DT Domestic standards in accordance with principles generally 
accepted in the in the United States 
0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03
DU Domestic Standards generally in accordance with United 
States GAAP
-0.01 0.09 0.02 0.08
US United States’ standards -3.95 44.35 -1.83 24.06
Total -0.69 16.04 -0.52 14.42
Skewness of Net Income 
(NI)
Skewness of Cash Flow of 
Operations (CFO)
 
Source: Compustat Database (2007) 
 
The measure ‘differential timeliness of earnings with respect to the recognition of good 
news and bad news’ was not able to provide insight in the relationship between the 
independent variable return on share price and the dependent variables accounting 
methods and accounting standards.  
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Based on the findings of the proxies ‘accumulation of accruals’ and ‘the skewness of 
earnings’, one can conclude that both accounting method and accounting standards 
influence the degree of earnings conservatism. However, the findings do not provide 
insight in whether the introduction of IFRS harmonizes the differences in the degree of 
earnings conservatism between European companies reporting under IFRS. As a 
consequence, the findings do not support hypothesis 5b, which states that due to the 
introduction of IFRS the difference in the degree of earnings conservatism between 
European companies reporting under IFRS will reduce importantly in 2005.  
 
 
6.  Analysis and conclusions 
The previous section discussed the research findings about how the degree of accounting 
conservatism in Europe differs for country characteristics, industry characteristics, 
company characteristics, and accounting regulation characteristics. This section presents 
an analysis of the research findings. The section closes with an overview of the main 
conclusions of the study. 
 
6.1  General developments in the degree of accounting conservatism in Europe 
With regard to the development in the degree of accounting conservatism in the financial 
statements of European companies, the analysis indicate that the financial statements of 
all companies in the sample show on average a certain degree of accounting conservatism 
during period 1991-2005. Next, the empirical results indicate that during period 1995-2001 
the degree of accounting conservatism is on average at the same level. This is in contrast 
with the findings of Givoly and Hayn (2000), which indicates an increase in conservatism. 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) noted an increase of the market-to-book ratio since the mid 
1980’s, heading to a ratio of 3.5 in the late 1990’s.  
The empirical results indicate an increase of the market-to-book ratio during period 1990-
1999; in 1999 the average market-to-book ratio is 3.5. However during period 1999-2003 
the market-to-book ratio declined sharply, followed by strong increase of the market-to-
book ratio during period 2002-2005. 
 
6.2  The impact of country differences on the degree of accounting conservatism 
The research findings indicate that the degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings 
conservatism differ per country. The differences in the degree of balance sheet 
conservatism and earnings conservatism between countries are explained by accounting 
regulation differences that exists between countries, and external economical factors. 
Country differences like the quality of the national judicial systems, the degree of 
development of national capital markets, the quality and the quantity of information are 
likely to affect the market value of listed firms. These factors do influence the market-to-
book ratio scores, and therefore influence the results of the analysis of the difference 
between countries in the degree of balance sheet conservatism in financial statement 
information of European companies. 
Next, the research findings indicate that differences in disclosure policies per country 
might affect the usefulness of financial statement information.  
 
 22 
6.3  The impact of industry differences on the degree of earnings conservatism 
The research findings indicate that the degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings 
conservatism differ not only per country but also per industry. With regard to the 
differences in the degree of balance sheet conservatism, the empirical findings indicate 
that companies operating in the pharmaceutical industry, computer industry, and service 
industry have the highest scores on balance sheet conservatism. These findings are in 
accordance with the findings of Pae and Easton (2004). This high degree of balance sheet 
conservatism is likely to be caused by the factor ‘non-recognition of intangible assets’. 
Companies operating in the pharmaceutical industry, the computer industry, and the 
service industry are characterized by major investments in R&D in order to develop new 
products and services. Accounting regulation has strict regulation for recognizing 
intangible assets; this can cause the non-recognition of intangible assets, which can widen 
the gap between a firm’s market value and the book value of equity. 
 
The differences in the degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism 
between industries are likely to be primary influenced by accounting regulation, which 
impacts the degree in accounting conservatism differently per industry – since each 
specific industry has it own characteristics. An example of the impact of accounting 
regulation on the differences in the degree of balance sheet conservatism in financial 
statements are the differences in reporting accounting regulation, which result in an asset 
understatement. Givoly, Hayn and Natarajan (2007) state that balance sheet conservatism 
through assets understatement can easily be caused by choosing to expense investments in 
certain assets (e.g. R&D) or accelerate the recognition of certain costs (e.g. through use of 
accelerated depreciation or LIFO).  
 
6.4  The impact of company differences on the degree of accounting conservatism 
With regard to the impact of company’s profitability level on the degree of accounting 
conservatism, the research findings indicate that financial statement information of 
companies with a positive return on share price has a lower degree of balance sheet 
conservatism than companies with a negative return on share price. Next, the research 
findings indicate that companies with an average positive return on share price have a 
higher degree of earnings conservatism in their financial statements than companies with 
on average a negative return on share price.  
 
Regarding the impact of firm size on the degree of accounting conservatism, the results of 
conducted analysis indicate that the degree of balance sheet conservatism is greater for 
large companies than for small companies. Next, the research findings indicate that firm 
size impacts also the degree of earnings conservatism in financial statements.  
 
These findings is in contrast with the findings of Pae and Easton (2004), who find in their 
study that company size has not an strong influence on the degree of balance sheet 
conservatism and earnings conservatism in financial statement information. 
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6.5  Impact of the introduction of IFRS on the degree of accounting conservatism 
The research findings do not indicate that the introduction of IFRS reduces importantly the 
difference in the degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism between 
European companies reporting under IFRS. These findings are not in accordance with the 
expectations of Van der Tas (2006) and Vergoossen (2006), who expected IFRS to 
harmonize the differences in financial reporting in Europe.  
 
Regarding the investigation of the impact of the introduction of IFRS on the degree of 
accounting conservatism in the financial statements, one have to consider that the impact 
of the introduction of IFRS on the degree of accounting conservatism might not be properly 
measurable by the applied four measures of Givoly and Hayn (2000). The explanation for 
the failure of the measure to detect accounting conservatism is caused by the interference 
of other external economical factors, like technological breakthroughs, or national or 
international political developments. 
 
6.6  Conclusion 
The main conclusion of this study is that the research findings indicate that the financial 
statement information of European companies have during period 1991-2005 a certain 
degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism. The research findings 
indicate that the degree of both balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism 
evolves over time. However, the research findings do not indicate that the degree of 
balance sheet conservatism or earnings conservatism increase over time.  
 
Next, the research findings reveal that country characteristics, industry characteristics, 
company characteristics and accounting regulation characteristics have a significant 
impact on the degree of accounting conservatism.  
 
Finally, the research findings do not indicate that the introduction of IFRS or other 
IAS/IFRS based accounting standards have reduced the difference in the degree of balance 
sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism between European companies reporting 
under IFRS.  
 
 
7.  Discussion 
This section discusses the limitations of this study and presents three suggestions for 
further research.  
 
7.1  Limitations 
This study has two important limitations. The first limitation of this study is that the time 
period is limited to 1991-2005. This restricts the potential insight into the impact of the 
introduction of IFRS on the degree of balance sheet conservatism and earnings 
conservatism. Next, the study is also limited by the accuracy of the four measures of 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) in measuring accounting conservatism. Since the four measures are 
influenced by external economical factors, they only give indications for the degree of 
both earnings conservatism and balance sheet conservatism in financial statements.  
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7.2  Suggestions for further research 
Analysis of the study results identified three new suggestions for further research. First, it 
is interesting to study in more detail which particular country characteristics, industry 
characteristics, company characteristics and accounting regulation characteristics have the 
strongest influence on the degree of accounting conservatism in financial statement 
information.  
 
Next, it is also interesting to investigate how the introduction of IFRS will impact the 
degree of accounting conservatism in financial reporting over time. From a standards 
setting perspective it is relevant to gain insight in whether IFRS will harmonize the 
differences in the degree of accounting conservatism.  
 
Finally, from a scientific point of view it is also relevant to study how accounting 
conservatism can be measured more accurately. Since a large set of factors influence the 
relation between return on share price and financial statement information, one can 
question to which extend we are measuring the developments in the degree of accounting 
conservatism in a proper way. More empirical insight regarding measuring the degree of 
accounting conservatism in financial statement information is welcome. 
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Cooking the books around initial public 
offerings 
 
A study about the pervasiveness of earnings management and 
investor protection regulations 
 
 
Jasper Seger3 
 
 
Executive summary 
Most prior studies suggest that firms opportunistically increase their earnings around an 
initial public offering (IPO). With a sample of 512 IPOs in 24 countries worldwide I find that 
IPO firms that are under suspicion of such behaviour, represent only a small proportion 
(+/-10%) of the total sample. My findings challenge the opportunistic perspective on 
earnings management and suggest that the information perspective is more pronounced. 
Furthermore, I find no evidence for a positive relationship between low investor protection 
regulations and opportunistic earnings management. It seems that stronger enforcement of 
investor protection laws do not counter self-interested behaviour.   
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Earnings management received more and more attention in the accounting literature. In 
the context of initial public offerings (IPOs) most researchers found pervasive evidence for 
earnings management (Friedlan 1994; Teoh et al. 1998, 1998a; Roosenboom et al. 2003; 
Pastor and Poveda 2006). They explain that IPO firms (also shortened as IPOs) use their 
managerial discretion to increase earnings. Researchers interpreted the evidence by 
suggesting that these income increasing activities are driven by opportunistic behaviour. 
IPOs are particularly liable to such behaviour because both incentives and possibilities are 
offered around the IPO process. An important incentive for IPOs is to achieve high offer 
prices when offering their shares to the public. Possibilities for opportunistic earnings 
management exist, because there is an unusually high level of information asymmetry 
around that time. Managers have the possibility to choose accounting methods that benefit 
their own interest. For investors it is difficult to access if those accounting methods reflect 
the true economic performance. (Ahmad-Zaluki et al. 2007, 1) 
 
Recently Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 30-32) doubted the evidence in IPO earnings 
management research. First, they did not found pervasive evidence of earnings 
                                             
3 This paper is based on my master thesis completed at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. I thank my 
supervisor drs. Rob van der Wal RA for his guidance and support. Jasper Seger is associate at the assurance 
department of PricewaterhouseCoopers, Rotterdam. 
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management in their study on the U.K. market. Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007, 31) stated that 
differences in pervasive earnings management evidence, can be the result of different 
environmental and company specific factors. For example, they found that earnings 
management is only pervasive in a period of an economic stress (East Asia crisis of 1997 
and 1998). Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 32) secondly stipulated that the appearance of 
discretionary accruals (which are frequently used as indicators of earnings management) is 
not caused by managerial self-interest, but by working capital changes that are 
endogenous to IPOs. Therefore they supported the “information perspective” on earnings. 
This perspective explains that managers have the opportunity to use their discretion 
(judgements and estimates), to manage earnings to a level that reflect the firms’ true 
economic performance4. In this scenario investors face fewer costs, because they do not 
have to search for additional information from other sources. 
 
Based on a sample of 512 companies that went public from 2001 to 2004 on worldwide 
stock markets, this positive accounting research presents new evidence regarding these 
debates. This paper first re-examines the extent of IPOs that engage in income increasing 
earnings management5. This paper re-examines the subjects with a more recent sample 
and with better accrual estimating models, compared with most prior research. Second, 
with reference to Ball and Shivakumar (2006), this paper re-examines on the basis of three 
conditions the extent of IPOs that are under suspicion of opportunistic earnings 
management. The three conditions are: 
 
1) Significantly positive discretionary accruals and exceptionally high earnings in excess of 
operating cash flow, in the year that earnings management is applied. 
2) Negative discretionary accruals and exceptionally low earnings in post-earnings 
management periods. 
3) Exceptionally inferior operating performance in post-earnings management periods. 
 
Re-examining both these subjects is necessary, because criticism like Ball and Shivakumar 
(2006) showed that present evidence is far from unequivocal. New evidence will shed more 
light on the pervasiveness of earnings management in general and of opportunistic 
behaviour specifically. 
 
Third, in continuation of Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007, 31) who advised for further 
investigations about environmental and company factors, this paper examines the 
relationship between investor protection regulations and earnings management. This paper 
also examines if these regulations constrain opportunistic behaviour. To the author’s best 
knowledge, are these investigations unique in the IPO context. 
 
                                             
4 See Deegan (2000) and Beneish (2001) for more information about the opportunistic and information 
perspectives. 
5 This paper does not examine other forms of earnings management, for example conservative accounting. This 
paper uses for the sake of simplicity the term “earnings management” as a synonym for the term “income 
increasing earnings management”. 
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Insight in the above mentioned subjects accesses in which extent earnings management 
may be detrimental to investors and other stakeholders, and in which extent investor 
protection regulations constrain managerial self-interested behaviour. Information about 
these subjects helps standards to determine how much discretion should be given to 
managers and whether new disclosures or standards are required, or whether existing 
standards can be maintained. It helps issuing firms about how discretionary accruals affect 
the post-issue performance, and might affect the cost of equity. And it helps investors and 
other stakeholders to distinguish IPOs that engage in earnings management, by analysing 
their accruals and financial position. (Teoh et al. 1998, 202-203; Healy and Wahlen 1999, 
3) 
 
The above mentioned research subjects lead to the following research question: 
 
“Do firms engage in income increasing earnings management based on accruals around 
IPOs? If yes, what is the extent of firms that are under suspicion of opportunistic 
behaviour? What is the relationship between investor protection regulations and earnings 
management around IPOs? And are there indications that these regulations constrain 
opportunistic behaviour?” 
 
To answer the research question this paper first describes in section 2, how earnings 
management is defined and what accruals are. It then describes which motivations IPOs 
may have to engage in earnings management. Section 2 provides also a briefly literature 
study and shows how this paper contributes to prior literature. The section ends with 
explaining the relation between earnings management and investor protection regulations. 
Section 3 describes the hypothesises that are formed and the sample selection and data. It 
also describes how earnings management is measured in this paper. The results and 
analyses of the empirical research are provided in section 4. This section explains these 
results with expectations, and with conclusions from prior research. It also gives 
suggestions for further research. Section 5 stipulates the conclusions of this paper. 
 
 
2.  Prior literature 
 
2.1  Earnings management around IPOs 
Schipper (1989, 92) defined earnings management as “A purposeful intervention in the 
external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain”. 
Accrual accounting is one of the methods that managers have to engage in earnings 
management6. This paper focuses on this method. Accruals are the differences between a 
periods’ earnings and cash flows. Accruals can be split up into non-discretionary accruals 
and discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are determined by managers. Non-
discretionary accruals are imposed by the situation and the sector in which a firm is acting, 
by the scale of the firm, by the total net revenue and by the value of the assets. Most 
                                             
6 See Stolowy and Breton (2000) and Mohanram (2003) for an overview of earnings management methods. 
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researchers use significantly positive discretionary accruals as an indicator for earnings 
management. (Teoh et al. 1998, 203; Mohanram 2003, 5) 
 
Ritter (1998, 5) defined an IPO as: “An IPO occurs when a security is sold to the general 
public for the first time, with the expectation that a liquid market will develop”. There 
are some explanations why IPOs engage in earnings management. Most of the following 
explanations are related with opportunistic earnings management, not with informative. 
Firstly, there is pressure from key players in the IPO process to report favorable earnings, 
for example from the underwriter and underwriting investment bankers.  Secondly, the 
‘lock-up’ period offers an incentive. When managers want to sell their shares with a 
maximum profit after the lock-up period, they have the incentive to maintain high 
earnings after the issuing. Thirdly, the reliability of the investors offers an incentive. 
Investment bankers make predictions for the future. The firm wants to obtain these 
predictions to avoid a decline in the confidentiality of the investors. Investment bankers 
also desire that shares are fully subscribed and that the price has a sufficient level. These 
aspects are important when firms want to do a secondary equity offering. Finally, when 
earnings decline rapidly immediately after the firm goes public, this usually leads to a 
rapid decline in share prices. This decline may result in lawsuits between the firm and 
discontented shareholders. An explicit incentive for informative earnings management is to 
provide high financial reporting quality. The role of external financial reporting is to 
“portray differences in firms’ economic positions and performance in a timely and 
credible manner” (Healy and Wahlen 1999, 1). Informative earnings management may 
therefore be sufficient for parties that use financial reporting for contracting purposes and 
for investment decision making. (Teoh et al. 1998, 179; Roosenboom et al. 2003, 3; Li et 
al. 2006, 4) 
 
When firms want to influence the firms’ earnings they have three timing possibilities. 
Figure 1 shows these timing possibilities: the pre-IPO period (years -1, -2, etc), the IPO 
year (year 0) and the subsequent years (year 1, 2, etc). 
 
Figure 1 - The timeline of IPOs 
        Lock-up     Year 0’s 
               IPO     period    earnings are 
              date      ends      announced       
       
                    Time 
 
 Fiscal year -1  Fiscal year 0  Fiscal year +1         Fiscal year +2 
 Pre-IPO  During IPO           Post-IPO 
 
 
Friedlan (1994) and Neill et al. (1995) found evidence for earnings management in the pre-
IPO period. On the other hand, Aharony et al. (1993), Roosenboom et al. (2003, 21) and 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 30) also examined the years before the IPO but found no 
evidence. Teoh et al. (1998, 203) examined if IPOs use accruals to increase earnings during 
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the IPO year. They investigated a sample of 1,649 U.S. IPOs and found that the median net 
income of the most aggressive quintile (highest discretionary accruals) are positive in the 
year of the IPO and decreases, to become zero in the fourth year after IPO. The operating 
cash flow is negative in the year of the IPO and increases in the subsequent periods. The 
net income of the more conservative quintiles decreases, but stabilise more and move 
upwardly. Teoh et al. (1998, 203) interpreted these patterns that managers use 
discretionary accruals driven by self-interest behaviour, to increase reported earnings in 
the period during the IPO. Other researchers strengthened this conclusion (Roosenboom et 
al. 2003, 23; Pastor and Poveda 2006, 25). Bajor (2002) focussed on the post-IPO period. 
He selected 190 U.S. firms that issued an IPO in 1995 and found significantly positive 
discretionary accruals in year +1. He stated that managers increase income driven by self-
interest. Similar results were found by Teoh et al. (1998, 1998a). 
 
To summarise, most researchers found evidence for pervasive earnings management during 
and after the IPO. However, recently Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 30-32) had several 
concerns about these studies, especially about the Teoh et al. (1998, 1998a) studies 
(Ahmad-Zaluki 2007, 7). Firstly, they found bias in the study of Teoh et al. (1998a) and 
therefore concluded that parts of the evidence of the study of Teoh et al. (1998a) were 
unreliable. Secondly, Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 30) did not found evidence for income 
increasing earnings management. They only found conservative figures7. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006, 32) also argued that in cases that discretionary accruals appear, this is 
not the result of earnings management but a result of working capital changes, which is 
endogenous to an IPO. They stipulated that in events like IPOs, firms usually adjust their 
working capital automatically. One reason that firms are going public is to unburden a 
resources constrain. This means that IPOs seems to have under-invest in inventory and 
receivables in pre-IPO periods, and use the IPO to relieve these constrains. In addition, 
IPOs seems to have over-use trade credit and other operating liabilities. Both those assets 
and liabilities are identified as “income increasing discretionary accruals” by Teoh et al. 
(1998, 1998a), but Ball and Shivakumar (2006, 32) identified those assets and liabilities as 
working capital changes which are endogenous to IPO proceeds. Finally Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006, 32) stated that IPOs do not opportunistically manage their earnings but 
provide higher quality financial information, demanded by public investors (the 
information perspective). This conclusion was strengthened by Fan (2007, 1), who stressed 
that earnings management could result in considerable costs for IPOs. He stated that most 
IPO´s have no incentives to use earnings management once it exceeds the point of being 
informative. They would only manage earnings to a level that expresses the real future 
performance of the firm. 
 
2.2 The contribution of this paper 
Criticism of Ball and Shivakumar (2006) showed that evidence on the pervasiveness of 
earnings management, opportunistic behaviour specifically, is far from unequivocal. In 
order to shed more light on this issue, this paper will first re-examine the extent of IPOs 
                                             
7 Both conservative and aggressive accounting can be defined as earnings management. This paper mainly 
focuses on aggressive accounting, this means that earnings are managed upwards instead of downwards. 
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that engage in earnings management. It performs the investigations with a more recent 
sample (21st century) and with better accrual estimating models8. This paper uses 
significantly positive discretionary accruals as indicator for earnings management, which is 
consistent with prior research (Teoh et al. 1998, 203; Roosenboom et al. 2003). Secondly, 
based on three conditions, this paper re-examines the extent of IPOs that are under 
suspicion of opportunistic earnings management behaviour. These IPOs should meet all the 
following three conditions to be under suspicion: 
 
1. Discretionary accruals in the year of earnings management are significantly positive and 
earnings are, compared with other IPOs, exceptionally highly in excess of operating cash 
flow.  
This paper assumes that in these situations discretionary accruals are used to manage 
earnings by a considerable increment. 
2. Discretionary accruals in post-earnings management periods are negative and earnings 
are, compared with other IPOs, exceptionally low.  
This paper assumes that in these situations the decline in earnings is a result of accruals 
that undergo reversal. This paper assumes that earnings are exceptionally low because the 
IPOs were not aware of the level of equilibrium of earnings management costs and 
revenues. 
3. Inferior return of sales (ROS) and return of assets (ROA) in post-earnings management 
periods. 
This paper assumes that when earnings are managed to a level that exceeds the level of 
equilibrium of costs and revenues, the accruals that undergo reversal, affect operating 
performance (ROS and ROA) in the periods after earnings management was used. Using ROS 
is consistent with Teoh et al. (1998) and Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007). Using ROA is 
consistent with Teoh et al. (1998). 
 
When earnings are highly in excess of operating cash flows (condition 1) this may indicate 
earnings management. However, to express a judgement about the degree of earnings 
management (e.g. strong, normal and weak income increasing), this paper uses the word 
“exceptionally”. It assumes that when earnings are exceptionally high in excess of 
operating cash flows strong income increasing earnings management is applied. This paper 
assumes that this strong level of earnings management is only applied when a firm is driven 
by self-interest, because when operating cash flows are exceptionally lower than earnings 
this can lead to liquidity problems. Liquidity problems may lead to misallocated capital 
and loss of financial prosperity (Schipper and Vincent 2003). The chance that a firm wants 
to express the real economic performance of the firm by strong upwardly managed 
earnings is small. 
 
Fan (2007) explained that IPOs only engage in earnings management when this expresses 
the real future performance of the firm. Because IPOs that meet condition 2 and 3 have 
inferior post-issue performance (measured by earnings in condition 2 and operational 
effectiveness ratios ROS and ROA in condition 3), earnings management did not reflect the 
                                             
8 Performance adjusted models are used in this paper. These models are not so much used in prior studies yet. 
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future performance. Hence, this paper assumes that these IPOs did not engage in earnings 
management to increase the informativeness of earnings. 
 
The three conditions are selected because they are all associated with costs and risks for 
IPOs and expose IPOs to several problems. For example, inferior post-issue performance 
caused by earnings management is associated with involuntary de-listing risks (Li et al. 
2006). To use these three conditions as proxies for opportunistic behaviour is consistent 
with some prior research, for example Teoh et al. (1998, 176) stated that: “A finding that 
accruals are unusually high in the IPO year, that post-IPO earnings are low, and that high 
IPO-year accruals predict low subsequent earnings would be consistent with the 
hypothesis of opportunism”. 
Several studies (Teoh et al. 1998; Fan 2007) pointed out that IPOs suffer a decline in the 
operating performance in post-IPO periods. Researchers try to explain this decline by 
examining the relationship with discretionary accruals. They stipulate that inferior post-
IPO operating performance occurs because discretionary accruals undergo reversal. Ahmad-
Zaluki et al. (2007) weakened this statement with their study on the Malaysian market. 
They only found weak evidence that earnings management by IPOs is associated with lower 
post-issue operating performance. The results of this paper regarding condition 3 are, 
besides to examine opportunistic behaviour, also used to give more insight in this debate. 
 
Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007, 30) found evidence that IPOs in Malaysia only engage in 
earnings management in times of economic stress (East Asia crisis). And Chen et al. (2005) 
found that firms with big four auditors engage less in earnings management compared to 
firms with non-big four auditors. Studies as these pointed out that the pervasiveness of 
earnings management depends on environmental and company-specific factors. A growing 
body of present papers strengthened this statement (Lewis 2007; Fan 2007). This paper will 
investigate if investor protection rules are a environmental factor that effect the extent of 
earnings management. And if the extent of opportunistic earnings management differ in 
countries with different investor protection regulations. To the authors best knowledge, 
are these investigations unique in the IPO context. 
 
2.3 Earnings management and investor protection 
Investor protection can be defined as “the protection of outside investors by the 
enforcement of regulations and laws”. (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002, stated in Boonlert-U-
Thai 2004, 7). Insiders have incentives to conceal the true performance of the firm by 
managing earnings to retain private control benefits. A private control benefit is, for 
example, consumption of the firms’ assets by other firms owned by managers. In general, 
the common aspect of private control benefits is that value is maintained by insiders and 
not shared with outside investors. Investors are protected by law and regulation to avoid 
this unfair distribution of value. They have opportunities to take disciplinary actions 
against the insiders, when they detect this unfair distribution. However, managers have 
the possibility to manage the degree and variability of earnings to mask the private control 
benefits. (Leuz et al. 2003, 2) 
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Leuz et al. (2003) investigated the level of earnings management in 31 countries in the 
world. They found that firms in countries with strong investor protection regulations 
engage in less earnings management, compared with firms in countries with weak investor 
protection regulations. Leuz et al. (2003, 21) stated that the reason for the lower level of 
earnings management is, that managers have less opportunities to retain private control 
benefits and therefore have fewer incentives to conceal the performance of the firm. This 
indicates that a strong level of protection limits insiders’ ability to expropriate values of 
the firm. Leuz et al. (2003, 21) concluded that their evidence highlight an important 
relationship between the quality of earnings and investor protection. The findings of Leuz 
et al. (2003, 21) are strengthened by evidence of other papers, for example Boonlert-U-Tai 
(2004). 
 
Firms can use their discretion to increase the informativeness of earnings. Leuz et al. 
(2003, 9) stipulated that this may be the result of effective investor protection regulations 
and therefore may not apply to firms in countries with weak investor protection 
regulations. They stated that firms in poor investor protection countries have more 
possibilities to manage earnings more aggressive, compared with strong investor protection 
countries. However, they have not examined this. This paper contributes to such further 
research and examines if there is a positive relationship between weak investor protection 
regulations and opportunistic behavior. 
 
In the literature are several indexes for the level of investor protection regulations 
available. Leuz et al. (2003) used the index of La Porta et al. (1998), which is based on the 
rules in the nineties. Several researchers have criticised this index (Djankov et al. 2008) 
and this paper chooses therefore a new and more recent index: the investor protection 
index of Djankov et al. (2008). They presented an index that measures the extent in which 
shareholders are protected against expropriation by firms insiders. Their index is composed 
with the help of Lex Mundi law firms and is based on the rules prevailed in 2003. 
 
 
3. Hypothesis development and research design 
 
3.1 Hypothesis development 
This paper first examines if significantly positive discretionary accruals are present in year 
-1, 0 or +1, and if they undergo reversal in year +2 and become negative. To examine the 
robustness of the results of the discretionary accruals, this paper performs a re-weighting 
procedure with outliers (e.g. if discretionary accruals are still present when outliers are 
eliminated), which is also used by Roosenboom et al. (2003, 20). And it uses a control 
group to compare discretionary accruals of this group with those of the sample group. This 
procedure is consistent with Bajor (2002, 41). 
 
After these two robustness checks this paper examines the three conditions for 
opportunistic behaviour. First if there is a positive relationship between significantly 
positive discretionary accruals, and exceptionally high earnings in excess of operating cash 
flow in the same year. Second if there is a positive relationship between earnings of IPOs 
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with significantly positive discretionary accruals, and negative discretionary accruals and 
exceptionally low earnings in post-earnings management periods. And third if there is a 
positive relationship between significantly positive discretionary accruals that undergo 
reversal and become negative, and inferior operating performance in later periods. Finally, 
this paper examines if there is a positive relationship between earnings management, 
opportunistic behaviour specifically, and low investor protection regulations. 
 
3.2 Sample selection and data 
The original sample consists 4,563 IPO observations from 31 countries in the period 2001 
till 2004 (4 years). The IPO observations are obtained from the Thomson One Banker 
database. The countries are selected for two reasons: 1) all countries have an sufficient 
number of IPOs in the selected period (more than 10) and 2) neither of these countries 
suffer hyperinflation in the sample period, which strongly affect earnings management 
measures (Leuz et al. 2003, 10). The sample period is chosen because: 1) it is not 
overlapping with prior research, 2) the investor protection index is based on the legal rules 
prevailing in the year 2003 and therefore usabe to the sample period, and 3) the sample 
period avoids the dot-com bubble (1995 till the spring of 2001). The following firms are 
excluded: 1,048 firms with no Sedol number available, 1,035 secondary equity offerings, 
639 financial and insurance companies, 304 issuers of non-ordinary and non-common 
shares, 55 regulated utility firms, 2 privatization’s of state-owned enterprises and 968 
firms with incomplete financial data. To exclude these groups is consistent with prior IPO 
research (Teoh et al. 1998; Roosenboom et al. 2003), which makes comparisons with other 
papers’ results more reliable, and the sample group reaches more homogeneity. The final 
sample consist 512 IPOs from 24 different countries9, spread across all industries. 
 
Accruals are measured through accrual estimating models. This paper uses two models 
which enhances the robustness of the results (Xiong 2006, 219). Different models are 
evaluated for this research and the performance adjusted models advised by Kothari et al. 
(2005, 195) are chosen10. Kothari et al. (2005, 195) found that the best measures of 
discretionary accruals (with the lowest type I and type II errors), can be achieved using the 
Jones (1991) model or the Modified Jones (1995) model adjusted for a performance 
adjusted firm’s discretionary accrual. For the performance adjustment process this paper 
uses the sort of industry and the ROA, which is advised by Kothari (2005, 165). This paper 
uses the cross-sectional regression analysis and it includes a constant term in the functions 
of the models. There are in total 2,048 IPO year observations (512 IPOs times 4 years). The 
matching process to obtain control firms for the performance adjusted models starts, 
consistent with Kothari et al. (2005, 173), at the Two digit SIC code level. This means that 
                                             
9 The countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
10 In this study the Modified Jones (1995) model with ROA as an additional regressor, is also selected and used 
to determine discretionary accruals. But there were striking results when comparing the models´ results 
with the other two models, and between the results of the sample and the control group of this model. This 
paper gives no outline of these results and interprets the results as an indication that the model is fairly 
ineffective. 
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each IPO year observation is matched with a control firm in the same country, with the 
same Two digit SIC code level and with the closest ROA in the same year. If the percentage 
difference of the ROA between the IPO and the control firm is more than 20%, the 
matching process is moved to the One digit SIC classification, which is consistent with 
Singer (2006, 12) and Fan (2007, 15). This matching procedure is able to obtain close 
matches for most of the IPO year observations: for 1,054 IPO year observations of the 
Performance adjusted Jones (1991) model discretionary accruals and for 1,055 of the 
Modified Jones (1995) version. The majority of the IPO year observations have a ROA of not 
more than 5% difference with the control firms in the same year. 
 
3.3 Accrual estimating models 
The estimating procedure for accruals is as follows. The first step is to measure total 
accruals using the Jones (1991) definition, which defines total accruals as the difference 
between earnings and operating cash flows. These are calculated by the following formula: 
 
TA τ  =  (NIτ – CFC τ) / Aτ -1            (equation 1) 
Where: 
TA           =   total accruals in year τ 
NIτ           =   net income in year τ 
CFCτ           =   cash flows from operations in year τ 
Aτ-1           =   total assets at τ-1 
 
The second step is to measure non-discretionary accruals. The formula for the 
Performance adjusted Jones (1991) model is as follows: 
 
NDAτ   =  α0 + α1 (1/Aτ-1) + α2 (ΔREVτ) + α3 (PPEτ)    (2) 
Where: 
NDAτ           =   non-discretionary accruals in year τ  
ΔREVτ           =   revenues in year τ less revenues in year τ-1 scaled by total assets at τ-1 
PPEτ           =   gross property plant and equipment in year τ scaled by total assets at τ-1 
α0, α1, α2, α3  =   firm-specific parameters 
 
The firm-specific parameters, α0, α1, α2, α3 are obtained from a linear cross-sectional 
regression of financial information from the control group. The model of this regression 
analyses is: 
 
TAτ  = a0 + a1 (1/A τ-1) + a2 (ΔREVτ) + a3 (PPEτ)     (3) 
 
Were a0, a1, a2 and a3 are the ordinary least squares (OLS) of α0, α1, α2 and α3. 
 
For the Performance adjusted Modified Jones (1995) model the formula for non-
discretionary accruals accruals is: 
 
NDAτ   =  α0 + α1 (1/Aτ-1) + α2 (ΔREVτ – ΔRECτ) + α3 (PPEτ)   (4) 
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ΔRECτ stands for the net receivables in year τ minus the net receivables in year τ-1 scaled 
by total assets at τ-1. The other variables represent the same variables as in the 
Performance adjusted Jones (1991) model. 
 
The next step is to determine discretionary accruals (DA) by the following formula: 
 
DAτ  =  TAτ – NDAτ         (5) 
 
Te final step is to subtract discretionary accruals of the control firm from those of the 
sample firm. Hence, the formula is for the Performance adjusted Jones (1991) and 
Modified Jones (1995) model discretionary accruals (DA) is: 
 
DAτ  =  SampleDAτ – ControlDAτ       (6) 
 
 
5 Results and analysis 
 
5.1 Indications of earnings management  
A Paired-Sample T Test is used to determine if discretionary accruals (from equation 6) are 
significantly positive. The level of statistical significance is 0.05% or lower and the level of 
statistical reliability is 95%. The tests give no significantly positive discretionary accruals 
among the firms that issued an IPO in the years 2001 and 2002. For the other two years the 
tests show consistent evidence that significantly positive discretionary accruals are present 
in year 0 of firms that issued an IPO in 2003, and in year +1 of firms that issued an IPO in 
2004. The results are robust to additional tests, of which figure 2 gives an example. This 
figure shows that discretionary accruals of the control group (not performance adjusted) in 
year 0, are 0.06 lower than that of the sample group (performance adjusted). For issuing 
year 2004 the accruals of the control group in year +1 are significantly negative (-0.02), 
while those of the sample group are significantly positive (0.06). The results of the 
Performance adjustment Jones (1991) model give consistent results. In addition, for both 
models count that in 2003 and 2004 significantly positive discretionary accruals undergo 
reversal in year +2 and become negative. 
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Figure 2 - Comparison of discretionary accruals between the sample and the control group 
 
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Exceptionally high earnings in excess of operating cash flow 
Accruals of year 0 of issuing year 2003 and year +1 of issuing year 2004 are separated into 
different quintiles. The quintile with the lowest discretionary accruals is called quintile 5 
the “conservative quintile”. The quintile with the highest is called quintile 1 the 
“aggressive quintile”. This procedure is consistent with Teoh et al. (1998). Figure 3 shows 
that quintile 1 and 2 have high significantly positive discretionary accruals in year 0. 
Average earnings of IPOs in quintile 1 are $ 5,483 million positive in year 0, operating cash 
flows are $ 2,376 million negative. Earnings in quintile 2 are $ 3,816 million positive in 
year 0; a grown of 73% compared with the prior year. Operating cash flows decreases with 
28% to a level of $ 3,965 million. The figure shows that in both quintiles 1 and 2 are 
exceptionally high earnings in excess of operating cash flow and thus are the IPOs in these 
quintiles, under suspicion of opportunistic earnings management. Earnings in the other 
quintiles do not grow in excess of operating cash flow and are not under suspicion of 
opportunistic behaviour. 
 
The results for the year 2004 indicate that the median earnings of quintile 1 is $ 2,094 
million positive in year +1 (a reduction of 10% compared to year 0) while operating cash 
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flows in this year is $ 920 million negative (a reduction of 277%). The statistics of quintile 1 
show indications that firms increase earnings in excess of operating cash flows, to prevent 
earnings from a great reduction. This is consistent with the opportunistic perspective. The 
other quintiles have no exceptionally high earnings in excess of operating cash flow. 
 
Figure 3 - Discretionary accruals, earnings and operating cash flows of IPOs from 2003 
 
Mean discretionary 
accruals 
Mean earnings per million    
dollar 
Mean op. cashflow per million 
dollar 
Earnings 
management in 
year 0 of firms 
that issued IPO in 
2003 -1 0 +1 +2 -1 0 +1 +2 -1 0 +1 +2 
5,604  5,483  7,589  -81  7,351  -2,376  9,187  5,136  
  -2% 38% -101%   -132% 487% -44% 
Quintile 1 most 
aggressive 
-0.22* 0.37* -0.03* -0.20*
      -101%       316% 
2,208  3,816  5,750  2,806  5,505  3,965  9,453  6,902  
  73% 51% -51%   -28% 138% -27% Quintile 2 -0.06 0.12*  -0.02  -0.01*
      -26%       74% 
4,553  4,658  2,892  2,892  4,367  5,815  5,563  5,841  
  2% -38% 0,0%   33% -4% 5% Quintile 3 -0.24* 0.02  0.00  -0.05 
      -38%       0% 
7,272  6,768  5,477  3,568  4,475  14,840  7,953  15,267 
  -7% -19% -35%   232% -46% 92% Quintile 4 -0.06 -0.06* -0.08* -0.01*
      -47%       3% 
5,386  6,674  5,578  3,814  5,328  13,543  4,834  10,615 
  24% -16% -32%   154% -64% 120% 
Quintile 5 most 
conservative 
-0.32* -0.20* 
 
-0.07* -0.04 
      -43%       -22% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note : there are more or less 25 IPOs in each year in each quintile (containing IPO year 
observations from both performance adjusted models). 
 
5.3 Exceptionally low future earnings 
Figure 3 shows that in quintile 1 a positive relationship between earnings of IPOs with 
positive discretionary accruals, and negative discretionary accruals and exceptionally low 
earnings in post-IPO periods is present. Earnings become $ 81 million negative and accruals 
undergo reversal in year +2. Firms within this quintile seem to have crossed the level of 
equilibrium, since earnings did not express the real future performance. For the year 2004 
earnings management is pronounced in year +1 but in year +2 there are no exceptionally 
low future earnings. Because there is no information available for later periods than year 
+2 it is difficult to interpret the results, since it is possible that earnings will decline in 
year +3. 
 
Key to symbols: 
- The difference between year +1 and +2 
- The difference between year +0 and +2 
- *: discretionary accruals are  
   significant 
- Bold: important figure 
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5.4 Inferior post-earnings management operating performance 
 To rule out the possibility that poor performance is a general problem and not explicit 
related with IPOs, this paper tests if the post-issue operating performances of IPOs is 
inferior compared to non-issuers. Figure 4 presents the ROS and ROA of the sample group 
of issuing year 2003 and 2004. Consistent with some prior studies (Teoh et al. 1998; 
Roosenboom et al. 2003) there is evidence of inferior post-issue operating performance by 
issuing firms. While the operating performance of non-issuing firms remains at a constant 
level, for IPOs it declines in post-issuing years 2004, 2005 and 2006 and stays behind. 
 
Figure 4 - The operating performance of issuers and non-issuers 
 
 
  
          
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The number of IPO year observations of firms that issued IPO in 2003 is 506, and for 
2004 1,150 (containing IPO year observations from both performance adjusted models). 
 
Figure 5 presents the ROS and ROA for firms that issued IPO in 2003 and 2004 sorted per 
quintile. The results show that both ROS and ROA of quintile 1 of IPOs from 2003 undergo 
an exceptional decline. This quintile presents a decline in ROS from year 0 to year +2 of -
128%. ROS becomes 0.03 negative in year +2, while ROS of the other quintiles remains 
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positive. ROA declines by -69% from year 0 to year +2 to a level of 3.39. The other quintiles 
have a maximum decline in ROA of -57% from year 0 to +2 (quintile 5) and a minimum ROA 
of 5.13 (quintile 4). Quintile 2 seems to decline “normal” compared to the other quintiles; 
a decline from year 0 to year +2 of -25% in ROS and -32% in ROA. It seems that quintile 1 
has both accruals that undergo reversal and, compared with the other quintiles, 
exceptionally inferior post-earnings management operating performance. 
 
ROS of quintile 1 of IPOs from 2004 decline to a level of 0.02 in year +2, which is 
considerable low compared to the other quintiles. Quintile 2 has the highest ROS of 0.06 
and quintile 4 and 5 have a ROS of 0.03. ROA of quintile 1 declines to 2.05 which is again 
low compared with the other quintiles. ROA of quintile 2 is also low with 2.41, however, 
ROS is the highest of all quintiles with 0.06. The results are consistent with those of firms 
that issued IPO in 2003, namely that quintile 1 has both accruals that undergo reversal 
and, compared with the other quintiles, exceptionally inferior post-earnings management 
operating performance. There is thus a positive relationship between significantly positive 
discretionary accruals that undergo reversal and become negative, and inferior operating 
performance in later periods, in quintile 1 of both 2003 and 2004 IPOs. IPOs in other 
quintiles have also inferior post-earnings management operating performance, but not so 
exceptionally high than quintile 1. A possible reason that the other quintiles, without the 
presence of opportunistic behaviour, also have poorer performances on the long run, could 
be that these IPOs have time their offering in a period of peak performance, which could 
not stand in the long run (Fan 2007, 21). 
 
Figure 5 - Discretionary accruals, earnings and operating cash flows sorted per quintile 
 
 
Mean return of sales in % Mean return of assets in % Firms that issued 
IPO in 2003 -1 0 1 2 -1 0 1 2 
0.12  0.10  0.06  -0.03   16.08  10.84  8.81  3.39  
  -19% -33% -142%   -33% -19% -62% 
Quintile 1 most 
aggressive 
      -128%       -69% 
0.04  0.06  0.06  0.04  6.43  7.99  7.39  5.40  
  46% 11% -32%   24% -7% -27% Quintile 2 
      -25%       -32% 
0.07  0.08  0.04  0.05  10.34  9.08  7.47  5.40  
  18% -47% 11%   -12% -18% -28% Quintile 3 
      -41%       -41% 
0.14  0.12  0.08  0.04  12.19  9.94  8.31  5.13  
  -18% -35% -45%   -18% -16% -38% Quintile 4 
      -64%       -48% 
0.12  0.13  0.09  0.06  14.26  12.22  8.11  5.26  
  8% -33% -31%   -14% -34% -35% 
Quintile 5 most 
conservative 
      -54%       -57% 
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Note: the key to symbols and the number of IPOs per quintile are the same as in figure 3. 
 
5.5 Opportunistic earnings management 
This paper finds a positive relationship between significantly positive discretionary 
accruals and exceptionally high earnings in excess of operating cash flow, in quintile 1 and 
2 of firms that issued an IPO in the year 2003, and in quintile 1 of firms that issued IPO in 
2004. The results also indicate that only firms in quintile 1 of IPO year 2003 have 
underperforming future earnings, and herewith could properly not have managed their 
earnings to the level of equilibrium. And third, despite inferior post-issue operating 
performance is pronounced for the complete sample of IPOs, there is only evidence of a 
positive relationship between exceptionally inferior post-earnings management operating 
performance and discretionary accruals that undergo reversal, in the most aggressive 
quintiles. This paper interprets the results of these three tests, that only the IPOs in the 
most aggressive quintiles of both issuing year 2003 and year 2004, meet the conditions 
outlined in section 2 and are thus under suspicion of opportunistic behaviour. 
 
The IPOs that are under suspicion of opportunistic behaviour represents more or less 20% of 
the firms that issued IPO in 2003 and 2004. And more or less 10% of the total sample (4 
years). Among others, Teoh et al. (1998) and Roosenboom et al. (2003) found higher 
percentages and concluded that opportunistic behaviour is strongly pronounced among 
IPOs. The results of this paper challenge this traditional view and add evidence to support 
the more recent view (Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Fan 2007) that the appearance of 
discretionary accruals is not a result of managerial opportunism, but appear because they 
are endogenous to IPOs. The results suggest that the information perspective on earnings 
management is more pronounced. 
 
A recommendation for further research is to examine the negative effects of opportunistic 
behaviour behaviour for investors. For example if investors are aware that it is used to 
Median return of sales in % Median return of assets in % Firms that issued 
IPO in 2004 -1 0 1 2 -1 0 1 2 
0.10  0.05  0.03  0.02  10.78  12.15  8.70  2.05  
  -53% -25% -30%   13% -28% -76% 
Quintile 1 most 
aggressive 
      -47%       -83% 
0.10  0.08  0.05  0.06  -0.02  5.68  4.92  2.41  
  -20% -45% 35%    -13% -51% Quintile 2 
      -25%       -58% 
0.08  0.08  0.03  0.05  2.19  7.69  6.89  6.19  
  -1% -65% 82%   251% -10% -10% Quintile 3 
      -36%       -20% 
0.09  0.05  0.05  0.03  5.19  8.25  4.12  3.64  
  -43% -5% -37%   59% -50% -12% Quintile 4 
      -40%       -56% 
0.05  0.03  0.02  0.03  2.74  5.30  0.66  4.02  
  -41% -35% 67%   93% -87% 506% 
Quintile 5 most 
conservative 
      9%       -24% 
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manipulate them. And when they are aware, if they make adjustments in the stock value 
or alternatively, that the costs of opportunistic behaviour are too small that a change of 
behaviour is necessary. Also the implications of informative earnings management for both 
the firm and investors, is a subject that demands more research. For example if investors 
upwardly adjust the firms’ value, when they realise that discretionary accruals are used to 
inform them instead of manipulating them. An other recommendation for future research 
is the effect of conservative accounting on future earnings and operating performance. 
This paper, and most other prior earnings management research, mainly focus on the 
relationship with aggressively accounting. 
 
5.6 Discretionary accruals and investor protection regulations 
The total sample consists of 512 firms in 24 countries worldwide (on 25 stock markets). 
The country with the highest investor protection measure is Singapore with a rate of 9.3, 
the lowest is Greece with a rate of 3.0. The tests show, consistent with Leuz et al. (2003), 
that discretionary accruals are higher in low investor protection countries. Those of the 
medium investor protection regulations are positive but less so than those of low investor 
protection regulations. Discretionary accruals of the high investor protection regulations 
are almost equal to zero or negative. The next step is to analyse the relationship between 
different discretionary accruals quintiles and investor protection regulations. The results 
are outlined in figure 6. IPOs from issuing year 2003 are sorted in two investor protection 
groups and IPOs from issuing year 2004 in three groups. When strong investor protection 
regulations would counter opportunistic behaviour, the expectation is that there are 
exceptionally more IPOs in low investor protection countries in quintile 1 compared to 
quintile 5. An other expectation is that there is a gradually descending line, from many 
IPOs in low investor protection regulations in quintile 1 to less in quintile 5. Figure 6 shows 
that in quintile 1 of issuing year 2003 there in more or less an equal number of IPOs in 
weak investor protection countries, as there is in quintile 5. And there are more IPOs in 
strong countries than there are in quintile 5. Issuing year 2004 shows no gradually 
descending line. For example, the number of weak investor protection countries declines 
in quintile 2 compared with quintile 1, but rises again in quintile 4. And the number of 
medium investor protection countries rises in quintile 2 compared with quintile 1, but 
declines again in quintile 4. This paper interprets these statistics that evidence for a 
positive relationship between weak investor protection regulations and opportunistic 
earnings management is far from unequivocal. This seems to be consistent with most IPO 
research that found evidence of opportunistic earnings management in high investor 
protection countries (for example in the U.S.). It seems that investor protection rules have 
their limits which prevent opportunistic earnings management in the context of IPOs. 
Because this conclusion is only based on one observation, more research is necessary to see 
whether it is generalisable. 
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Figure 6 - The distribution of investor protection regulations per discretionary accruals 
quintile 
 
 
      
 
      
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
 
6 Summary and conclusions 
Based on a sample of 512 companies in 24 countries worldwide, and using better accrual 
estimating models and a more recent sample than most prior research, this paper first 
argues that IPOs do engage in earnings management. However, it seems that earnings 
management is less pronounced than prior research has suggested (Teoh et al. 1998; 
Roosenboom et al. 2003), because earnings management is only found in two of the four 
issuing years. These results show that both investors and standard setters should interpret 
results of prior research with care. 
 
Second, based on three selected conditions there are indications that the use of earnings 
management is driven by self-interest. But because IPOs that are under suspicion of such 
behaviour only represent a small proportion of the total sample (+-10%), this paper adds 
more evidence to the recent view (Ball and Shivakumar 2006), that the appearance of 
discretionary accruals is not a result of managerial opportunism, but occurs because 
discretionary accruals are endogenous to IPOs. The results challenges the opportunistic 
perspective on earnings management and suggest that the information perspective on 
earnings management is more pronounced. 
Third, the results show that strong aggressively managed earnings by IPOs, “predict” 
excessively lower future earnings and inferior post-issue operating performance. On the 
other hand, there is little evidence for this relationship in situations of less aggressively 
managed earnings. 
 
At last, in continuation of Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007) who advised for further investigations 
about company and environmental factors, the results of this paper add to the growing 
body of evidence that  the pervasiveness of earnings management depends on these 
factors. The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between low investor 
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protection regulations and earnings management: discretionary accruals are, on average, 
higher for countries with low investor protection regulations. However, no positive 
relationship is signalled between opportunistic behaviour and low investor protection 
regulations. It seems that stronger enforcement of investor protection laws do not counter 
opportunistic behaviour. Therefore should investors not rely on investor protection rules 
excessively, when investing in an IPO. This conclusion complements the findings of Leuz et 
al. (2003, 9). 
 
The relevance of these results can be summarised as follows. First, the results show that 
earnings management, opportunistic behaviour specifically, can be very costly and can be 
predicted by discretionary accruals around the IPO process. This helps issuing firms about 
how discretionary accruals affect the post-issue performance and affect the cost of equity. 
Second, accounting standard setters and regulators who are interested in earnings 
management behaviour, see that care must be exercised in interpreting the effectiveness 
of investor protection rules with respect to opportunistic behaviour. They may re-consider 
their laws and regulations to make them more effective. And finally, investors and other 
stakeholders notice that earnings management is not all-pervasive. And in situations that it 
is present, it is far from unequivocal that it is used to manipulate accounting figures. 
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The effect of leverage increases on real 
earnings management 
 
 
Irina Zagers-Mamedova11 
 
 
Executive summary  
Main subject of this paper is to understand whether there could be an incentive for 
managers to manipulate cash flow from operating activities (CFO) through the use of real 
earnings management (REM), in situations with increasing leverage. Based upon a study of 
Jelinek (2007) who researched the correlation between increasing levels of leverage and 
accrual earnings management, I developed my main hypothesis with respect to the effect 
of leverage increases on REM to influence CFO. Results indicate that in leverage increasing 
firms, the leverage results in REM, in order to affect CFO, when using the absolute value of 
long term debt in calculating leverage.  
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
1.1  Historical perspective and actuality 
The focus of external users on reported earnings as a central variable for making decisions 
and recent corporate scandals have caused earnings management (EM) to find itself in the 
center of public attention. Much quoted in this respect is Arthur Levitt, former Chairman 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). In his speech of 1998, Levitt (1998) 
talked about the “the numbers game” with which he attacked practices where 
management abuses  “big bath” restructuring charges, premature revenue recognition, 
“cookie jar” reserves, and write-offs of purchased in-process research and development 
(R&D) (Healy and Wahlen 1999). These practices are threatening the credibility of financial 
reporting, according to Levitt. Others followed Levitt when they expressed their views 
about EM. Frits Bolkestein, the former Dutch European Commissioner in charge of Internal 
Market and Taxation for example, raised his concerns regarding EM in his speech of July 
2002. Bolkestein (2002) said: “We must have factual, not fictional, accounting.” He also 
emphasized the importance of company accounts that are true and fair and stated that 
companies: “… must not distort, hide, fabricate and present, in whole or in part, a 
misleading web of lies and deceit.” 
Managers who want to influence accounting income can choose from a large set of 
methods. Some of the methods require real transactions and some are pure accounting 
decisions. In general, EM is classified into the two categories: EM achieved by fraudulent 
activities and EM achieved by non-fraudulent activities.  EM while staying within the 
                                             
11 Irina Zagers-Mamedova completed her master at the Erasmus University in September 2008, and now resides 
in Geneva, Switzerland for a period of two years. Thesis supervisor: Prof. dr.  M.A. van Hoepen RA. 
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boundaries of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), may be accomplished 
through accruals, manipulations with no cash flow effects and through real earnings 
management (REM), manipulations which do have cash flow effects. In this paper EM 
achieved by fraudulent activities and EM achieved by non-fraudulent activities are seen as 
two different categories. So with EM I will only refer to non-fraudulent activities that stay 
within the boundaries of GAAP.  
A significant portion of studies on EM have focused on EM through manipulation of 
accruals. However, Graham et al. (2005) find evidence that managers take real economic 
actions to maintain accounting appearances, and sometimes are more likely to use real 
actions than to use accruals to apply EM. It appears that managers are willing to burn 
“real” cash flows for the sake of reporting desired accounting numbers. There appears to 
be a constant tension between the short-term and long-term objectives of the firm.   
In the current global economy, it seems that a company can only survive by joining forces 
through mergers and acquisitions. Acquisition prices are often structured through capital 
increases and external debt financing which often results in increasing interest charges. 
Next to the focus on reported income statement earnings, analysts and investors focusing 
more on cash flows rather than the income statement of a company as a result of 
corporate scandals analysts have lost faith in earnings-based metrics. This is also caused by 
high interest charges more and more companies seem to face, as a result increasing 
financial loans and increasing interest rates. Sufficient cash flows from operating activities 
are essential for these companies to remain profitable and viable in the future. Lack of 
cash flows could result in bankruptcy or a Company to turn into a takeover prey. Knowing 
that investors  use the cash flow statement to make investment decisions,  highly 
motivated and intelligent management teams could be involved in REM  to create  ways to 
influence  the true picture of a company’s cash flow from operations (CFO) and receive or 
maintain external debt financing.   
Highly leveraged companies could favor cash flow from operations in favor of other 
financial support sources primarily because many analysts believe that cash flow from 
operations is a more transparent indicator of a company’s performance.  The results of the 
research performed by Nwaeze et al. (2005), suggest that leverage has positive and 
significant effect on the role of cash flow from operations.  
The importance of reliable information on CFO for investors and the (adverse) economic 
consequences that manipulations of real activities might have, makes  REM an interesting 
subject. In this paper for leverage increasing firms, the relationship between REM and 
leverage increases is researched to understand whether there could be an incentive for 
managers to manipulate CFO through the use of real REM.     
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the definition of REM 
and provides evidence from prior studies on the existence of REM. The third section 
consists of three parts. In the first part, I develop the main hypothesis, based on this 
extensive literature overview. The second part presents the design of a conceptual model 
to identify REM that affects CFO, the model to analyze solvability. The sample period and 
sample selection presented in the third part. The interpretations of results are presented 
in section 4. Section 5, provides the analysis of results and gives the suggestions for further 
research. Finally, the summary and conclusion are presented in section 6. 
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2. Real earnings management and prior literature 
 
Introduction 
Based on recent literature a definition for REM is given. Next, an overview of relevant 
literature in the field of REM is presented. Recent studies are categorized in groups and 
provide strong evidence on the existing of REM and show methods on how REM can be 
measured. 
 
2.1  Real earnings management 
For the purpose of the paper I define REM as a purposeful action by management of a 
company to alter reported earnings in a particular direction, which is achieved by changing 
the timing and/or structuring of an operation, investment and/or financial transaction 
with cash flow effects and has sub-optimal business consequences.  
This definition is based on definitions given by Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Zang (2007). 
From the definition we learn that there should be managerial intent in order to influence 
earnings by structuring transactions. This is the key to the definition of REM.  The way a 
firm accounts for a transaction depends on the form of the transaction. Consequently, if a 
firm can design a transaction to give it a specific form, it will be able to record this 
transaction in a desired way; this is what Healy and Wahlen (1999) call “structuring 
transaction” (Stolowy and Breton 2004).  Also there is a difficulty in parsing out which 
effect is due to normal business activities and which is due to real management activities. 
In this paper the focus will be on manipulation through real activities. The reason for this 
is twofold. First the negative value implications of manipulating real activities are thought 
to be the one of the most serious forms of earnings management (Ewert and Wagenhofer 
2005; Chen et al. 2008). The second reason, is that by definition, accruals management 
does not directly affect cash flows, but merely changes the timing of revenue and expense 
recognition. However, REM can adversely affect cash flows both in the short in the long 
term by, for example by cutting discretionary expenditures. 
 
2.2 Prior studies 
The possibility that managers manipulate real activities is discussed in the academic 
literature. In general, most of the existing work focuses on R&D expenditures (Baber et al. 
1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee 1998; Cheng 2004). 
Baber et al. (1991) found that relative R&D spending is significantly less when spending 
jeopardizes the ability to report positive or increasing income in the current period. In 
most instances, choices among accounting practices have no direct cash flow 
consequences, but changes in R&D spending to satisfy current-period income objectives do 
alter cash flow.  
Dechow and Sloan (1991) investigate the hypothesis that chief executive officers (CEOs) in 
their final years of office manage discretionary investment expenditures to improve short-
term earnings performance. The authors examine the behaviour of R&D expenditures for a 
sample of firms in industries that have significant ongoing R&D activities. The results 
suggest that CEOs spend less on R&D during their final years in office. 
Next to Dechow and Sloan, Bushee (1998) examines firms trying to meet previous year’s 
earnings and finds that they reduce R&D more if they have lower institutional ownership. 
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He found evidence that R&D reductions by firms trying to meet earnings thresholds are 
potentially value-destroying and are prevented by the presence of sophisticated investors. 
Also evidence exists on firms engaging in a whole range of activities in addition to just R&D 
expense reduction.  
Cheng (2004) provides evidence that compensation committees establish a greater positive 
association between changes in R&D spending and changes in CEOs options in order to 
prevent opportunistic reductions in R&D spending. He defines the horizon problem as the 
CEOs that are 63 or older, and myopia as a firm facing a small earnings decline or a small 
loss. 
There are few studies about how managers use specific transactions, other than cutting 
R&D expenditures, to influence earnings. Some of the studies focus on stock repurchases 
(Hribar et al. 2006; Bens et al. 2003), examine the sales of fixed assets (Herrmann et al. 
2003; Bartov 1993), sale price reductions (Jackson and Wilcox 2000), overproduction, 
managing of sales, advertising, SG&A expenses and effect of REM (Roychowdhury 2006; 
Gunny 2005) and trade off between accrual and REM (Zang 2007). 
 
I briefly review the remaining studies. 
 
Stock repurchases 
Hribar et al. (2006) extend Bens et al. (2003) in several ways. They identify the conditions 
under which a stock repurchase increase earnings per share (EPS) and document the 
frequency of accretive (i.e., EPS increasing) repurchases. Second, they examine whether 
accretive stock repurchases are disproportionately more frequent among firms whose 
reported quarterly EPS would have otherwise fallen short of analysts’ forecasts. The study 
provides evidence on whether stock repurchases are used to manage reported EPS.  Third, 
they investigate how investors price the repurchase-induced accretive component of 
reported EPS when the extent of repurchase in first disclosed. 
Bens, Nagar and Wong (2003) investigate the use of stock repurchases to offset earnings 
per share (EPS) dilution caused by employee stock options. They report that managers of 
firms increase the level of their firms’ stock repurchases in years when options-related EPS 
dilution increases and when annual earnings are below the level required to sustain past 
EPS growth rates. Managers partially finance these repurchasing by reducing R&D.  
 
Sales of fixed assets 
Herrmann et al. (2003) examine the usage of income from the sale of fixed assets and 
marketable securities to manage earnings. They found a negative relation between income 
from asset sales and management forecast error. When current reported operating income 
is below (above) management's forecast of operating income, firms increase (decrease) 
earnings through the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities. 
Bartov (1993) examines sales of fixed assets and shows that the profit from sales of assets 
is negatively correlated with earnings changes. He uses this to argue that firms facing 
earnings declines boost profits through increased asset sales.  
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Sale price reductions 
Jackson and Wilcox (2000) in their study, made an investigation whether managers grant 
sales price reductions in the fourth quarter to accelerate customer purchases and, as a 
result, avoid losses and declines in earnings and sales. Consistent with expectations, the 
results of univariate and multivariate tests indicate that firm managers grant sales price 
reductions in the fourth quarter to meet annual financial reporting targets. 
 
Overproduction, managing of sales, advertising, SG&A expenses and effect of real 
manipulation 
Management of sales, reduction of discretionary expenses, overproduction are examined 
by Roychowdhury (2006). In his study he develops the empirical methods to detect real 
activities manipulation other that reduction of R&D expenses. The results suggest that 
drawing inferences on earnings management by analyzing only accruals may be 
inappropriate, because suspect firm-years manipulate real activities to avoid reporting 
losses. Additionally, firms appear to be managing real activities to a greater extent if they 
have a higher proportion of current liabilities. 
Next to Roychowdhury, Gunny (2005) examines the extent to which REM affects 
subsequent operating performance (as measured by both earnings and cash flow) and 
whether investors anticipate the performance consequences of real management. The 
results provide evidence that REM has an economically significant impact on future 
performance. 
 
Trade off between accrual and real earnings management 
Zang (2007) studies whether managers use real manipulation and accrual manipulation as 
substitutes in managing earnings and studies the order in which managers make these 
decisions.  The author follows the prior literature on REM (Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 
2005). She found that managers determine real manipulation before accrual manipulation. 
Based on this result, she used an empirical model that captures the sequentially of real 
and accrual manipulations to test the tradeoffs between the two. 
Cohen et al. (2007) document that following the passage of SOX accrual-based earnings 
management declined significantly, while REM increased significantly. Consistent with the 
results of a recent survey by Graham et al. (2005), this suggests that firms switched to 
managing earnings using real methods, possibly because these techniques, while more 
costly, are likely to be harder to detect.  
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2004) found factors that determine the intensity of the 
substitution of accounting by REM and the welfare effects, such as substitution rates 
between accounting and REM by manager, the real cost of earnings management, and the 
precision of the market knowledge about the manager’s incentives. 
The most important evidence on REM is provided by Graham et al. (2005). The authors 
found strong evidence that managers take real economic actions to maintain accounting 
appearances. In particular, 80% of survey participants report that they would decrease 
discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings target. 
More than the half (55.3%) state that they would delay starting a new project to meet an 
earnings target, even if such a delay entailed a small sacrifice in value.  
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3.  Hypothesis development, research design and sample 
 
Introduction 
In this section, I present my hypotheses with respect to the effect of leverage increases on 
REM and more specific on REM to influence CFO. I also discuss REM in relation to CFO. Next 
the focus is on external financing and more specific on solvability or leverage. Then the 
definition of solvability and relevance for REM is given. Based upon these discussions, the 
hypotheses for this study are presented. 
 
3.1  Hypothesis development 
 
CFO 
The majority of investors are now keenly aware of the concept of quality of earnings. As a 
result, certain investors ignore reported earnings and use the operating activities section 
of cash flow statement as a “reality check” on reliability of the revenues and expenses 
reported in the income statement. The cash flow statement (CFS) is one of three 
statements required for financial statements to be in accordance with US GAAP. 
The definition of CFO is specified in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 
No. 95, Cash Flows and is defined as follows: “Operating cash flows are those that are 
related to the corporation’s operating activities (i.e., those activities reflected in the 
corporation’s income statement).  
From the definition we learn that the CFO section reports the corporation’s ongoing cash-
generating activities that provide cash for dividend and other payments. 
Prior studies provide evidence the existence of REM (Section 2). The effects on CFO had 
significantly less focus of researchers.  Because REM is thought to be the one of the most 
serious forms of EM and is an issue that concerns the investment community, it is 
important to better understand the factors that could be behind this phenomenon.  
There are some studies that assume that cash flows are free from manipulation (Givoly and 
Hayn 2000; Barth, Cram and Nielson 2001). However, recent academic studies indicate that 
managers may engage in and benefit from managing cash flow (Melendrez et al. 2005; 
Graham et al.2005). 
There are indications that managers take real actions to report positive or to improve CFO 
(Zhang 2006). Taking into account the importance of reliable information about CFO for 
investors and the (adverse) economic consequences that manipulations of real activities 
might have (Gunny 2006) the question arises whether companies are, in a certain situation, 
for example, companies with relatively high or increasing debt, more likely to take real 
actions with positive cash flow consequences. 
 
Leverage 
In the current global economy, as already noted in section 1, it seems that a company can 
only survive by joining forces through mergers and acquisitions. Companies that have high 
leverage may be at risk of bankruptcy if they are unable to make payments on their 
external debt financing; they could also be unable to find new lenders in the future. So, if 
a company wishes to take out a new loan, lenders will scrutinize several measures of 
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whether the company is borrowing too much and will demand that it keeps its debt within 
reasonable boundaries.  
Previous literature suggests that leveraged firms engage in EM to avoid debt covenant 
default (Beatty and Weber 2003; Dichev and Skinner 2002; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). 
However, these studies measure EM using accrual based measures. 
Jelinek (2007) studies the effect of leverage increase on accrual EM. Jelinek suggests that 
leverage changes and leverage levels have a different impact on EM and concludes that 
increased leverage is associated with reduced accrual EM. Moreover results suggest that 
there is a beneficial consequence of debt because the increased debt reduces manager’s 
discretionary spending, and in turn, reduces accrual EM.  
The conclusion has been drawn by Jelinek could be incorrect. As there could be another 
explanation of why increased leverage is associated with reduced accrual EM. For example 
companies with increasing debt could be involved in the REM. However, increased leverage 
could give an incentive for managers to switch from accrual earnings management to REM. 
Moreover, reducing of discretionary expenses is one of the REM activities that could 
provide evidence that the company engage in REM. 
One relevant research on management of CFO is performed by Zhang (2006) and comes 
close to consider the effect of the level of leverage on REM; he investigates the possibility 
that debt covenants, amongst others, could be a one of the incentives for management to 
manipulate cash flow through real activities. The result of his research suggests that 
coefficients on debt covenants are positive but not significant, because the proxy to 
capture incentives is too crude. Unlike this paper, Zhang considers the incentives to avoid 
default of debt covenants, amongst which debt-to-equity-ratio, rather than researching 
whether changes in the level of leverage are positively correlated to REM.  
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a model to investigate whether increases of 
leverage of a company are an incentive for management to manipulate earnings through 
real activities in order to affect CFO. Based on the study of Jelinek (2007) that 
distinguishes between leverage increasing firms and highly leveraged firms the main 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: Leverage results in real earnings manipulation by management.  
 
Based on study Jelinek (2007) and based on the primary purpose of this paper, I distinguish 
between high leverage and leverage-increasing firms. To investigate whether leverage 
changes and leverage levels have different impact on REM, I present the following 
hypothesis:   
 
H2: Real earnings management in order to positively affect cash flow from operating 
activities, in leverage-increasing firms, is positively correlated with the level of leverage. 
 
Based upon my study of recent literature, I was unable to identify other previous research 
that focuses on researching these hypotheses. This is most likely caused by the focus of 
earnings management on accruals management, and less on REM. Researchers that focus 
on REM most commonly research the effects on earnings rather than effects on CFO. As 
such, and to my best knowledge, this is the first time a hypotheses is developed to identify 
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the positive correlation of the level of leverage and the changes in leverage with REM used 
to positively effect operating cash flows. In the next section I develop a model to test 
these hypotheses and identify data samples.  
 
3.2  Research design  
Models to measure real activities manipulation 
In general, in literature two models are indentified to measure real activities 
manipulation.  
 Investigating firm’s total level of REM. As a proxy for REM researchers (Chen et al. 
2007) use abnormal level of cash flows from operations. To determine normal level of 
CFO they use the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998) which was implemented in 
research by Roychowdhury (2006).  
 Examine abnormal level of cash flows from operations and also abnormal discretionary 
expenses and abnormal production costs, and the sum of standardized three REM 
proxies, to capture the effects of real actions presumably better (Roychowdhury 
2006).12  
Roychowdhury focuses on the following three manipulation methods:  manipulation of 
sales, overproduction, decrease of discretionary expenses . In general, some of three 
activities would increase operating cash flows, but some would decrease them. 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to develop a model, that will more precisely measure 
whether the increasing level of solvability (leverage) of a company is an incentive for 
management to manipulate earnings through real activities  and not the existence of a 
higher or lower level of  REM. Therefore, I use abnormal CFO based on Roychowdhury 
[2006], as a proxy for REM. The reason is twofold. First, I am primarily interested in 
investigating a firm’s total level of REM in order to identify increasing effects of REM on 
cash flow from operating activities rather than a mixture of positive and negative effects 
of REM on cash flow from operating activities, and abnormal cash flow from operation is 
one such aggregate measure. Second, not one model is deemed to have prevalence above 
the other model. The explanation could be that studies concerning REM are only in 
development.  
 
Normal level of CFO 
To determine normal level of cash flow from operating activities for every firm and year, I 
use the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented in research by 
Roychowdhury (2006).  
Roychowdhury (2006) explains normal CFO as linear function of sales (Sit) and change in 
sales in the current period (ΔSit). All variables in the model are scaled by lagged total 
assets (Ai,t-1).  
 
(CFOit /TAi, t-1 =  α0t + α1t [1/TAit-1] + α2t [Sit/TAi, t-1] + α3t [∆Sit/TAi, t-1] + εit  (1) 
 
 
                                             
12 This proxy for REM has been used and verified to be valid in subsequent studies by Gunny (2006), Cohen 
(2007), Zhang (2006), Zang (2007). 
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Abnormal CFO 
Next, for every firm and year, I calculate abnormal level of cash flow from operation (RE). 
Abnormal CFO is equal to actual cash flow from operation minus the “normal” cash flow 
from operation computed using estimated coefficients from the above equation (1). 
 
Model to measure level of leverage 
In general, two widely used methods exist to measure the level of leverage. Measurement 
based on the use of book value debt and equity (i.e., accounting) or market value of debt 
and equity.  There is no law or regulation stating how the level of leverage should be 
measured. For example, in case of leased assets accountants try to estimate the present 
value of the lease commitments. In the case of long term debt they simply show the face 
value. This can sometimes be very different from present value.  To be consistent with 
previously studies (i.e., Nwaeze et al. 2005; Jelinek 2007), first I measure leverage 
(LEVERAGE) as the ratio of long term debt to the total of book value of equity and long 
term debt.  Although more commonly a ratio of long term debt to book value of equity is 
used, I use this method as it is preferable in situations where a sample includes companies 
with a negative book value of equity. A negative book value of equity would otherwise 
result in a low leverage level (negative) despite the absolute value of long term debt. 
Therefore the first formula to calculate LEVERAGE can be shown as follows:  
 
(LEVERAGE) = long-term debt / book value of equity + long term debt.   (2) 
 
Furthermore, I also measure the level of leverage using market values as valuation models 
in the finance literature that use leverage ratios as inputs are generally based on the 
market value of debt and equity (White et al. 2003). Market values of both debt and equity 
are available or can readily be estimated, and their use can make the ratio a more useful 
analytical tool. The use of market values, however, may produce contradictory results. 
The debt of a firm whose credit rating declines may have a market value well below face 
amount. A debt ratio based on market values may show an “acceptable” level of leverage. 
A ratio that would control for this phenomenon and can be used in conjunction with book- 
or market-based debt ratios is one that compares debt measured at book value to equity 
measured at market: 
The formula for calculation this leverage ratio is as follows:  
 
(LEVERAGE) = long-term debt at book value / market value of equity.   (3) 
 
In addition, I also use the actual book value of long term debt as a measure for solvability.  
The main reason for this is the assumption that a company with a high absolute amount of 
long term debt could be closely monitored by the issuers of debt irrespective of the 
relative value of long term debt in comparison to equity. Therefore, I want to measure 
whether the total amount of long-term debt is correlated to the level of REM. To 
determine the LEVERAGE based upon this measure, leverage is calculated as shown below: 
 
(LEVERAGE) = long-term debt.         (4) 
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Model to measure hypotheses 
Since I have chosen to calculate leverage in three separate ways in order to determine 
whether one or more of these models individually affect the level of REM, the hypothesis 
H2 is subdivided into three sub-hypotheses. I estimate three distinct models by using 
ordinary least squares regression to separately test the three hypotheses. 
In order to reflect the first book value approach to calculating the leverage ratio, I have 
developed the following hypothesis: 
  
H2.A: Real earning management in order to positively affect cash flow from operating 
activities, in leverage-increasing firms, is positively correlated with based on the equation 
(2) measured level of leverage.  
 
To test hypothesis I estimate the following regression: 
 
(RE) = α0 + α1 (LEV_INC) + α2 (SIZE) + α3 (CAPIN) + εit     (5) 
 
In order to reflect the market value approach to calculating the leverage ratio, I have 
developed the following hypothesis:  
 
H2.B: Real earning management in order to positively affect cash flow from operating 
activities, in leverage-increasing firms, is positively correlated with based on the equation 
(3) measured level of leverage. 
 
To test hypothesis I estimate the following regression: 
 
(RE) = α0 + α1 (LEV_INC) + α2 (SIZE) + α3 (CAPIN) + εit     (6) 
 
In order to reflect the absolute value of long term debt as the leverage ratio, I have 
developed the following hypothesis:  
 
H2.C : Real earning management in order to positively affect cash flow from operating 
activities, in leverage-increasing firms, is positively correlated with based on the equation 
(4) measured level of long term debt . 
 
The hypothesis H2.C represents that REM is positively correlated to leverage for leverage-
increasing firms, when using the absolute value of long term debt in calculating leverage. 
To test hypothesis I estimate the following regression: 
 
(RE) = α0 + α1 (LTD_INC) + α2 (SIZE) + α3 (CAPIN) + εit     (7) 
 
Control variables 
This study controls for size. Large firms are more widely followed by the analyst’s 
community and have a different information environment than smaller firms. To control 
for this I include variable (SIZE) in the regression. Also, I include variable (CAPIN) to 
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control for capital intensity. Zhang (2006) suggests that cash flow information is relatively 
more important for capital intensive firms than for non-capital intensive firms.  
 
3.3  Sample period and sample selection 
Similar to Roychowdhury (2006), I require that cash flow from operating activities is 
available on Compustat from the Statement of Cash Flows. This restricts my sample to the 
post-1986 period. As stated  previously, I strive to examine changes in REM across leverage 
increasing firms and highly leveraged firms. For identifying the sample period I use results 
of previous studies. The studies by Graham et al. (2005); Cohen et al. (2007) documented 
that the level of REM activities declines prior to The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and 
increased significantly after the passage of SOX.  As a result my sample is further 
restricted to the post-2002 period. The effects of SOX are expected to be presented earlier 
in financial information of US based companies compared to foreign private issuers (foreign 
companies listed on the US stock exchanges) who were not required to comply with SOX 
until 2005. As such, my study will collect data for U.S. firms in Compustat rather than non-
U.S. companies. To determine the sample and firm classification, I carry out a similar 
sample selection method as previously presented by Jelinek (2007) in her study. As a result 
the total number of companies in my data set equals to 1.287 firms (7.722 observations). 
Next, I divided my total sample of 1.287 firms into the following three potential samples: 
Samples 1 year 2002-2004, Sample 2 year 2003-2005 and Sample 3 year 2004-2006. Then, 
based on Jelinek (2007), I classified each firm in each of three samples as Leverage-
Increase firm or Constantly Highly-Leveraged.   
 
Figure 1. Determination of leverage-increasing firms and control firms  
Most Leveraged      4th Quartile      4th Quartile
      3th Quartile      3th Quartile
       2th Quartile      2th Quartile
Least Leveraged      1th Quartile      1th Quartile
 
 
A firm is classified as a Leverage-Increasing firms if: the firm is initially in the first 
(bottom) or second quartile of the sample leverage distribution at the beginning of a 
sample period and moves up at last 2 quartiles by end of the sample period. A firm is 
classified as a Constantly Highly-Leveraged if it is in the third quartile of the leverage 
distribution at both the beginning and the end of a sample period, or in the fourth quartile 
of the leverage distribution at both the beginning and the end of a sample period. I 
excluded all firms without classification from each of the three samples.  
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4.  Results 
 
Introduction 
This section presents the test of hypotheses, the results and interpretation of results.  
 
4.1  Test and Results 
 
Test 1 Hypothesis H2.A 
Consistent with hypothesis H2.A, leverage-increasing firms, where leverage is measured 
based on book value of equity, should have increased abnormal CFO at the end of a sample 
period.  
I run regressions (5) for each Box separately. Then, I also re-estimate the regression (5) for 
all three samples together. The results of this test are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: 
Leverage calculated based on book value of equity:   
      After elimination     Test results 
Sample Period 
Sample 
N 
Leverage 
increasing 
N 
Control 
N 
Total 
Sample
Hypo-
thesis Coefficient Significance
Box 1 
2002-
2004 1287 75 348 423 H.2A positive 
not 
significant 
Box 2 
2003-
2005 1287 86 413 499 H.2A positive 
not 
significant 
Box 3 
2004-
2006 1287 84 453 537 H.2A negative significant 
Total   245 1214 1459 H.2A negative 
not 
significant 
 
The output shows that the coefficient of LEV_INC is positive, but not significant in two first 
regressions for sample-box 1 and box 2 (p-value equals .194 and .437). In the regression of 
sample-box 3 the coefficient is reported as a negative (-.114) and significant (p-value is 
0.006). This result indicates that increased leverage, relative to constantly high levels of 
leverage, is associated with negative REM, suggesting reduced operating cash flow 
manipulation. However, average prediction accuracy (Adjusted R-square) equals to 8%. 
Therefore the results of sample-box 3 require further investigation in future research using 
a larger sample and a longer post-SOX sample period. 
 
Test 2 Hypothesis H2.B 
Consistent with hypothesis H2.B, leverage-increasing firms, where leverage measured 
based on market value of equity, should have increased abnormal CFO at the end of a 
sample period. I run regressions (6) for each Box separately. Then, I also re-estimate the 
regression (6) for all three samples-boxes together. The results of this test are presented 
in Table 3. 
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Table 3: 
Leverage calculated based on market value of equity:   
      After elimination     Test results 
Sample Period 
Sample 
N 
Leverage 
increasing 
N 
Control 
N 
Total 
Sample
Hypo-
thesis Coefficient Significance
Box 1 
2002-
2004 1287 70 252 322 H.2B negative 
not 
significant 
Box 2 
2003-
2005 1287 76 304 380 H.2B positive Significant 
Box 3 
2004-
2006 1287 86 348 434 H.2B positive 
not 
significant 
Total   232 904 1136 H.2B positive 
not 
significant 
The output produced by SPSS reports that only in Box 2 coefficient of LEV_INC positive 
(.194) and significant at 5% level (p-value 0.040), suggesting that leveraged–increasing 
companies in sample box 2 are more likely to manipulate cash flows. The coefficient on 
leverage in two other boxes is not significant. Average prediction accuracy (Adjusted R-
square) is equal to 7%. The re-estimating of the regression (6) for all three samples 
together does not present significant result on increased leverage. 
Test 3 Hypothesis H2.C 
Similar to the hypotheses H2.A and H2.B I test the hypothesis H2.C.The results of this test 
are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: 
The actual book value of Long Term Debt is used:   
      After elimination     Test results 
Sample Period 
Sample 
N 
Leverage 
increasing 
N 
Control 
N 
Total 
Sample 
Hypo-
thesis Coefficient Significance
Box 1 
2002-
2004 1287 8 107 115 H.2C positive significant 
Box 2 
2003-
2005 1287 10 120 130 H.2C positive significant 
Box 3 
2004-
2006 1287 9 124 133 H.2C positive significant 
Total   27 351 378 H.2C positive significant 
                  
 
The results show that the coefficient on long term debt (LTD_INC) is positive and 
significant at 1% level in all three boxes (Box 1: 0.117, Box 2: 0.142, Box 3: 0.095) which is 
consistent with H2.C. In other words the results of this test suggests, that firms with 
increased long term debt are more likely to manipulate CFO, which support H2.C 
hypothesis; management appears to be managing cash flows more in these firms than in 
other firms. Also by re-estimating of the regression (7) for all three samples together the 
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coefficient on long term debt is positive and significant at 1% level. The average adjusted 
R square is 30%.   
 
 
5.  Analysis of results and suggestions for further research 
 
5.1  Analysis 
In summery, I examine the impact of increased leverage on REM, paying particular 
attention to distinguish between highly leveraged and leveraged increasing firms. The main 
hypothesis states that increased leverage results in real earnings manipulation by 
management in order to affect cash flow from operating activities.  
I estimate three distinct models by using ordinary least squares regression to separately 
test three sub-hypotheses. The sub-hypotheses are based on three different methods to 
measure level of leverage.  
The overall test results indicate that from three above mentioned hypotheses: H2.A, H2.B 
and H2.C only the last hypothesis supports the main hypothesis H1. This hypothesis states 
that the leverage results in real earnings manipulation by management in order to affect 
CFO firms, when using the absolute value of long term debt in calculating leverage. The 
results of testing of the hypotheses H2.A and H2.B are ambiguous and as such no evidence 
has been found to support these hypotheses by my research. H2.C however does provide an 
unambiguous support to the main hypotheses. 
 Furthermore, it is worth noting the relation between real earnings measure proxy and two 
control variables SIZE and CAPIN. The coefficient on capital intensity (CAPIN) is significant 
at 1% level and positive across all regressions, consistent with Zhang (2006), finding that 
CFO is relatively more important for capital intensity firms. In contrast to Zhang (2006), 
the coefficient on SIZE is positive and significant across all regressions. The explanatory 
power of last model is quite high compared to other models. 
 
5.2  Suggestions for further research  
This study consists of some data limitations and different assumptions in the models.   
First, Jelinek (2007) distinguishes between firms with leverage increases and the firms with 
leverage that is consistently high at the both the beginning and the end of a six 
consecutive five-year sample periods (from 1992 to 2002). The main reason for this is to 
avoid capturing temporary changes in debt, which may not meaningfully impact managerial 
behaviour. As indicated in previously chapters, the level of REM activities declines prior to 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 and increased significantly after the passage of SOX.  
As a result my sample is restricted to the post-2002 period and consists of only a five-year 
period (from 2002 to 2006) – I use three consecutive three-year sample periods with the 
assumption that the expected results are not affected. Therefore the recommendation for 
further investigation in the future research is to use a larger sample and a longer post-SOX 
sample period. 
Second, this study collects the data for U.S. firms in Compustat rather than non-U.S. 
companies. In future years I recommend that this study is also carried out for non-U.S. 
companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges or more widely on listed stock exchanges in 
varies countries.  
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Third, I measure the level of leverage using market values as valuation models in the 
finance literature that use leverage ratios as inputs are generally based on the market 
value of debt and equity. A debt ratio based on market values may show an “acceptable” 
level of leverage.  I use the ratio that would control for this phenomenon and that 
compares debt measured at book value to equity measured at market. 
Also, other causes may play a role that have not yet been addressed. One of these causes 
is the method of measurement of abnormal cash flows from operating activities. Abnormal 
CFO is measured on the basis of the figures from the previous period (assets etc).  For 
example, if business activities are suddenly increased in the current year through 
acquisitions, increased CFO that would be justified by this increase, would be incorrectly 
marked as abnormal. Use of the pro forma financial information could control for this 
phenomena. 
  
 
6.  Summary and conclusion 
 
6.1  Summary 
As my main subject of this paper is to understand whether there could be an incentive for 
managers to manipulate cash flow from operating activities through the use of real 
earnings management, in situations with increasing leverage, external financing in relation 
to earnings management was discussed. I found several studies that linked the level of 
external financing to the use of real earnings management. However, no studies were 
found that specifically linked increasing levels of external financing or leverage to the use 
of real earnings management. Based upon a study of Jelinek (2007) who researched the 
correlation between increasing levels of leverage and accrual earnings management, I 
developed my main hypothesis with respect to the effect of leverage increases on real 
earnings management and more specific on real earnings management to influence cash 
flows from operating activities. My results indicate that by the distinguishing between 
highly leveraged and leveraged increasing firms, the leverage results in real earnings 
manipulation by management, in order to affect CFO, when using the absolute value of 
long term debt in calculating leverage.  
 
6.2  Conclusion 
This study is motivated by business press and recent researches that firms engage in 
manipulation of operating cash flows. The results make the following main contribution to 
existing literature. First, this study is the first that measures the impact of leverage levels 
and leverage changes based on Jelinek (2007) on abnormal CFO. My results indicate that by 
the distinguishing between highly leveraged and leveraged increasing firms, the leverage 
results in real earnings manipulation by management, in order to affect CFO, when using 
the absolute value of long term debt in calculating leverage. In other words the results 
suggest that firms with increased long term debt are more likely to manipulate cash flow 
from operation. Second, my result is significant in light of previous recent literature on 
leverage/REM where the researches do not find evidence of a significant association 
between leverage and real activities manipulation as incentive for managers to manage the 
operating cash flows. (Roychowdhury 2006, 35; Zhang 2006, 26). This is primarily because 
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previous research focused on constant leverage (high, low or scaled) and not on leverage 
increases. It is however important to keep in mind certain limitations in my research which 
are discussed in section 5. 
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Real economic activity and earnings 
management from a cross-country 
perspective 
 
 
 
Romy Tylsch13 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence on differences in the extent of earnings 
management across countries. I use an earnings management detection model developed 
by Leuz et al. (2003) to determine this extent in Germany, Japan, and the USA. Based on 
previous research, I hypothesize due to differences in prevailing institutional factors in 
those countries that earnings management is most pervasive in Germany and least 
pervasive in the USA with Japan exhibiting values in between. The results mostly confirm 
the hypothesis. Moreover, I investigate a possible link between real economic performance 
of a country and the extent of earnings management. I expect a negative correlation 
between them, whereas the intensity of this relation decreases with increasing 
pervasiveness of accounts manipulation in a country. Empirical results confirm these 
hypotheses partly. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Earnings management, or accounts manipulation as it is also called, is a distinct area of 
concern in financial reporting. Recently, the credibility of performance measures has 
increased in importance especially with the occurrence of recent accounting scandals such 
as in the cases of WorldCom and Enron. As stated by Lev (2003), earnings are a standard 
measure for investor’s valuation models, as well as an indicator for business and 
management performance which makes it vulnerable to manipulation.  
 
For the purpose of this paper, I adapt a definition by Healy and Wahlen (1999, 368): 
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
                                             
13 Associate Assurance IS, PricewaterhouseCoopers WPG AG, Berlin. Supervisor of the 
master thesis: ms. Dr. Y. Wang. 
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Managers achieve the above mentioned incentives by creating a smooth increase of the 
earnings figure over time or by using discretionary actions to meet or beat benchmarks. 
Graham et al. (2005) note that smooth earnings are preferred by management because 
predictions about future performance can be made more easily. Glaum et al. (2004) state 
that losses, declining income, and earnings figures that do not meet analysts’ forecasts 
lead to doubt among investors about the company’s future growth prospects, which may 
lead to major problems at the company.  
 
Extensive research has been made in this field by academics since the 1970s. International 
accounting research is concerned with the question which and to what extent market 
forces and institutional factors influence earnings management practices. Based on 
previous research on specific institutional factors in a country, e.g. by Guenther and 
Young (2000), and Leuz et al. (2003), I summarize findings of previous research regarding a 
de- or increasing impact on earnings management pervasiveness by different institutional 
factors, such as the political influence on the national accounting system, corporate 
culture and ownership in firms, the prevailing financial system in a country, and 
conformity of tax and accounting laws. Since those institutional factors differ across 
countries, I also expect earnings management to vary.  
 
In particular, my research focuses on Germany, Japan and the USA because those countries 
stand for contrary institutional factors. Thereby, I expect Germany to exhibit the greatest 
extent of earnings management and the USA the smallest extent. An empirical analysis 
using a detection model developed by Leuz et al. (2003) is conducted in order to obtain 
evidence for my expectations. 
 
The economic performance of a country is an institutional factor that has not obtained 
much attention in the past. Jin (2005) analysed that earnings management in aggregate 
varies across countries and is dependent on economic conditions. The variation within one 
country is predictable from real economic activity. My research investigates whether this 
statement can be confirmed by empirical research. I hypothesize a negative relation 
between the economic performance of a country and the extent of accounts manipulation. 
 
In addition, I claim that the association is closer in some countries than in others. Thereby, 
I expect that the higher the general pervasiveness of earnings management, the lower the 
association between accounts manipulation and economic activity. Basis for this conclusion 
is a study conducted by Guenther and Young (2000) who investigated an association 
between real economic activity and company performance measures and find that 
company performance measures reflect real economic performance of the firm in different 
degrees across countries. 
 
Specific outcomes of Guenther and Young’s (2000) study are a low relation for Germany 
and a high association for the USA, with Japan exhibiting a value in between. I expect the 
same result for my research. This conclusion is based on the fact that earnings are also a 
measure for company performance that reflects economic activity in varying intensity 
across countries due to prevailing institutional factors. 
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As introduced above, research in international accounting attempts to find ways to predict 
the pervasiveness of earnings management under the influence of certain institutional 
factors or economic conditions. In addition, the presence of earnings management is not 
desirable from an investor’s point of view. Therefore, investors should be more cautious 
when earnings management practices are expected to increase. My approach contributes 
to the research in international accounting, because it helps regulators and financial 
analysts predict the extent of earnings management under certain economic conditions.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a comprehensive literature 
review. Chapter 3 develops hypotheses and describes the research design. Chapter 4 
presents the results of the research and analyses those. Chapter 5 provides a summary and 
conclusions of the findings.  
 
 
2.  Literature review 
 
2.1  Institutional factors  
It should be noted that certain institutional factors coincide with each other. However, it 
is still crucial to analyse them separately on how they individually influence management 
behaviour. Certainly, incentives on firm-level still hold across countries, but their 
importance in financial reporting differs by the existing institutional factors.  
 
Political influence in standard setting 
Ball et al. (2000) distinguish two legal systems based on their political influence in 
accounting standard setting, namely common-law and code-law systems. In general, those 
systems are the basis of existence of the stakeholder and shareholder governance model 
respectively. High political influence is noted for code-law systems, whereas in common-
law countries, the market and private sector develops and decides about accounting 
practices.  
 
As mentioned above, the common-law system coincides with the shareholder governance 
model and refers to common-law countries, also called outsider economies, such as the 
USA and UK. In this legal system a board of professionals which is elected by shareholders, 
develop new accounting standards.  
 
In code-law countries, also called insider economies, such as Germany, France or Japan, 
Government is heavily involved in the development of new standards. The reason for that 
lies in the fact that code-law originates from collective planning in the public sector. For 
that reason, political pressure on accounting occurs on national and firm level. 
Governments cooperate with business units, banks and political parties when legislating 
and implementing national accounting standards 
 
On firm level, political influence comes from major ‘stakeholders’, such as banks, 
Government, managers, or creditors, who interact with firms. In the stakeholder 
governance model, accounting income can be described as a “pie” that must be separated 
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between those groups of interest. Consequently, major stakeholders influence the way and 
extent earnings are managed, which leads to a higher extent of management in code-law 
countries than in common-law countries 
 
Classifying countries is a necessary step in a research analysis. However, this approach may 
not reflect reality. For instance, Ball et al. (2000) and Guenther and Young (2000) raise the 
question of homogeneity of those models within countries. They conclude that code and 
common law interact with each other. Financial reporting is always balanced in the 
middle, i.e. no pure planning or market system exists. For the purpose of my paper, I 
classify countries according to the general tendency of the respective institutional factor. 
 
Corporate governance and ownership 
Corporate Governance is a broad term describing the way how investors assure that they 
receive a return from their investment into a corporation (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Studies by Leuz et al. (2003), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and La Porta et al. (2000) 
describe that the pervasiveness of earnings management is lower in countries where strong 
investor protection, a dispersed ownership structure, and developed equity markets are 
prevalent. I analyse the logical background for those findings below.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) analyse that insiders, i.e. managers attempt to conceal private 
benefits they gain from outsiders, i.e. investors to the public because otherwise they 
would be held reliable for them. More specifically, insiders want to prevent outsiders from 
interfering because private control benefits of managers would be unmasked. That is why 
losses are attempted to be hidden and or earnings figures managed. This lack in 
transparency of firm performance and earnings management actions is called information 
asymmetry. Studies by Trueman and Titman (1988) and Dye (1988) found that its existence 
is a necessary condition for earnings management.  
 
Evidence for those findings has been delivered by an empirical research by Leuz et 
al. (2003). The authors clustered 31 countries with similar legal and institutional features 
into three identified groups and found by measuring the general pervasiveness of earnings 
management for each country that earnings management is exercised least in the first 
group, with an increasing extent in the second group, and most in group three.  
 
In particular, cluster one are mostly outsider economies with common-law structures that 
exhibit a strong legal enforcement and a large equity market. Examples are the United 
Kingdom and The USA. Cluster 3 includes countries, such as Italy and India that follow 
mainly code-law structures, i.e. with centralized ownership, less developed stock markets 
and weak legal enforcement. The second cluster is composed of countries that are 
wealthy, i.e. can afford a strong legal enforcement of laws. However, otherwise they 
exhibit rather code-law structures. 
 
In outsider economies with a usually dispersed ownership structure, firm performance must 
be communicated to all shareholders in a cost-effective way, i.e. by financial statements. 
This creates a demand for financial information that reflects true firm performance, as it 
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is also stated by Guenther and Young (2003), which should have a decreasing effect on the 
extent of earnings management.  
 
Orientation of financial systems 
As explained by Berglof (1990), financial systems can be divided into two categories: bank-
oriented and market-oriented. The major characteristic of bank-oriented systems is the 
close relationship between banks and companies. In fact, they cover the predominant part 
of the capital needs of the businesses. Furthermore, in bank- oriented systems, the 
demand for published financial statements is decreased because banks have access to the 
respective company’s internal information.  
 
Market-oriented systems are based on the operation of numerous, diversified investors 
with bounded or limited access to company information. Referring to the previous analysis 
of shareholder protection, financial accounting disclosure is essential for each capital 
provider to ensure effective communication. This argumentation implies that earnings 
management should be less pervasive in market-oriented systems. 
 
With respect to Ail and Hwang (2000), the extent of bank- or market-orientation can be 
measured by the debt-to-asset ratio. According to Berglof (1990), bank-oriented systems 
have a higher debt-to-asset ratio. The reason lies in the following relation: If in a bank-
oriented system are no restrictions imposed on commercial banks, then banks can easily 
control firms and extend credit beyond levels acceptable in market-oriented systems. 
Guenther and Young (2000) identified in a comparison of five countries (France, Germany, 
Japan, The USA, and UK) the highest debt-asset ratios for France and Germany and the 
lowest debt –asset ratios for the UK and the US. 
 
Conformity of tax with financial accounting rules 
Another aspect to be covered is the conformity of tax accounting rules with a country’s 
financial accounting rules. High conformity means that financial statements are prepared 
both for financial reporting and tax purposes. According to Guenther and Young (2000), 
conformity is high in countries, such as Germany, France, and Japan, and low in the UK 
and USA. Economic earnings are reflected in a better way by non-conform systems because 
managers tend to manage taxable income in order to minimize taxes. I conclude that 
earnings management tends to be more pervasive in countries with high conformity of the 
two sets of rules.  
 
The quality of accounting standards 
Ball et al. (2003) have analysed that not the accounting standards, but rather the 
preparers’ incentives, and other institutional structures are important when classifying 
countries to determine the quality of financial reporting on firm level. The authors have 
analysed earnings timeliness and conservatism for four East Asian Countries. The sample 
countries have similar accounting standards categorized as common-law. Ball et al. (2003) 
find that despite the similarity of accounting standards with the ones in the UK or the US, 
those countries do not resemble the same earnings properties because they differ in 
institutional factors to the US or UK. The authors conclude that accounting standards of 
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high quality may be necessary for the quality of accounting information, but not absolutely 
sufficient.  
 
2.2.  The link between real economic activity and earnings management 
In the literature, macroeconomic activity is widely measured by its output, i.e. the gross 
domestic product (GDP) of a country, because it de- and increases with the economy. 
Relating to Clayton and Giesbrecht (1997), the proxy can be interpreted as the market 
value of all final goods, services and structures which were produced over one year period 
by production forces in specific country. 
 
Turning to the earnings management side, according to Jin (2005), the magnitude of 
earnings management fluctuates quarterly and its variation is predictable from real 
economic activity. In particular, he analyses that the aggregate extent of earnings 
management is bigger during recession then during expansion. Thereby, the relation 
between earnings management and real GDP growth is not linear. In particular, it exhibits 
a U-shape. Earnings management decreases with real GDP growth up to a certain point, 
after which it increases with real GDP growth, and vice versa. The author explains this 
situation with the fact that, in very weak economic periods, managers tend to engage in 
“take a bath” form of earnings manipulation at which all liabilities are recognised in one 
period. The reason for that behaviour is that an extreme growth in earnings can be 
reported in the following period. On the contrary, in very strong economic periods, 
managers reserve some earnings for future purposes using “cookie jar” strategy (Jin 2005). 
 
I imply from the study above that as long as GDP does not grow at an extreme rate, there 
exists a negative association between the pervasiveness of earnings management and GDP 
growth, i.e. the higher GDP growth, the lower earnings management and vice versa.  
 
 
3.  Hypothesis development and research design 
As a result of the literature review in the previous section, Germany's institutional 
framework entails predominantly factors that are categorized as earnings management 
encouraging. The opposite holds for The USA with predominantly earnings management 
discouraging factors. 
 
Japan’s situation is somewhat extraordinary in the attempt to classify countries because 
although it is classified as a code-law country, it is currently moving away from this code-
law approach to the more economic common-law approach (Choi et al. 1999). Dietl (1998) 
explains that accounting rules in Japan are both based on Commercial Code and the 
Securities and Exchange law which are stakeholder and shareholder oriented respectively. 
In situations, where the commercial code does not give guidance, the Securities and 
Exchange law steps in and provides accounting rules through business practices. As in 
Germany, financial statements must conform both to financial and tax accounting. 
However, this assumption holds only in areas regulated by the commercial code. 
Therefore, there exist cases where code rules do not apply.  
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Hypothesis 1 
Considering the legal and economic situations in those three countries, I expect the 
pervasiveness of earnings management to be distributed as follows: 
 
H1a: Earnings management is significantly more pervasive in Germany than in the USA. 
 
H1b: Earnings management is significantly more pervasive in Germany than in Japan. 
 
H1c: Earnings management is significantly more pervasive in Japan than in the USA. 
 
In order to provide evidence for my assumptions, I conduct an empirical research using a 
method developed by Leuz et al. (2003). The authors have shaped four earnings 
management proxies in order to capture different earnings management activities on 
country-level. Generally, those concern the detection of income smoothing, discretion 
practices and accrual manipulation in reported earnings. The four independent measures 
of earnings management for each country are combined to an aggregate measure for each 
country. 
 
In accordance with Burgstahler et al. (2006), I note that those four proxies are not perfect, 
especially because they cannot determine the absolute extent of earnings management. 
However, they present a clear tendency and can be used for comparison across countries, 
especially with a large sample size and over a long period of time.  
 
I analyse the four proxies used to determine the extent of earnings management on 
country-level below. 
 
(i) Income smoothing decisions 
According to Burgstahler et al. (2006), operating earnings can be used as a measure for 
company’s economic performance. In order to detect any abnormality, its variability can 
be deflated by the variability of operating cash flow over the same time period. For that 
reason, I determine the ratio of the standard deviation of the two measures for each firm 
in the sample and select the median ratio, whereas both operating income and cash flow 
from operations are scaled by lagged total assets (Leuz et al. (2003). The median is used in 
order to dampen the effect of outliers. If this measure is low, ceteris paribus, I can 
conclude that managers use accounting discretion to alter the earnings figure in order to 
smooth earnings. Since data about cash flow from operations is not easily available for 
many companies, I compute it indirectly by subtracting the accrual component from 
earnings, according to Dechow at al. (1995). 
 
(CFO)
(OpInc)1
σ
σ
=EM  
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(ii) Smoothing and the relation between changes in accounting accruals and operating cash 
flows 
As described before, according to Leuz et al. (2003), actions, such as accelerating the 
reporting of future earnings or to delay reported expenses in order to hide bad current 
performance, or reserving as a means to underreport current income in order to conceal 
strong performance, may be undertaken. 
 
However, both ways lead to an increase in accruals when cash flow from operations 
decrease, and vice versa (Leuz et al. 2003). According to Skinner and Myers (1999), a 
larger magnitude of it serves as an indicator for income smoothing activity. Consequently, 
the second measure I apply is the Spearman correlation between changes in total accruals 
and changes in total cash flow from operations. In order to obtain a measure on country-
level, the correlation is determined over the entire set of firms in each country, as 
proposed by Leuz et al. (2003). Again, the measures are scaled by lagged total assets. 
 
),(2 CFOACCEM ΔΔ= ρ  
 
(iii) Discretion in reported earnings: The magnitude of accruals 
The third earnings management measure uses the magnitude of accruals as an indicator for 
the degree to which insiders exercise discretion in reporting earnings. The more a 
company’s earnings reflect its cash in- and outflows, the lower is the magnitude of 
accruals with respect to cash flows from operations, i.e. a high absolute value of accruals 
relative to cash flow from operations serves as an indicator for earnings management. As 
before, both measures are deflated by lagged total assets and the median is selected in 
order to avoid the influence of any extreme values on the result (Leuz et al. 2003).  
 
CFO
ACC
EM =3  
 
(iv )Discretion in reported earnings: Small loss avoidance 
According to Hayn (1995), previous empirical research confirms that small reported losses 
are usually rare in relation to small reported profits, e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), 
DeGeorge et al. (1999). The authors agree that a high ratio of small reported profits and 
small reported losses is an indicator for earnings management, since companies manage 
reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses.  
 
The index itself is computed using after-tax earnings scaled by lagged total assets 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). If net earnings are in the range [-0.01, 0), then I can 
classify the firm-year observations as a small loss. On the other hand, if net earnings are in 
the range [0, 0.01], the firm-year observation is classified as a small profit (Leuz et al. 
(2003). 
 
Loss Sm of #
Profit Sm of #4 =EM  
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(v) Aggregate Measure 
Leuz et al. (2003) obtained his overall scores by averaging the country ranks for each 
measure. Since I merely consider three sample countries, this method would not lead to a 
valuable result. That is why I chose to transform the individual earnings management 
measures into percentage values either by scaling or ranking of EM1 to EM4 (from 0 to 100) 
and compute the aggregate earnings management measure by averaging the four individual 
scores for each country. 
 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 
My second hypothesis concerns the association between real economic performance and 
earnings management.  
 
As a result of the literature research in chapter 2, I expect that the extent of earnings 
management decreases with increasing real economic performance in every country, and 
vice versa. For that reason, my second hypothesis can be formulated in the following way: 
 
H2: Real economic activity and earnings management are negatively correlated. 
 
Guenther and Young (2000) have provided evidence that the association between real 
economic activity and firm performance measures differs across countries. Among the 
author's sample countries were Germany, Japan, and The USA, with the USA showing the 
closest association, followed by Japan and Germany in the end. Since company 
performance is also reflected in corporate earnings, the level of reported earnings is 
influenced by the economic performance of a country to some extent. For that reason, I 
expect the same effect for the association between earnings management and real 
economic performance of a country.  
 
H3a: The association between real economic activity and earnings management is closer in 
the USA than in Germany. 
 
H3b: The association between real economic activity and earnings management is closer in 
the USA than in Japan. 
 
H3c: The association between real economic activity and earnings management is closer in 
Japan than in Germany 
 
In order to provide evidence for my second and third hypotheses, which concern the 
association between real economic performance and earnings management, I determine 
the Pearson correlation coefficient of the two measures. In general, the aggregate 
earnings management measure for each country is computed by means of the method 
explained in Model 1 with some minor adjustments for EM1 and EM4 by year. For the first 
earnings management proxy by year, I obtain one ratio for each year (for each country) 
using cross-sectional data of the respective year, as opposed to time series data from 
model 1. In order to determine EM4, I add '1' to each numerator and denominator to 
circumvent invalid results. 
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As a measure for real economic performance, I use the economic growth rate. I agree with 
Guenther and Young (2000) that GDP is an appropriate measure because it completely 
reflects a country’s economic activity. Most researches in the field use real GDP growth as 
a proxy for real economic activity because it reflects the underlying strength of the 
economy best. In addition, the GDP estimate is determined independently from financial 
accounting on firm-level.  
 
As GDP is an estimate with substantive differences in estimation methods, the use of the 
percentage change in my analysis balances out the differences. However, any other 
measure of real economic performance should yield similar results. I also determine the 
percentage change of the aggregate measure of earnings management for each year and 
country of observation because the earnings management score is only a relative measure 
rather than absolute, as stated before.  
 
Sample selection 
I chose the countries Germany, Japan, and the USA for my analysis because they represent 
principal types of standard setting in the world. Especially among those countries, I find 
different institutional factors from which I can derivate my expectations.  
 
The period of observation ranges from 1990 to 2004. I omit accounting data from 2005 till 
today because the introduction of the IFRS in Germany and Japan has somewhat changed 
the way of financial reporting and therefore may disturb the credibility of the results. All 
of the considered target economies have been stable over that time span.  
 
The sample consists of all listed firms on the national stock exchange in each country 
except those from regulated industries, such as financial services. This action is taken 
because management decisions in those businesses are restricted by Government 
regulations. 
 
 
4. Results and analysis 
Annual accounting data is obtained through the Thomson Financial database. The selected 
currency is Dollars to increase comparability across countries. GDP rates are taken from 
the United Nations Statistics Division. My final sample consists of 2 130 firm-year 
observations. 
 
Table 1 displays the distribution of the firm-year observations over the three countries and 
the median firm size of the observed companies in US$. The Median $US sales of the firms 
from 1990 to 2004 are used as a proxy for firm size. The average debt/asset ratio in each 
country is obtained from financial data from 1990 to 2004. Here is to note that, against the 
expectations, the debt/asset ratio of German firms is smaller that of Japanese firms. 
Average GDP per capita is computed from 1990 to 2004 and exhibits similar values for all 
countries 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of sample firms and countries 
 Germany Japan USA Total 
# Firm years 735 720 675 2 130 
# Firms 49 48 45 142 
Median Firm Size in US$ 1,585,343 988,647 1,473,000  
Debt/Asset ratio 20,07 %  30,29 % 17,32 %  
GDP per capita 26,259 33,359 30,102  
 
Model 1 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the four individual earnings management scores. 
The results for EM1 and EM2 reveal that earnings are smoother in Germany than in Japan 
and the USA and smoother in Japan than in the USA. This is expressed by the percentage 
scores which indicate the tendency to manage earnings. 
 
 Earnings management tendencies for EM3 and EM4 are about similar for Japanese and 
German firms, but much lower for the US. In total, Germany obtains the highest rank in 
earnings management pervasiveness. Additional results are that the rank order for the 
three sample countries is different for EM1 and EM2 than for EM3 and EM4. The two 
smoothing measures (EM1 and EM2) indicate a greater extent of earnings management for 
Germany than for Japan, whereas the so called discretion measures (EM3 and EM4) 
indicate a higher pervasiveness for Japan than for Germany.  
 
Table 2: Individual and aggregate earnings management scores 
 
The individual earnings management scores for EM1 to EM4 are obtained as 
described in the model theory. For EM1, EM3 and EM4, annual statement data from 
1991 to 2004 is used. To compute EM2, annual statement data from 1990 to 2004 is 
used. In order to be able to compute an aggregate earnings management score, I 
transform the individual scores into a percentage index which represents the 
tendency to manage earnings. Thereby, high values indicate a strong tendency to 
manipulate accounts. 
 
 
 Germany  Japan  USA  
  %index  %index  %index 
EM1 0,597 65,248 0,7 46,809 0,924 31,206 
EM2 -0,895 78 -0,845 58 -0,703 1,2 
EM3 0,782 58,103 0,795 59,311 0,465 28,51 
EM4 3,381 38,402 3,81 45,315 1,556 8,961 
EMAggr 59,938  52,358   17,469   
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Table 3: P-values for significance of differences in aggregate earnings management score 
 
The two tailed p-values are displayed in this table. 
 Germany Japan USA 
Germany -- -- -- 
Japan 0,49 -- -- 
USA 0,06 0,05 -- 
 
My results show a difference in the extent of earnings management in Germany and Japan, 
which is however not significant. A possible explanation is the unusually low percentage of 
debt/asset ratio in Germany, as noted in Table 1. A high debt/asset ratio is an encouraging 
factor for earnings management. As a result, it may be that the selected German or 
Japanese firms do not represent the expected institutional factors, which may distort the 
results.  
 
Another possible explanation for the insignificant difference of the scores is that there is a 
difference in the power of influence of the prevailing institutional factors. Leuz et 
al. (2003) have tested for the strength of the relation of specific institutional factors and 
the pervasiveness of earnings management. Their findings reveal that outside investor 
protection and legal enforcement explain a substantial portion of the earnings 
management score, whereas ownership structure, the political situation, and the degree of 
tax conformity as individual factors do not have any explanatory power. Those cognitions 
coincide with recent literature. Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2002) find that with 
increasing investor protection, private benefits of control by dominant firm owners 
decrease. 
 
I conclude that the ownership structure is only an effect of investor protection policies and 
therefore not a substantive determinant for the pervasiveness of earnings management. In 
addition, although it is generally believed that the use of earnings for tax purposes raises 
earnings management (Ball et al. (2000), Coppens and Peek 2003), there exist no empirical 
evidence for that. 
 
As a consequence of the analysis above, the driving factor for the difference in the extent 
of earnings management pervasiveness in Germany and Japan is most likely the extent of 
investor protection. Therefore, shareholder rights must be more strongly enforced in Japan 
than in Germany, whereas the difference is not significant. 
 
My results coincide with the findings of Leuz et al. (2003) who developed the model used 
and determined the extent of earnings management in 31 countries. Among those 
countries were Germany, Japan, and the USA. Small differences in the scores for EM1 to 
EM4 with respect to my results can be observed.  
 
A possible reason for that lies in the sample size. My sample size of 2 130 firm year 
observations in total is considerably lower than Leuz et al.’s (2003) for the three countries 
(24 707 firm-year observations). Since the median is used to select the respective score for 
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EM1 and EM3, and the number of ranks is important for the determination of the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient, the volatility of the results increases with a decreasing 
number of observations. 
 
In addition, Glaum et al. (2004) note, that a firm’s propensity to manage earnings is 
dependent on the size. In particular, the authors find that discretionary practices to avoid 
losses are more widespread in firms of greater size, especially in Germany. As a 
consequence, a difference in the firm size should lead to a modified result. Leuz et 
al. (2003) indicate a lower median firm size for Germany (US$ 336 894), and for Japan 
(US$ 463 191), and a higher one for the USA (US$ 3 597 429) in their sample. (See Table 2)  
 
As described in the literature review, both Germany and Japan belong to Leuz et al.’s 
(2003) cluster 2 which predominantly comprises countries with accounting standards with 
code-law origin, and other earnings management encouraging factors. Accordingly, the USA 
are assigned to cluster 1, which consists of countries with outsider economies, and other 
earnings management discouraging factors. This classification indicates that Leuz et al. 
(2003) does not consider earnings management pervasiveness to be significantly different 
in Germany and Japan. 
 
Model 2 
Table 4 presents the aggregate earnings management scores (denoted by EMaggr) for the 
three sample countries by year. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive analysis EM1 to EM4 by year 
The table represents aggregate earnings management scores by year and country. In order 
to obtain an aggregate earnings management score, I translate the individual scores into a 
percentage which denotes the tendency to manipulate accounts. 
 
 Germany Japan USA 
EMaggr % index  % index  % index  
2004 45,03  75,86  22,50  
2003 50,82  64,43  23,65  
2002 60,18  36,40  27,01  
2001 59,88  54,66  11,17  
2000 50,50  38,34  24,24  
1999 68,79  61,75  19,42  
1998 47,35  63,35  23,62  
1997 65,49  45,60  21,84  
1996 50,84  67,04  26,08  
1995 53,64  69,88  24,48  
1994 57,38  53,93  15,05  
1993 56,31  55,03  11,56  
1992 67,37  53,84  37,64  
1991 71,32  73,00  34,76  
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For the analysis, I relate the percentage change of real GDP for the respective country per 
year with the percentage change in the aggregate earnings management measure per year. 
The associations between the two measures are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Correlation Coefficients of the Percentage Change of Real GDP and EM 
 
The considered time period is 1992 to 2004. The displayed p-values are two-tailed 
 
Country Correlation p-value (two tailed) 
Germany 0,088 0,388 
Japan -0,156 0,306 
USA -0,137 0,327 
 
The results show that there is a very small positive correlation in Germany and a small 
negative correlation in Japan and the USA. None of the correlations are significant. 
However, although without significance, the result is partly consistent with hypothesis 2. I 
denote a negative correlation at least for Japan and the USA, as anticipated. As a 
consequence, I cannot confirm hypothesis 2.  
 
I also conducted a randomization test, according to Noreen (1989), in order to test for the 
difference in the correlation coefficients. This procedure provides evidence for hypothesis 
3. However, since the correlation coefficients for all three countries have been low 
initially, the test does not provide any further evidence. As a consequence, the result is 
not consistent with hypothesis 3a, 3b and 3c. In contrast, it is to note that I obtain a higher 
negative association for Japan and the USA than for Germany, as expected.  
 
A reason for the low association in each country may lie in the small sample size and the 
specific model used to detect earnings management. As noted by Burgstahler et al. (2006), 
the model developed by Leuz et al. (2003) only reveals relative values that can only be 
used for comparison. I conclude that it may be inappropriate for a comparison with 
economic activity. In addition, a small number of observations increase the volatility of the 
results which leads to a distortion of the aggregate earnings management score, as in 
model 1. 
 
Another reason for this outcome may be that many of the sample firms are multinational 
firms and thus their earnings figures include national and international performance. To 
address this issue, I calculate the economic growth rate based on GNI because this measure 
accounts for the value of products and services owned by the country, regardless of where 
they are located.  
 
Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients between the percentage change of EMaggr by 
year and the percentage change of GNI. The table indicates that there is a closer 
association of earnings management and real economic activity in Germany than in Japan 
and the USA and the lowest correlation in Japan. The results also show a clear tendency in 
all sample countries for earnings management to correlate negatively with real economic 
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activity, although the results are not significant. In conclusion, hypothesis 2 cannot be 
confirmed, but a tendency to a negative association in each sample country can be 
observed. In addition, since the results are not significant, I can not confirm hypothesis 3a, 
3b, and 3c.  
 
Table 6: Correlation Coefficients Percentage Change in GNI and Earnings Management 
 
The time period of 1992 to 2004 is considered. The displayed p-values are two-tailed. 
 
Country Correlation p-value (two tailed) 
Germany -0,252 0,203 
Japan -0,006 0,48 
USA -0,171 0,288 
 
As mentioned before, the analysis of the impact of institutional and economic factors in a 
country on earnings management practices leaves much room for further research. More 
reliable measures of earnings management need to be developed and the relationships 
between further institutional and economic factors need to be analysed. Other possible 
measures of economic performance may be the percentage change of current year’s 
unemployment rate, the inflation rate, or the percentage change of the following year’s 
money market interest rate. 
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This research paper provides further evidence in the area of international accounting 
research of earnings management. I provide a summary of previous research about the 
impact of institutional factors on the pervasiveness of earnings management. As a result, it 
becomes clear that since varying institutional factors in different countries prevail, the 
general pervasiveness of earnings management is also expected to differ across countries.  
 
Using a descriptive earnings management detection model, I find that the extent of 
accounts manipulation differs among Germany, Japan, and the USA. Thereby, the tendency 
to manage earnings is lowest in the USA, whereas it is highest in Germany with Japan 
exhibiting scores in between. However, a significant difference in the aggregate score can 
only be proved between German and American firms, and Japanese and American firms. 
The difference in earnings management pervasiveness for Germany and Japan is not 
significant. As a conclusion, I can confirm hypothesis 1a and 1b, but not hypothesis 1c. 
 
In order to explain the insignificant difference, I have analysed findings by previous 
research about the influence of specific institutional factors on the pervasiveness of 
earnings management. The result was that investor protection is most likely the driving 
factor for the extent of earnings management. I conclude that this institutional factor may 
not be significantly different from Germany’s which also leads to an insignificant 
difference in earnings management pervasiveness. Another reason may be that the 
selected companies for my research do not entail the expected characteristics of firms 
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from that country. Therefore, the results may be distorted. An indicator for that is the 
unusually low debt/asset ratio for German companies (0,2) compared to the ratio for 
Japanese firms (0,3). According to expectations, the ratio should be lower for Japan than 
for Germany. 
 
Having analysed the influence of institutional factors on accounting practices, my research 
is especially interested in one specific external factor that may influence earnings 
management: real economic performance of a country. I expect a negative association 
between the two items, i.e. when the economy of a country is growing, earnings 
management decreases, and vice versa. Using the percentage change of GDP as a measure 
for real economic activity, I obtain a negative correlation for the USA and Japan and a 
positive correlation for Germany. However, none of the results is significant. In addition, 
the rank order of the three associations is not according to my expectations. As a 
conclusion, I cannot confirm hypothesis 2, 3a, 3b, and 3c. However, the result indicates a 
closer relation of real economic activity and earnings management for Japan and the USA 
than for Germany, as expected. 
 
Since the selected sample countries are multinational firms and generate a substantive 
part of revenues abroad, I exchange the percentage change of real GDP with GNI as a 
measure of economic performance and test again for the association in each country. The 
result is somewhat different. I obtain a negative correlation for each country. The 
outcome is still not significant, but reveals a clear tendency to a negative association in all 
sample countries. Correlation exhibits the highest value for Germany and the lowest value 
for Japan with insignificant differences in the magnitudes. 
 
Regarding my analysis of institutional and economic factors and their impact on the extent 
of earnings management, it is difficult to make absolute statements because earnings 
management is generally difficult to detect and measure. For instance, Healy and Whalen 
(1999) express that academic research gives only a limited knowledge about earnings 
management measures. We never know what accounting choice would have been made 
with the absence of economic and institutional factors.  
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Voluntary disclosure: Evidence from UK 
 
Nikolaos S. Zourarakis14 
 
 
Executive summary 
This paper investigates the voluntary disclosure of Intellectual Capital (IC) of British firms 
and provides some evidence on an unexplored area of the literature; that of the 
association of Corporate Governance (CG) with IC disclosure. Inconsistent with 
expectations, the results show that British firms disclose more information about their 
human capital. On the other hand, findings indicate that ownership structure, size and 
industry are important factors in describing disclosure trends of IC which is in line with 
what anticipated. Lastly the outcomes of the study support the notions of Agency theory 
that refer to manager’s opportunism and information asymmetry. 
 
1. Introduction 
During the last decades information age competition started to substitute the traditional 
industrial age competition and inevitably firms started to formulate their strategies in 
order to be up-to-date with the new business environment and the phosphorus 
opportunities of the new era. In line with this change, the users of financial statements 
adjusted their needs for information to the new circumstances that had been emerged 
from this transaction of economical conditions.  
However, the inadequacies of the traditional accounting systems to incorporate the 
requirements of firms have resulted in an information gap between managers and 
stakeholders. A possible solution for this problem is the provision of voluntary disclosures 
through the annual reports of the firms, which will eventually reduce this gap. Thus, 
voluntary disclosures have gained much attention and have been the center of academics 
and accounting legislators during the last years. Apart from the one described above, a 
new problem came into sight and contributed to the increased demand of voluntary 
disclosures; agency costs, which resulted from the separation of the principals from the 
decision-making function of the firms (Fama and Jensen 1983). . Consequently, voluntary 
information which will eventually eliminate the gap between internal and external parties 
has become a necessity. 
The present paper focuses on a particular type of voluntary disclosure, that of IC. Although 
there is not a consistent definition of IC, it is regarded as a type of intangible asset and a 
form of unaccounted capital. Moreover, IC is highly connected with knowledge 
management and it is a sign of competitive advantage, especially in developed economies 
where technological advances and R&D are of great significance. 
Previous studies concerning IC disclosure explored the reporting practices of companies; 
nevertheless IC literature is still developing and more studies will have to be carried out, 
so that to provide a strong background for future researchers. It has to be mentioned that 
                                             
14 The author would like to thank his supervisor, Mrs dr. Yue Wang, for the attention and the valuable advice 
that has provided throughout the period of the research.  
 84 
none of the studies concerning IC disclosure incorporates the term of corporate governance 
(CG), despite the fact that in the voluntary disclosure literature CG is described as a 
significant factor influencing disclosures. More specifically it is argued that voluntary 
disclosures are a result of managers’ decisions and that the board of directors is the main 
control mechanism in terms of monitoring the management’s actions. Therefore, corporate 
governance (CG) can be a significant factor in explaining voluntary disclosure patterns and 
academic research shows that determinants of CG, such as board composition and 
ownership structure, are positively associated with the voluntarily provision of 
information. 
This study deals with the description of IC disclosure trends of British listed firms and the 
relationship of CG attributes and other firm’s characteristics with IC disclosure. Moreover 
the main objectives of the research is i) the contribution to the existing literature in terms 
of results and ii) the investigation of an unexplored area of the literature; that of the 
association between IC and CG. 
For this purpose, two different techniques were employed. The first is content analysis, 
which aimed to capture the voluntary disclosure trends based on pre-defined IC categories. 
The second is regression analysis, which was the main tool in describing the relationship 
between measures of CG and other firm’s attributes, and IC disclosure.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Next chapter includes the literature 
review, as well as a review of relevant prior research results. Chapter 3 underlines the 
research objectives and presents the major aspects of the methodology employed. Chapter 
4 describes the results obtained, while chapter 5 discusses these empirical results. Finally, 
Chapter 6 concludes the study, discusses the main problems and limitations of the present 
paper, and provides suggestions for further research. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Theoretical background 
Although Johansson et al. (2001) maintain that IC definitions are connected with various 
theories of the organization, in the literature there is not a common view of which theory 
provides a better understanding of IC disclosure, and thus researchers tend to use different 
approaches in order to perform their studies. This is also proven by the fact that the 
majority of the studies do not provide a clear link between IC reporting practices and 
theoretical approaches. This paper acknowledges this fact and addresses this issue by 
adopting Positivist Agency Theory, as a relevant theoretical background in explaining 
voluntary IC disclosure patterns. 
The paradigm on which the paper chose to base its analysis is the positivistic one, which 
assumes that the IC phenomenon is given and can be understood by dividing it in isolated 
parts and adding knowledge to these parts (Bornemann et al. 1999). This approach includes 
hypothetico-deductive testing (O’Donnel 2004) and is based on the assumption that social 
reality is independent of individuals and exists even if these individuals are not aware of it 
(Collis and Hussey 2003). 
Agency theory states that principals (managers) will provide voluntary information only if 
this action increases their welfare or in other words if the benefits from disclosure are 
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higher than the costs incurred. Additionally individuals may be self-interest-seeking. This 
implies that agents may act to serve their own interests rather than the interest of the 
principals. Hence, managers should try to satisfy and convince shareholders that they are 
not acting for their own-interest by providing voluntary information in the annual reports 
(Eisendhardt 1989). 
The emergence of agency costs and the increased demand for voluntary disclosures are 
two strong incentives for managers to disclose a considerable amount of voluntary 
information. Provision of voluntary information by managers can potentially decrease both 
the information gap between the firm and the stakeholders, and the agency costs arisen. 
As Depoers (2000) argues, widely held firms present higher agency costs, which can be 
controlled and eventually decreased through voluntary disclosure. 
Concerning CG, agency theory suggests that wider ownership is more likely to result in a 
higher level of voluntary information, since wide share ownership can create more 
conflicts between managers and stakeholders (principals and agents). Thus, CG policies 
should be formed in such a way that address these conflicts and potentially reduce agency 
costs. Consequently, CG has a crucial role in addressing the relationship between the firm 
and the providers of finance. In view of the fact that IC reflects the hidden value of the 
firm and it is a an indicator of competitive advantage, the role of CG is of major 
importance in formulating the IC reporting trends, indicating the significance placed on IC 
and revealing the will of managers to provide voluntary information related to IC. 
 
2.2 Measuring intellectual capital 
Within the literature there have been identified several frameworks which are used over 
time in order to classify and measure intellectual capital (Table 1). However, the present 
paper focuses on the framework which is considered to be the most relevant for the 
purposes of the study; Intangible Asset Monitor. This framework for IC measurement was 
the major template for the conduction of the research. Intangible Asset Monitor was 
created by Karl Sveiby (1997), who managed to create an intangible asset monitor (IAM), 
which is regarded as one of the most widely accepted models for understanding and 
reporting on IC. The scholar tried to address this issue, by dividing intangible assets into 
three categories; internal structure, external structure and employee competence. 
 
2.3  Prior research studies 
In the literature there are several studies dealing with the issue of voluntary disclosure and 
its determinants. Meek et al. (1995) showed that size and, to a lesser extent, industry are 
important factors in explaining voluntary disclosures. However, their results vary 
depending on the kind of information. Hossein et al. (1995) proved that size, foreign listing 
status and leverage are considered as important incentives for voluntary disclosure. On the 
other hand auditor and assets are insignificant. Furthermore, Chow and Wong (1987) also 
underlined the strong association between size and voluntary disclosure; nevertheless their 
results do not reveal a significant correlation between leverage and assets, and corporate 
disclosure. In line with the previous findings, Depoers (2000) and Raffournier (1995) 
showed that size as well as internationality of a firm affects the provision of voluntary 
information. Finally, the results of McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) demonstrated 
significant relationships between disclosure and size, industry and ownership structure. 
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The present paper acknowledges the results of the above studies and further focuses on 
papers that examine a. the IC disclosure and b. the influence of CG on voluntary provision 
of information.  
 
 
TABLE 1: FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING IC 
 
Developers Framework Classification of IC 
Kaplan and Norton 
(1992) 
The Balanced Scorecard Internal process perspective 
Customer perspective 
Learning and Growth 
Financial Perspective 
Haanes and Lowendahl 
(1997) 
Classification of Resources Competence 
Relational 
Lowendahl (1997) Classification of Resources Competence 
Relational 
Sveiby (1997) Intangible Asset Monitor Internal structure 
External structure 
Employee competence 
Edvinsson and Malone 
(1997) 
The Navigator Human capital 
Structural capital 
Petrash (1996) Value Platform Human capital 
Customer capital 
Organizational capital 
Danish Confederation of 
Trade Unions (1999) 
Three categories of 
knowledge 
People 
Systems 
Market 
Roos et al. (1997) Intellectual Capital Index Human capital 
Infrastructure capital 
Relationship capital 
 
 
2.3.1  IC disclosure 
Empirical studies were performed in several countries to investigate the corporate 
reporting practices on IC and the majority of these studies utilized different IC indicators 
and measurement approaches. The latter fact is rather expected, since both the definition 
and the theory of IC is controversial, as it was previously discussed. The results of the 
studies vary, as far as the content of IC reporting is concerned. On the other hand, the 
majority of the studies reveal a significant relationship between the disclosure amount and 
firm’s characteristics. The findings of the most relevant studies are summarized below. 
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The study of Guthrie and Petty (2000) had a number of imperfections; however it provided 
valuable information to researchers on how to address the crucial issue of IC reporting. 
Findings indicated that IC disclosure was low and Australian firms did not report according 
to an IC framework. Brennan (2001) focused on Irish knowledge-based companies and the 
results showed that companies had substantial IC assets, but they are not measuring these 
assets in an appropriate way. Among the categories, external capital was the most 
reported, followed by internal capital and human capital. The study of Bozzolan et al. 
(2003) revealed that firms pay attention to their external structure, while industry and size 
seem to be relevant factors in explaining the reporting practices. Abeysekera and Guthrie 
(2005) found that companies had increased their IC reporting level and the more reported 
category of the three was external capital, followed by internal capital and human capital. 
Garcia-meca et al. (2005) concluded that the most reported categories of IC are 
customers, strategy and process. On the other hand, firms did not choose to report a big 
amount of information about innovation and R&D. Additionally, the scholars showed that 
the size and the internationality of the firm are positively associated with IC disclosure. 
Guthrie et al. (2006) tried to provide a comparative analysis of IC disclosure in Australia 
and Hong-Kong. Results indicated that Australasian firms did not disclose a high amount of 
information related to IC, while they focused primarily on qualitative data. As it was 
anticipated, size was positively correlated with disclosure for both locations.  
 
2.3.2 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance is highly related to agency theory and its assumptions, since it can 
be defined as a way to protect the shareholders’ interests (Tirole, 2001).  Thus the linkage 
between the problem (agency costs) and the potential solution (voluntary disclosure) is 
how effectively organizations deal with the concept of CG. Within the literature there 
have been identified various determinants of CG, such as ownership structure, board 
composition, managerial ownership, governmental ownership, audit committee and audit 
firms. Regarding the association of CG and disclosure, only few studies have been 
conducted that examine the impact of CG on the extent of voluntary disclosures.  
More particularly, Eng and Mak (2003) examined whether CG measures and other relevant 
factors affect the disclosure of voluntary information. The results showed that ownership 
structure and board composition influence the voluntary disclosure and that lower 
managerial ownership and considerable government ownership are positively associated 
with voluntary disclosure. Blockholder ownership, though, was not a relevant factor in 
describing disclosure trends. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found that two CG measures and 
only one cultural characteristic of firms were associated with voluntary disclosure. Chau 
and Gray (2002) examined the influence of ownership structure of firms on voluntary 
disclosures. The findings showed that more widely held firms disclosed more voluntary 
information, while “insider” or family-controlled firms demonstrated a lower level of 
disclosure. Lastly, Barako et al. (2006) showed that audit committee, board composition, 
foreign ownership and percentage of stocks owned by institutional shareholders are the 
most statistically significant CG measures that influence voluntary disclosure. Among the 
other factors, size and leverage ratio were positively related to the extent of disclosures. 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Research design 
The main purpose of this research is to investigate the magnitude of IC disclosure in annual 
reports of British firms and thus the main research question of the paper is: “What is the 
importance placed from British firms on IC?” Furthermore, one main objective is to 
examine the extent of IC disclosure and reveal the significance placed on IC categories, 
while another goal is to identify the association between IC disclosure and CG measures, as 
well as other firm’s attributes.  
 
3.2.1  Coding Process 
The coding process involved reading the annual report of each company and coding the 
information according to pre-defined categories of IC. More specifically, after reading the 
annual report, each sentence was coded based on a numerical scheme: “0” if no 
information was provided, “1” if qualitative information was provided, “2” if quantitative 
information was provided and “3” if information was presented in graphs, tables or figures. 
Additionally this paper focused on information, that was not requested by laws or 
accounting principles and was provided voluntarily by the companies. Same information 
regarding an IC item was not counted more than once. After its identification, each item 
was classified into the three main categories and sub-categories based on key words that 
were the titles of each sub-category (Table II). 
 
 3.2.2 Statistical Models 
The four main categories (Overall IC disclosure, Internal Capital, External Capital and 
Human Capital) were set as the dependent variables for four statistical models (Model 1, 
Model 2, Model 3, Model 4). The models were estimated based on the following equation: 
 
Regression Model: 
iiiiii
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INDbLRbROEb
ROAbTALnbMObOSbBCbaD
876
54321 )(
+++
+++++=
 
 
a = constant 
b = Coefficients for each variable 
D = Disclosure index (Total Disclosure, Internal capital, External capital, Human capital)  
BC = Board composition (percentage of independent directors in the board of directors) 
OS = Ownership structure (Sum of substantial shareholders, who hold more than 3% of 
ordinary share capital) 
MO = Managerial ownership (Percentage of ordinary shares held by executive directors) 
Ln(TA) = Natural Logarithm of Total Assets (as at 31/12/07) 
ROA = Return on assets 
ROE = Return on equity 
LR = Leverage ratio (defined as Total Assets/Total Liabilities) 
IND = Industry (Dummy Variable; 0 for Financial companies and 1 for non-financial 
companies) 
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1. Employee Relations
2. Employee Related 
Items 
3. Work related 
knowledge and 
competence  
4. Training and 
Development 
“1” for qualitative 
information 
“2” for quantitative 
information 
“3” for figures, tables 
and charts 
1. Intellectual Property 
Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks and Brands 
2. Management Philosophy 
and corporate culture 
3. Information Systems and 
Network Systems 
4. Management Processes 
TABLE II: CODING PROCESS 
 
    Is an IC item included in the sentence? 
 
                      Yes                                         “0” if No 
 
What kind of IC item is it? 
 
 
                Internal Capital   External Capital  Human Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Hypotheses development 
 
Board Composition 
Non-executive directors are a crucial element of the board’s ability to address a potential 
agency conflict (Barako et al. 2006). Hence, higher proportion of non-executive members 
in the board of directors can be a strong incentive for voluntary disclosure. 
 
H1 = IC disclosure is positively associated with the proportion of non-executive members 
in a board. 
 
Ownership structure 
Agency theory underlines that widely held firms are more likely to disclose voluntary 
information due to the effort of managers to prove that they do not act self-centered. 
Thus companies with wide share diffusion are expected to present a higher level of 
disclosure. 
1. External Brands
2. Customers  
3. Distribution Channels  
4. Business 
Collaborations  
5. Company Names  
6. Market Share 
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H2 = IC disclosure is negatively associated with the proportion of shares held by 
substantial shareholders 
 
Managerial Ownership 
Agency costs are more likely to emerge when managerial ownership is low (Eng and Mak 
2003) and thus low managerial ownership is expected to lead to higher disclosure levels 
 
H3 = IC disclosure is negatively associated with managerial ownership 
 
Size 
Large companies undertake more activities and consequently firms need to report more 
information to external parties in order to reduce agency costs. This study utilizes the 
natural logarithm (Ln) of Total Assets as the proxy measure for a firm’s size. 
 
H4 = IC disclosure is positively associated with size 
 
Industry 
Companies were separated in two different groups; financial and non-financial companies. 
In the regression model “Industry” was set as a dummy variable and the first group of firms 
was assigned with “0”, while the second was assigned with “1”.  
 
H5 = IC disclosure is higher for Non-Financial companies 
 
Profitability 
Profitability is regarded as a significant factor from the scope of agency theory, since 
managers of profitable firms tend to use voluntary disclosure as a way to justify their 
position and compensation package (Barako et al. 2006). In the present paper profitability 
is measured with two proxies; ROA and ROE. 
 
H6 = IC disclosure is positively associated with ROA 
 
H7 = IC disclosure is positively associated with ROE 
 
Leverage Ratio 
Finally, leverage ratio is an important factor in corporate reporting, since higher debts 
tend to increase agency costs and hence voluntary disclosure (Meek et al. 1995). Leverage 
ratio is calculated as Total Assets divided by Total Liabilities. 
 
H8 = IC disclosure is positively associated with debt 
 
3.2 Methods Employed 
The first method employed is content analysis, which is a significant tool for gathering 
data through the codification of qualitative and quantitative information into pre-defined 
categories in order to derive patterns regarding the presentation and the reporting of 
information (Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005). The second method, regression analysis, 
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describes the relationship between a quantitative dependent variable and one or more 
independent quantitative variables. In the literature regression analysis is used in order to 
investigate whether various factors are relevant in explaining the amount of IC disclosure.  
 
3.3 Sample 
The final sample consisted of 97 companies, which were listed on FTSE 100 as at 31th 
December 2007 (Appendix I). Three companies (TUI Travel, Thomson Reuters and Carnival) 
were excluded from the sample since they did not provide adequate information about CG. 
The data were gathered mainly by hand, while information about industry and profitability 
was obtained from the official site of LSE15 and Compustat Global respectively. 
It could be argued that the selection of the sample is biased. Nevertheless the majority of 
the previous studies concerning voluntary reporting show that the size of firms is a key 
factor that determines the extent of voluntary information (Gray et al. 1995, Mitchell et 
al. 1995). More particular Gray et al. (1995) mention that a sample consisted of large 
companies is more likely to demonstrate examples of voluntary disclosure, than a similar 
sample of medium or small companies. In addition to this, it has been proved that bigger 
firms tend to disclose more information on their annual reports (Guthrie and Mathews 
1985) and are the pioneers in any improvements in corporate disclosure, due to the 
demanded financial resources that they possess (Andrew et al. 1989). Bigger firms are also 
expected to possess more intellectual capital because they are more noticeable and have 
more resources at their disposal to fund new projects (Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005). Thus 
a sample consisted of large companies is more appropriate, in terms of examining trends, 
identifying innovations and recording voluntary disclosure practices. Therefore, this study 
focuses on the biggest companies listed on the index FTSE-100 of the London Stock 
Exchange, which tracks the performance of the top listed companies ranked according to 
criteria such as market capitalization, liquidity and free float of shares. 
 
3.4 Data Source and Unit of Analysis 
The source of the data was the annual report of each firm for the fiscal year 2007. Annual 
reports are a highly useful source of data, because companies use them to provide helpful 
and important information to account users (Guthrie and Petty 2000). Moreover, annual 
reports give the opportunity to users to make comparisons of management strategies 
across reporting periods, since annual reports are the product of a regulatory procedure 
(Abeysekera 2001; Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005).  
The unit of analysis that should be used in content analysis is a crucial part of this study 
and many papers have highlighted its importance. However, the appropriate unit of 
analysis is a topic highly debated in the IC literature, with words, sentences, paragraphs 
and pages being as the most suitable unit. According to Milner and Adler (1999) words 
contain little meaning without context, while paragraphs and pages have several different 
meanings that are difficult to be coded. Thus, the present paper uses sentences as the unit 
of analysis, so as to ensure that problems related to the use of words, paragraphs or pages 
are overcome and unnecessary unreliability is avoided (Bozzolan et al. 2003). This method 
is supported by many scholars (Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005; Bozzolan et al. 2003; Beattie 
                                             
15 www.londonstockexchange.com 
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and Thomson 2006) because sentences are easily identifiable wholes (Carney 1972) and 
they are preferred when meanings are to be deducted from written data (Gray et al. 
1995). 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Content analysis 
The most reported category of IC was human capital and the most reported sub-categories 
were i) employee related measures, ii) work related competence and knowledge, and ii) 
management philosophy and corporate culture. On the other hand the least reported 
category of IC was external capital and the least reported subcategories were i) external 
brands, ii) market share, and iii) information and network systems. During the research the 
term “intellectual capital” was included to one annual report; nevertheless the company 
that used the term of IC did not provide any relevant information. Regarding the 
categories of IC, all companies disclosed more information about their Human Capital 
which is far the first reported category, followed by Internal Capital and External Capital. 
Detailed descriptive statistics are shown on table III. What is interesting is that out of the 
first ten ranked companies in IC reporting the first is a financial one, while the majority of 
the rest belongs to the non-financial group (Table IV). 
 
TABLE III: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
TABLE IV: TOP 10 COMPANIES ACCORDING TO TOTAL IC DISCLOSURE 
Company Internal 
Capital 
External 
Capital 
Human 
Capital 
Total IC 
disclosure 
Mean 37,4433 30,0619 55,7526 123,2577 
Median 35,0000 27,0000 56,0000 116,0000 
Std. Deviation 17,92052 19,55112 23,33632 46,64053 
Minimum 8,00 2,00 9,00 28,00 
Maximum 101,00 82,00 130,00 242,00 
Company Internal 
Capital 
External 
Capital 
Human 
Capital 
Total IC 
disclosure 
1. HSBC Holdings PLC 60 52 130 242 
2. GlaxoSmithKline 70 81 87 238 
3. National Grid 101 35 80 216 
4. Vodafone Group 54 54 99 207 
5. Rio Tinto 71 18 115 204 
6. FirstGroup 64 55 81 200 
7. SABMiller 49 42 108 199 
8. HBOS 42 82 67 191 
9. Aviva 52 66 69 187 
10. BP 55 24 108 187 
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4.1.1 Overall disclosure 
British companies included on average 123 items that are related to IC items in their 
annual reports; 37 of them refer to internal capital, 30 refer to external capital and 56 
refer to human capital. This means that 52% of the reported IC items are related to 
external capital, 27% to internal capital and 21% to human capital. The most reported sub-
categories were those of “Employee Related measures” and “Management Philosophy and 
Corporate Culture”, while the least reported were “External Brands” and “Information and 
Networking Systems”. 
As far as the companies are concerned, “HSBC Holdings Plc” was ranked first in the Overall 
Disclosure index, followed by “Glaxo SmithKline”, “National Grid”, “Vodafone Group” and 
“Rio Tinto”.  All of the previous firms chose to disclose more information about their 
Human Capital, except “National Grid” which reported a fairly big percentage of Internal 
Capital items. Details of the top ranking companies are shown in Table VI. Finally, the last 
five companies in IC reporting are “Cadbury”, ”Liberty International”, “ENR Corporation”, 
“Lonmin” and “Bunzl”.  
 
4.1.2 Internal capital 
Internal capital is considered as the structural capital which is held inside the company. 
The two most reported sub-categories of internal capital were “Management philosophy 
and corporate culture” and “Management Processes”, representing half of the total 
sentences related to internal capital. On the other hand the category “Information and 
Networking systems” had the lowest marks, although many companies included IT costs on 
their balance sheet. Chart 1 shows the distribution for each internal capital sub-category. 
“National Grid” reported the highest amount of internal capital information, giving 
emphasis on Infrastructure Assets which were assigned with 52 marks. The next ranked 
companies were “Shire” and “AstraZeneca”, which both belong to the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. Finally Bunzl, Eurasian and Liberty International reported the lowest level of 
information with marks 10, 10 and 8 respectively.  
 
4.1.3 External capital 
External Capital, which was the least reported category of IC, refers to relationships and 
value resources that derive from outside the firm. The category with the highest number 
of marks was “Distribution Channels”, while the next two most reported sub-categories 
were “Customers” and “Business Collaborations”. An encouraging sign was that a large 
number of companies included not only sections of “corporate social responsibility” 
reports, but also environmental reports. Of course those companies, which dedicated a big 
part of their annual reports for environmental activities, were mainly companies that their 
operations had an impact on natural resources (Mining, Oil & Gas). The percentages of 
each external capital item are shown in Chart 2. 
“HBOS” was the company with the highest number of reported sentences, followed by 
“Glaxo SmithKline” and “3I Group”. It has to be mentioned that the majority of the first 
ranked companies were financial and this was rather expected since this type of companies 
pay more attention to external business factors.  
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4.1.4 Human capital 
Human Capital has as its focus the employees of the firm and includes areas such as 
education, know-how and entrepreneurial spirit.  This category was the most reported 
among the others, representing almost the half marks of the total IC disclosure. The sub-
category with the highest number of sentences was “Employee Related Measures” followed 
by “Work related Knowledge and Competence”. The category of human capital was also 
the most reported in terms of the number of charts, tables and figures. Chart 3 shows in 
detail the percentages of the reported categories. 
”HSBC Holdings”, “Rio Tinto”, “BP” and “SAB Miller” reported the highest amount of 
information about human capital. All of the previous companies included statements for 
equality in the working sector and gave much emphasis to employee knowledge and 
competence. 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
In order to examine whether CG and firm’s characteristics have a statistically significant 
effect on British firms in terms of IC reporting, four different models were estimated. This 
method assists in examining possible negative or positive associations between the amount 
of IC information disclosure and measures that can affect this amount. In each one of the 
four models, a different dependent variable was set; Overall Disclosure, Internal Capital, 
External Capital and Human Capital. The results are summarized in Table V16 (numbers 
inside the brackets stand for the results of the t-test). 
 
                                             
16 Details about the regression results can be found in Appendix II 
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TABLE V: REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
 
BC = Board composition 
OS = Ownership structure 
MO = Managerial ownership 
Ln(TA) = Natural Logarithm of Total Assets 
ROA = Return on assets 
ROE = Return on equity 
LR = Leverage ratio 
IND = Industry 
 
 
5.  Analysis 
 
5.1  Analysis of results 
The results of the present research show that the crucial elements of IC were adequately 
identified and captured by the firms; nevertheless they were not reported within a 
consistent IC reporting framework. This was rather expected since none of the companies 
that were included in the sample had installed IC reporting framework. More specifically 
the term “Intellectual Capital” was mentioned only in one of the annual reports. This 
proves that British firms seem to be unaware of the systematic reporting of their IC assets. 
The high percentage of human capital items indicates that organizations have highlighted 
the importance of their human assets and resources. Guthrie (2001) gives credit to the fact 
that the adequate reporting of human capital can create several advantages for the 
company, such as the efficient allocation of human resources, the identification of gaps in 
 Internal Capital External Capital Human Capital Total IC 
disclosure 
2R  0,262 0,304 0,239 0,371 
Adjusted 2R  0,195 0,241 0,170 0,314 
F statistic 3,912 4,806 3,454 6,489 
Significance 0,001 0,000 0,002 0,000 
Variables:     
BC 0,115(1,144) -0,200(-2,041)* -0,039(-0,394) -0,059(-0,636) 
MO 0,022(0,228) -0,098(-1,043) 0,033(0,339) -0,016(-0,183) 
OS -0,178(-1,749)* -0,233(-2,358)* -0,228(-2,261)* -0,280(-2,894)** 
Ln(TA) 0,236(1,914)* 0,332(2,773)** 0,450(3,680)** 0,455(3,999)** 
ROA 0,007(0,062) -0,044(-0,400) -0,008(-0,073) -0,020(-0,190) 
ROE -0,048(-0,421) -0,005(-0,050) 0,11(-0,097) -0,015(-0,145) 
LR 0,189 (1,544) 0,023(0,197) 0,12(0,097) 0,088(0,781) 
IND 0,401 (3,822)** -0,084(-0,789) 0,309(2,962)** 0,294(3,999)** 
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skills and abilities of employees, and finally public policy benefits. The lower percentages 
of external and internal capital can be the result of the firms’ unawareness and 
inadequaecy to efficiently report information about these items. On the other hand, when 
taking into account the notions of agency theory one could underline that managers are 
acting in an opportunistic way and thus are hiding crucial IC elements. Eitherway, firms did 
dislcose a substantial amount of information about their human capital, which clearly 
shows the importance placed on this aspect of IC. 
Furthermore, the different weight given on IC categories raises questions as to whether 
British firms have evaluated the significance of their IC as a whole. Particularly the 
relatively low percentage of external capital items can be explained as an inadequate 
identification of external factors related to globalization and intense competition. April et 
al. (2003) outlines the importance of external capital in a domestic economy that is 
pressured from globalization and the need for companies to centre their attention on 
external factors for future growth. Additionally, Guthrie (2001) states that the emphasis 
given towards external capital is related with the intense competition, which characterizes 
segmented and fractured markets. Moreover the reason for lower percentages of external 
and internal capital may lie on the fact that managers are concerned with the exploitation 
of such additional information by competitors. Thus IC disclosure may hide risks, even 
though companies have strong theoretical incentives for disclosing IC information. This 
finding can be explained within the fields of Agency Theory, since such actions indicate 
that managers are acting in an opportunistic way and they do not wish to disclose 
information about IC, because it can be used from competitors to increase their 
competitive advantage.  
The results of the regression analysis can be described as partly adequate in explaining the 
factors of IC disclosure, with the models showing relatively weak explanatory power. On 
the other hand all the models present a significant relationship with only one measure of 
CG; ownership structure. In addition to this, a number of other independent factors that 
are further analyzed below are associated with IC disclosure. Independent variables, when 
used together, can reliably predict the dependent variables at a significant level of 1%, 
since the p-values of F-stat for all models are lower than 1% (Dielman 1991). Furthermore, 
R-squared is relatively low for all IC categories, which indicates that the model was not 
properly specified, since the fit of the regression line to the data is considered better, as 
the value of R-squared tends to one (Dielman 1991, 99). In other words, other variables 
which are not being taken into account by this study, can explain a larger amount of the 
variance. However, R-squared is not in such a low level that deters the researcher from 
reaching to a reliable conclusion. 
Managerial ownership (MO) seems to have a negative association with Total disclosure; 
however p-values for t-tests are insignificant and hence we can reject H1. Board structure 
does not affect IC disclosure, with the exception of external capital, where the association 
is significant at 5% level. Thus, although there seems to be a negative association between 
board structure and IC disclosure for the majority of the models, the adverse statement 
cannot be rejected with high confidence (90% or more). This means that British firms 
disclosed information about their IC, regardless of the percentage of non-executive 
directors in the board or the percentage of ordinary shares held by executive directors. 
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This result is inconsistent with the prior studies, in which both variables demonstrated a 
strong association with voluntary disclosure.  
On the other hand ownership structure (OS) demonstrates a negative association for all 
models, which is considered significant at 1% for total disclosure and 5% for the rest of the 
models. This leads us to accept H2 for all models and conclude that higher percentage of 
ordinary shares held by substantial shareholders results in lower amount of IC information 
provided by the firms. In this case there is a consistency between the present paper and 
previous studies.  
As far as the rest of the factors are concerned, profitability does not influence voluntary 
disclosure, since in any case the association can be considered as significant. Thus, we 
cannot accept H6 and H7 with a high level of confidence. Conversely, size seems to have a 
strong association with IC disclosure, as it was expected. All models demonstrate strong 
associations between size and disclosure, with p-values lower 1% for the majority of the 
models. Therefore we can state that big firms tend to disclose more voluntary information 
about their IC. This fact is consistent with all the studies in the literature and, mostly, 
supports the notion of agency theory about information asymmetry and opportunistic 
behavior. On the other hand, debt does not seem to significantly influence voluntary 
provision of IC information, although there seems to be a positive association with the 
dependent variables. Consequently, it is evident that debt is not an incentive for firms to 
disclose non-mandatory information related to IC. Finally industry seems to have a 
significant association with voluntary disclosure with the exception of the second model. 
Therefore we conclude that Non-Financial of the firms disclose a higher amount of 
voluntary information than financial firms. 
 
 TABLE VI: RESULTS OF THE HYPOTHESIS TESTED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* significant at 5% level 
** significant at 1% level 
NS - Not Significant 
SS - Statistically significant 
 
 Internal 
Capital 
External 
Capital 
Human 
Capital 
Total IC 
disclosure 
H1 NS SS* NS NS 
H2 NS NS NS NS 
H3 SS* SS* SS* SS** 
H4 SS* SS** SS** SS** 
H5 NS NS NS NS 
H6 NS NS NS NS 
H7 NS NS NS NS 
H8 SS** NS SS** SS** 
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5.2 Comparative Analysis 
As far as content analysis is concerned, comparisons with other studies should not be 
performed in terms of absolute numbers, since the numerical scheme followed by these 
papers is not similar to the method adopted by this study. However, the results can be 
compared in percentages, which depict the general trend of IC disclosure.  
British companies focused on their human capital, which is the most reported category 
followed by internal capital, while the least reported category is external capital. This is 
inconsistent with most of the previous IC studies, which showed that companies paid more 
attention to their external capital. Moreover, these studies also revealed the unawareness 
of companies concerning the understanding of IC. This fact was underlined by the present 
paper which revealed that firms in UK have not implemented a theoretical framework on 
which to report IC.  
Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005) argue that the high percentage of external capital reported 
by firms in Sri Lanka stems from the fact that organizations are facing an external 
competition from developed economies where visible brand names are dominant. The 
adverse statement can be also true for British firms since the economy that they operate 
in, which is one of the strongest of the world, does not provide with them with strong 
incentives to report on specific information. This can also be a reason that the “External 
Brand” sub-category is the least reported within the British companies’ sample. 
Guthrie and Petty (2001) attribute the high amount of external capital items reported by 
Australian firms to the rationalization of distribution channels, reconfiguration of firm 
value chains and re-assessment of customer value. However, it seems that British economy 
either has already gone through the economical changes mentioned before or pays less 
attention to these changes since they are not influencing the economy as a whole. 
Finally, Bozzolan et al. (2001) discuss that Italian companies reported a low level of 
information about human capital, because managers were concerned with the potential 
exploitation of such information from competitors. However, it seems that managers of 
British firms place a completely different meaning on human capital and this shows that 
the reporting of IC items is highly attributable to the economic circumstances and the 
corporate reporting background of each country. 
Concerning the measures of CG (ownership structure, managerial ownership and board 
structure) only one seems to be strongly associated with disclosure at 1% significant level. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) also reached the same conclusion in their study for 
Australian firms, while this result is inconsistent with the study of Eng and Mak (2003) who 
showed that ownership structure is not related to disclosure. Hence it is obvious that CG 
affects voluntary disclosure depending on the economic environment of each country. It is 
possible that in more developed countries substantial shareholders of firms have different 
motives for corporate disclosure, than in less developed countries. Moreover, board 
composition and managerial ownership are not affecting disclosure of British firms in 
contrast with the findings of previous studies (Eng and Mak 2003; Chau and Gray 2003; Ho 
and Wong 2001; Barako et al. 2006; Haniffa and Cooke 2002).   
Regarding the other factors, size has a positive association with IC disclosure. This was 
rather expected since all of the previous studies have underlined the association of size 
with IC disclosure (Bozzolan et al. 2003; Guthrie et al. 2006; Bozbura 2004; Garcia-meca et 
al. 2005) and voluntary disclosure in general (Meek et al. 1995; Barako et al. 2006; Chow 
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and Wong 1987; Depoers 2000; Hossein et al. 1995; Raffournier 1995; Schadewitz and 
Blevins 1998). Hence size is the most important factor related to voluntary disclosure. This 
notion is valid for all economies around the world, regardless of the development level of 
each economy. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to investigate the extent of voluntary disclosure and whether 
measures of CG as well as other firm’s characteristics are associated with the provision of 
IC information. A sample of ninety-seven listed British firms was used and a total number 
of eight factors were set as independent variables in four statistical models. Additionally, 
content analysis and statistical techniques, such as regression analysis, were utilized in 
order to gather the data and establish statistical relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables.  
Findings showed that British firms presented a high level of IC disclosure, although they 
have not implemented a framework on which to report IC. Human capital was the most 
reported IC category, suggesting that British firms not only give more emphasis on the 
human factor but also have identified the major importance of human resources, since 
they are regarded as the driving force of a company and a potential source of sustained 
competitive advantage (Wright et al. 1994). On the other hand the low percentage of 
external capital can be attributed to the small importance placed by British firms on it. 
However the fact that information about important aspects of the organization is not 
disclosed or not disclosed adequately leads us to the conclusion that managers are 
following an opportunistic approach in providing information to stakeholders. Thus the 
firms’ effort to reduce agency costs with the provision of voluntary information has certain 
gaps and insufficiencies, which recycles the agency problem. 
Concerning the outcomes of the statistical methods findings indicated that CG measures do 
not influence IC disclosure, with the exception of ownership structure which showed a 
strong positive association with disclosure in all models estimated. Thus it is evident that 
substantial shareholders are a crucial part in a company’s reporting policy development. 
This finding supports the concept of Agency theory which underlines that widely held firms 
tend to disclose more voluntary information, due to agency problems. Among the other 
factors only size and industry seem to be important in describing IC disclosure trends. 
The results of the present paper present a contradiction when compared to previous 
studies. On one hand, content analysis showed that British firms focused mostly on their 
Human Capital which is totally inconsistent with all studies related to IC. On the other 
hand, the strong association of the majority of the factors that were incorporated by the 
present paper is also supported by previous researchers. Specifically ownership structure 
and size seem to be important factors regardless the economic environment.  
The results of the paper also support the notion of reliability since there seems to be 
strong association between a number of factors and voluntary disclosure. However, as 
Collins and Hussey (2003, 58) mention, a research can be regarded as reliable if it can be 
repeated. At this point several arguments can be raised against the method of content 
analysis since it includes a high level of subjectivity when coding the data. Therefore, to 
ascertain reliability, the researcher conducted his study very carefully and with 
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consistency to the guidelines of previous papers. As for validity, Groves et al. (2004) argue 
that a survey is valid according to the extent to which its findings accurately reflect the 
intended construct. The sample of the present study can be considered at least as 
adequate in describing reporting trends of big British firms and thus the study can be 
considered as valid.  Finally, as far as generalisability is concerned, taking into 
consideration that the sample consists only of the biggest firms in LSE, generalizations 
should be made with caution and care.  
 
 Contribution 
The paper acknowledged the increased significance placed on IC and the importance of CG 
in terms of providing information and tried to present valuable information with the scope 
of contributing to the IC literature, which is still being under development. This 
contribution refers to the results of IC disclosure as well as to the identification of the 
factors that affect this disclosure. Additionally, this study provided evidence about an area 
of IC literature that has not been investigated before and aimed at presenting a picture of 
annual reporting practices and revealing critical issues concerning IC disclosure in UK. The 
importance of the results lies on the fact that English companies are provided with 
significant information about IC reporting trends, enabling them to either improve or 
modify their disclosure practices. Lastly, this paper is concerned to make visible the 
crucial roles for accounting in the English economy, particularly in the field of IC, and 
contribute in the identification process of the competitive advantage in organizations. 
 
 Limitations and suggestions for future improvement 
This research has both theoretical and practical implications. Concerning the highly 
debated topic of the appropriate theoretical approach, the findings of this paper was 
analyzed on the grounds of Agency theory. However, it is possible that an alternative 
approach may yield more comprehensive conclusions. Thus, future studies will have to deal 
with a crucial theoretical dilemma, which demands an in-depth understanding of the 
accounting literature.  
On the other hand, practical implications of this study are mainly related to the content 
analysis. A major issue of content analysis is the subjectivity involved in its methodology. 
This is due to the heavy reliance of the method on the reliability of the coder (Abeysekera 
2006). Reliable data are regarded the data that remain stable during the measuring 
process (Krippendorff 2004). Neuendorf (2002) points out that without the establishment of 
reliability, content analysis measures are uninterpretable. However, she argues that 
reliability is an essential, but not an adequate condition for validity. According to Milne 
and Adler (1999) the estimation of reliability requires the measurement of accuracy, 
stability and reproducibility. Consequently future researchers will need to address this 
issue before carrying out their study by distinguishing the accurate nature of information 
related to IC and judging whether references to IC should be counted as IC items (Beattie 
and Thomson 2006). Other implications of the statistical model are related to the sample 
and the variables. A bigger sample can possibly result in higher accuracy and 
generalisability, while other variables which were not taken into account by this study, 
could explain a larger amount of the variance.  
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Appendix I: Companies 
 
3i Group Friends Provident Royal Bank of Scotland Group 
Admiral Group G4S Royal Dutch Shell 
Alliance Trust GlaxoSmithKline RSA Insurance Group 
Amec Hammerson SABMiller 
Anglo American HBOS Sage Group 
Antofagasta HSBC Holdings plc Sainsbury (J) 
Associated British Foods ICAP Schroders 
AstraZeneca Imperial Tobacco Group Scottish and Southern Energy 
Aviva Innvensys Severn Trent 
BAE Systems InterContinental Hotels Group Shire 
Barclays International Power Smith and Nephew 
BG Group ITV Smiths Group 
BHP Billiton John Wood Standard Chartered 
BP Johnson Matthey Standard Life 
British Airways Kazakhmys (WI) Tesco 
British American Tobacco Kingfisher Thomas Cook Group 
British Energy Group Land Securities Group Tullow Oil 
British Land Co Legal and General Group Unilever 
British Sky Broadcasting Liberty International United Utilities Group 
BT Group Lloyds TSB Group Vedanta Resources 
Bunzl London Stock Exchange Group Vodafone Group 
Cable and Wireless Lonmin Whitbread 
Cadbury Man Group Wolseley 
Cairn Energy Marks and Spencer Group WPP Group 
Capita Group Morrison WM Supermarkets Xstrata 
Carphone Warehouse Group National Grid  
Centrica Next  
Cobham Old Mutual  
Compass Group Pearson  
Diageo Petrofac  
Drax Prudential  
Enterprise Inns Reckitt Benckiser Group  
Eurasian Natural Res Corp Reed Elsevier  
Experian Rexam  
FERREXPO RIO TINTO  
FirstGroup Rolls-Royce Group  
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Appendix II: regression results 
 
Model 1: Internal capital 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,512a ,262 ,195 16,07590 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA 
 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 8087,708 8 1010,964 3,912 ,001a 
Residual 22742,230 88 258,434   
1 
Total 30829,938 96    
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA  
b. Dependent Variable: INTCAP     
 
 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -12,286 14,232  -,863 ,390 
BC ,173 ,151 ,115 1,144 ,256 
MO ,038 ,166 ,022 ,228 ,820 
OS -,179 ,103 -,178 -1,749 ,048 
LNTA 2,399 1,253 ,236 1,914 ,035 
ROA ,011 ,183 ,007 ,062 ,951 
ROE -,011 ,026 -,048 -,421 ,675 
LR 14,685 9,510 ,189 1,544 ,126 
1 
IND 16,361 4,281 ,401 3,822 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: INTCAP    
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Model 2: External capital 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,551a ,304 ,241 17,03536 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA 
 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 11157,735 8 1394,717 4,806 ,000a 
Residual 25537,893 88 290,203   
1 
Total 36695,629 96    
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA  
b. Dependent Variable: EXTCAP     
 
 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 23,691 15,082  1,571 ,120 
BC -,327 ,160 -,200 -2,041 ,044 
MO -,183 ,176 -,098 -1,043 ,300 
OS -,256 ,109 -,233 -2,358 ,021 
LNTA 3,683 1,328 ,332 2,773 ,007 
ROA -,078 ,194 -,044 -,400 ,690 
ROE -,001 ,028 -,005 -,050 ,961 
LR 1,985 10,078 ,023 ,197 ,844 
1 
IND -1,606 4,537 -,036 -,354 ,724 
a. Dependent Variable: EXTCAP    
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Model 3: Human capital 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,522a ,273 ,207 20,78531 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 14261,494 8 1782,687 4,126 ,000a 
Residual 38018,568 88 432,029   
1 
Total 52280,062 96    
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA  
b. Dependent Variable: HUMCAP     
 
 
 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -,805 18,401  -,044 ,965 
BC -,077 ,196 -,039 -,394 ,695 
MO ,073 ,214 ,033 ,339 ,735 
OS -,300 ,133 -,228 -2,261 ,026 
LNTA 5,962 1,620 ,450 3,680 ,000 
ROA -,017 ,237 -,008 -,073 ,942 
ROE ,003 ,034 ,011 ,097 ,923 
LR 1,190 12,296 ,012 ,097 ,923 
1 
IND 16,397 5,535 ,309 2,962 ,004 
a. Dependent Variable: HUMCAP    
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Model 4: Total disclosure 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 ,609a ,371 ,314 38,63405 
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 77484,675 8 9685,584 6,489 ,000a 
Residual 131347,881 88 1492,590   
1 
Total 208832,557 96    
a. Predictors: (Constant), IND, MO, BC, LR, ROE, OS, ROA, LNTA  
b. Dependent Variable: TOTDIS     
 
 
 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 10,599 34,203  ,310 ,757 
BC -,231 ,363 -,059 -,636 ,526 
MO -,073 ,399 -,016 -,183 ,855 
OS -,736 ,247 -,280 -2,984 ,004 
LNTA 12,044 3,012 ,455 3,999 ,000 
ROA -,084 ,440 -,020 -,190 ,850 
ROE -,009 ,063 -,015 -,145 ,885 
LR 17,860 22,855 ,088 ,781 ,437 
1 
IND 31,153 10,288 ,294 3,028 ,003 
a. Dependent Variable: TOTDIS    
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Disclosure of information concerning 
remedies against directors’ liability 
 
Andrew van der Schalk MSc. LL.M17 
 
 
Executive summary 
Why do some corporations decide to voluntarily disclose information regarding a granted 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a 
concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in contrast to others? In order to 
explain why some corporations disclose more information on this topic than others, first, 
the literature on liability of directors, remedies against these liabilities and motives for 
voluntary disclosure is researched. After that, empirical research is performed to 
determine if listed corporations in The Netherlands significantly differ in disclosing 
information regarding a granted indemnification clause and a concluded directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance. 
 
1. Presentation of the research problem 
Public indignation regarding a number of corporate scandals have lead to an increasing 
demand of transparency and information disclosure and an emphasis on the importance of 
decision usefulness of annual reports. According to Foster (1986), the usefulness of 
financial statements is affected by the content or timing of information disclosures. The 
most important way for corporations to disclose information is still through regulated 
financial reports, including the financial statements (Healy and Palepu 2001). Besides 
information disclosure that is prescribed by regulations, corporations can also disclose 
information voluntary. Voluntary disclosure is the release of financial and non-financial 
information in excess of that what is required by regulations. 
 
Improving the decision usefulness of annual reports is a topical subject. The most 
important criticism is the fact that the information being provided in annual reports is too 
much based on the past and insufficiently focused on the future (Knoops 2004). More 
information should be disclosed dealing with opportunities and threats, risks and all sorts 
of events and circumstances that can be of influence on future developments of the 
corporation. Disclosing more information about possible risks and whether or not the 
corporation has taken any precautions to cover those elements of risk could contribute to 
this. In other words, disclosing information regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of 
internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance could enhance the decision usefulness of annual reports. 
Especially interesting to see, is whether corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX 
significantly differ in disclosing information concerning this subject.  
 
                                             
17 Supervisor: Drs. R. van der Wal RA. The author is currently employed at KPMG Accountants N.V. 
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The research question is formulated as follows: 
 
Why do some corporations, listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX, decide to voluntarily disclose 
information in their annual report or articles of association concerning a granted 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a 
concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in contrast to others? 
 
In the second chapter prior literature is discussed. The chapter will start with an overview 
of the legal grounds on which a director can be held liable according to Dutch law. The 
legal grounds for liability of directors will be discussed because an exclusion or limitation 
of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurance only become relevant after a directors is being held liable for his actions 
or his failure to act. It is important to know what the scope of coverage is of these 
different remedies and to what extend a listed corporation in The Netherlands is obligated 
by Dutch law to disclose information concerning a granted exclusion of liability and 
indemnification clause and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. This will 
be discussed in the second part of this chapter. If corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or 
AScX significantly differ from each other in disclosing information regarding a granted 
exclusion of liability and indemnification clause and a concluded directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurance, a possible explanation might be found in accounting theory. To this 
end, in the last part of this chapter, some light will be shed on Positive Accounting Theory, 
research on voluntary disclosure and the Signalling Theory. 
The third chapter presents the research design. 
In the fourth chapter the empirical results will be elucidated. 
Possible explanations for differences in the level of disclosure will be discussed in the fifth 
chapter using the theoretical framework of the second chapter. At the end of this chapter 
suggestions for future research will be given. 
Some conclusions will be drawn and a short summary will be given in the sixth chapter. 
 
 
2. Prior literature 
 
2.1. Legal grounds for liability of directors 
First an overview will be given of the legal grounds on which a director can be held liable 
according to Dutch law. Only Civil Code provisions are discussed since these provisions 
most often lead to settlements or result in directors having to pay damages. Dutch 
scholarly writers generally make a distinction between internal and external liability of 
directors. 
 
2.1.1. Internal liability 
Internal liability can be seen as liability towards the corporation. The mean rule of internal 
liability can be found in Section 2:9. This provision provides that each managing director 
has an obligation towards the legal entity to perform properly the duties assigned to him. 
Managing directors must have a certain amount of freedom to lead the corporation. 
Entrepreneurship means taking risks every now and then. Not every mistake or incorrect 
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choice of policy automatically leads to liability (Assink and Olden 2005). When a managing 
director causes damages to the corporation, these damages can, under certain 
circumstances, be recovered by the corporation from the director. The Supreme Court has 
held that a managing is liable for the damages the corporation has suffered if, depending 
on all the circumstances, serious negligence (ernstig verwijt) is attributable to him.18 
According to Van Schilfgaarde (2006) and Orsel (2005) serious negligence not only covers 
behavior of which a managing director ‘knew’ it would lead to damages but also behavior 
of which he ‘should have known’ would cause damages to the corporation. The underlying 
idea of Section 2:9 is collective responsibility resulting in joint and several liability. 
However, the director has the possibility of individual exoneration. 
 
Unique for The Netherlands is the right to initiate inquiry proceedings 
(enquêteprocedure)19 before the Enterprise Chamber (Ondernemingskamer) of the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeals. The Enterprise Chamber will grant a request for an inquiry if 
there is a good reason to doubt the proper management of the corporation.20 Experts will 
then be appointed by the court. These experts will produce a report on their findings of 
the inquiry. Central to this inquiry are the policy and the course of affairs (beleid en gang 
van zaken) in the corporation. If, on the basis of this report, the Enterprise Chamber finds 
mismanagement (wanbeleid), it may set aside corporate resolutions. The Enterprise 
Chamber can allow the corporation to recover the costs of the inquiry from the managing 
and supervisory directors. The Supreme Court held that a decision of the Enterprise 
Chamber finding mismanagement does not imply that a director is personally liable. The 
Supreme Court added that the stated facts in inquiry proceedings are still uncertain in civil 
proceedings. Nevertheless, the inquiry proceedings can have great significance in the area 
of liability of directors. 
 
2.1.2. External liability 
External liability is liability towards third parties. The basic tort (onrechtmatige daad) 
provisions are set forth in Sections 6:162 and 6:163. To protect creditors and to prevent 
abuse of legal entities, three acts were introduced in the 1980’s. The First Abuse Act is not 
relevant for directors’ liability. The Second Abuse Act provides for personal liability of 
managing directors for premium, wage tax and value added tax obligations of a legal entity 
that is in default in its payments thereof, if the non payment is caused by the managing 
director’s evidently improper management (kennelijk onbehoorlijk bestuur). The structure 
of the Second Abuse Act is similar to that of the Third Abuse Act. Therefore it will not be 
discussed in more detail since the Third Abuse Act is of greater importance in view of 
liability of directors. The Third Abuse Act makes it possible for the trustee in bankruptcy to 
hold directors liable for evident improper management that has led to the bankruptcy. 
Section 2:138/248 provides that each director is jointly and severally liable to the 
bankruptcy estate in the amount of any liabilities that cannot be satisfied out of the 
                                             
18 HR January 10, 1997, NJ 1997, 360, JOR 1997, 29 (Staleman/Van de Ven) and HR April 4, 2003, JOR 2003, 134 (Skipper 
Club Charter). 
19 Section 2:129/239. 
20 Section 2:350(1). 
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liquidation proceeds, if it is evident that the board has performed its duties improperly 
and plausible that this was an important cause of the bankruptcy.21 The Supreme Court 
ruled that there is evidently improper management if no reasonable managing director 
would perform his duties is such manner under the same conditions.22 The director can 
avoid liability if he proves the shortcoming is not attributable to him and he has not 
breached any duty to take measures to prevent its consequences.23 Liability cannot be 
avoided by making an appeal to internal assignment of duties. No director can avoid his 
responsibilities by saying that he lacks the specific expert knowledge that is required to 
understand the decision being made in those situations. The Third Abuse Act attaches 
great importance to the duty to engage in proper bookkeeping and the duty to make the 
annual accounts public. In the event of a bankruptcy there is an irrefutable presumption 
that the board has preformed these two duties improperly. In addition, there is a refutable 
presumption that this improper performance was an important cause of the bankruptcy. 
 
If the annual accounts, interim accounts and annual report give a misleading presentation 
of the situation of corporation, the managing directors are jointly and severally liable to 
third parties for any resulting damage.24 This liability is only relevant to the extent that 
these documents have been made public. The misleading presentation must relate to the 
current financial condition of the corporation. A director can only avoid liability by 
showing that the misleading presentation is not attributable to him. Section 2:150/260 
contains a similar rule for the supervisory directors, with two exceptions. Firstly, this 
Section does not apply to the interim accounts and the annual report. Secondly, the 
individual avoidance of liability is treated differently with respect to the annual accounts. 
To avoid liability a supervisory director only has to show that the misleading presentation 
is not due to any failure in the exercise of his supervisory duties (De Savornin Lohman 
1996). The supervisory director may rely on the information provided to him by the 
management board and the auditors (Asser-Maeijer 2000). 
 
2.2. Remedies against liability 
A director is only liable if an irrevocable judicial judgment is pronounced or if he 
voluntarily accepts his liability. It is not an established fact that the damages and fines 
paid and the cost of defending made by a director must come at his own expense, since 
these costs stem from his actions or failure to act as a director of the corporation 
(Potjewijd 2003). The legal literature makes a distinction between the internal and 
external liability of directors. The remedies against liability claims can also be divided in 
an internal and external cluster. 
 
2.2.1. Exclusion or limitation of internal liability 
Directors may stipulate that their contracts include a clause providing for an exclusion or 
limitation of internal liability. This means directors are excluded for claims of the 
                                             
21 Section 2:149/259 declares Section 2:138/248 of similar application with regard to the supervisory director. 
22 HR June 7, 1996, NJ 1996, 695 (Van Zoolinge) and HR June 8, 2001, NJ 2001, 454 (Panmo). 
23 Section 2:138/248 subsection 3. 
24 Section 2:139/249. 
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corporation by virtue of Section 2:9. An exclusion of liability clause provides for exclusion 
of liability in advance. In The Netherlands it is possible for a corporation to exclude or 
limit the internal liability of directors beforehand on the basis of Section 2:9 as long as it 
does not extend to an act or failure to act that can be characterized as intentional or 
intentionally reckless (Orsel 2006). Besides this, managing and supervisory directors can 
also be granted a discharge by the corporation. A discharge is a release of liability after 
the fact. If a discharge is granted to a director, the corporation can no longer hold him 
accountable for improper management. If, on the basis of the report, the Enterprise 
Chamber finds mismanagement, it may nullify the resolution granting a discharge. 
 
2.2.2. Indemnification for external liability 
Directors can also stipulate that their contracts include a clause providing for an 
indemnification for external liability. An indemnification may be granted to directors 
under Dutch law since an implicit or explicit legal provision prohibiting such a clause is 
absent (Glasz et al. 1994; De Nijs Bik 1998). In The Netherlands an exclusion of liability 
and indemnification clause can be incorporated in the articles of association. It is also 
possible to lay down such a clause in a separate contract. The aim of an indemnification 
clause is to compensate a director for the loss he suffered due to the disputes he is 
personally involved in because of the position he fulfils within the corporation (Potjewijd 
2003). Firstly, the members of the board of directors can be reimbursed for the amount of 
damages they are personally due for. Secondly, the members of the board of directors 
have a right to be reimbursed for reasonable25 costs of defending claims. Lastly, a member 
of the board of directors has a right to be reimbursed for costs of legal assistance in case 
no claim against him is submitted but he gets involved in a lawsuit on account of the 
position he fulfils within the corporation. 
 
2.2.3. Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance 
In granting an indemnification the loss suffered will come at the expense of the 
corporation. The situation is completely different if the corporation has concluded a 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance to cover this risk. The loss will now come at the 
expense of the insurer. Central to a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance is to cover 
the personal liability of directors. Besides this, such insurance can also be concluded by a 
corporation to cover the risk it runs after it has granted an exclusion or limitation of 
internal liability and indemnification for external liability to the directors. This will almost 
always be included in a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (Franssen van de Putte 
2004). It is in the best interest of a corporation to enter into a directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurance. Firstly, external liability of a director can also lead to liability of the 
corporation.26 If the insurance enables a director to fulfil his debt, the corporation is also 
freed (De Nijs Bik, 1998). Secondly, it is also better to insure the risk of internal liability. 
Usually it concerns a substantial amount of money. If the director is unable to pay the 
amount of money claimed by the corporation, the capital position of the corporation is 
being affected (De Nijs Bik, 1998). Lastly, side effects can occur if directors are too afraid 
                                             
25 Section 6:69 (2) and HR October 16, 1998, NJ 1999, 196. 
26 Section 6:170, 171 and 172. 
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of being held liable (Kroeze, 2005). Fear can lead to directors becoming extremely 
cautious. The economy of a country can experience serious disadvantages of risk avers 
behavior by entrepreneurs. 
 
2.2.4. Disclosure 
According to Section 2:382(2) and Section 2:383e a corporation must state in the notes to 
the annual report the amount for which it has granted loans and guarantees to their 
managing and supervisory directors. Van Schilfgaarde (2006) is of the opinion that this also 
includes a clause providing for an exclusion of liability and indemnification. The legislator 
has not ventured an opinion on that point. According to Potjewijd (2003), the existence of 
an exclusion of liability and indemnification clause means that the director finds himself in 
a financially dependent situation in proportion to the corporation. In addition, such a 
clause can lead to a situation in which the corporation lends to a director the reasonable 
costs of defending claims. If the act or failure to act of a director is qualified as serious 
negligence in an irrevocable judicial judgment the director will have to pay back all the 
money lend to him by the corporation. These financial ties of the director with the 
corporation should be made public in the annual report, but it is highly disputable whether 
Section 2:382(2) and Section 2:383e obligate a corporation to state in their annual report 
that an exclusion of liability and indemnification is granted to their directors. 
 
The risk a corporation runs by granting an exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
indemnification for external liability can be covered by a directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance. The payment of the premium to the insurer can be seen as a cost for the 
corporation and must be included in the financial statements. The rules and regulations do 
not prescribe that a corporation presents these costs separately and as a result they 
cannot be distinguished from the other costs disclosed in the financial report. In addition, 
nowhere is stated that a corporation is obligated to disclose information on which 
insurances have been concluded.  
 
Furthermore, no relevant case law could be found. This leads to the conclusion that a 
listed corporation in The Netherlands is not required to disclose any information regarding 
a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external 
liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. 
 
2.3. Motives for voluntary disclosure 
Proposed introductions of, or amendments to, mandated accounting requirements are 
always a source of great interest to corporate management. They often spend a lot of time 
and effort trying to influence accounting regulators. On the other hand corporations also 
release financial and non-financial information in excess of that what is required by 
regulations. What could motivate such behavior? 
 
2.3.1. Positive Accounting Theory 
There are several theories aimed at predicting and explaining particular accounting-
related phenomena. Positive Accounting Theory developed by Watts and Zimmerman and 
others is one of them. It is based on research that proposed that markets were efficient 
 115
and that contractual arrangements were used as a basis for controlling the efforts of self-
interested agents. It focuses on how accounting can assist in the functioning of the agency 
relationship and emphasizes that accounting can be used to reduce the agency costs of a 
corporation. 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) identified three hypotheses that were frequently used in 
research that sought to explain and predict accounting practice. The hypotheses identified 
are the bonus plan hypothesis, the debt/equity hypothesis and the political cost 
hypothesis. The political cost hypothesis can be used to explain voluntary disclosures. 
Some corporations have a higher public profile than others and are therefore subject to 
greater interest by the public, media, government, financial analysts and so on. According 
to Linsley and Shrives (2003), these corporations can enclose more additional information 
to avert this unwanted attention. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) believe that the magnitude 
of the political costs is highly dependent on corporation size. Healy and Palepu (2001) are 
more cautious and point out that size is likely to proxy for many other factors. Financial 
analysts have a significant influence on a corporation. Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that 
firms with more informative disclosures have larger analyst following, less dispersion in 
analyst forecasts and less volatility in forecast revisions. Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) 
find a positive correlation between the level of voluntary disclosure and the number of 
analysts following, the number of news items and accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. 
 
2.3.2. Voluntary disclosure literature 
 Research on voluntary disclosure focuses on capital market motives for accounting and 
disclosure decisions. This research supplements the positive accounting literature. 
Researchers discuss six forces that effect managers’ disclosure decisions for capital market 
reasons: capital market transactions, corporate control contest, stockcompensation, 
litigation, proprietary costs and management talent signaling. 
 
Only two of these forces are useful for this research: capital market transactions and 
litigation. In the capital market transactions hypothesis great importance is attached to 
investors’ perception of a corporation. Healy and Palepu (2001) conclude that there is a 
significant relation between investors’ perceptions and the managers’ decision to issue 
public debt or equity. Through greater disclosure, corporations attempt to reduce the cost 
of capital by reducing investor uncertainty. Research supports the idea that there is a 
negative relation between the level of voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity capital 
(Barry and Brown 1985, 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Botosan 1997; Botosan and 
Plumlee 2002; Francis et al. 2005). 
 
The cost of litigation also effects managers’ disclosure decisions. Corporate managers face 
the threat of a claim of shareholders or other investors after voluntarily disclosing 
information. Legal action could be brought against managers for inadequate or untimely 
disclosures. This could encourage corporations to increase voluntary disclosure. Litigation 
could also reduce managers’ incentives to provide disclosure. The legal system therefore 
plays an important role in the managers’ decision to voluntarily disclose information (Healy 
and Palepu 2001). Large, wealthy corporations face a greater litigation risk since litigants 
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seek out corporations that can potentially pay a high amount of damages (Kothari et al. 
2009). 
 
The Signalling Theory can also help to explain why corporations choose to voluntarily 
disclose information. It suggests that some corporations wish to signal the capital market 
about having stronger risk management capabilities than others (Linsley and Shrives 2003). 
High quality corporations, in order to distinct themselves from low quality corporations, 
will have to voluntarily provide investors with credible information (Çelik et al. 2006). 
 
 
3. Hypotheses development and research design 
 
3.1.  Hypotheses development 
Directors are nowadays being held liable by the corporation as well as third parties more 
often when problems occur within the corporation (Vroom 1999; Potjewijd 2003; Van 
Olffen 2004; Assink and Olden 2005). There are a number of remedies against such claims. 
Directors may stipulate that their contacts include a clause providing for an exclusion or 
limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability. Such a clause can 
be qualified as a risk for the corporation. To cover this risk a corporation can conclude a 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. The fact that directors nowadays run a greater 
risk of being held liable and the amount of money claimed by third parties has rapidly 
increased over the last decade, make it important for shareholders and potential investors 
to know whether the corporation has granted the managing and supervisory directors an 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability. To 
know whether the corporation has concluded a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance 
to cover this risk, is possibly even more important for them. 
 
Public indignation regarding a number of corporate scandals have lead to an increasing 
demand of transparency and information disclosure and an emphasis on the importance of 
decision usefulness of annual reports. The most important criticism is the fact that the 
information being provided in annual reports is too much based on the past and 
insufficiently focused on the future (Knoops 2004). More information should be disclosed 
dealing with opportunities and threats, risks and all sorts of events and circumstances that 
can be of influence on future developments of the corporation. Disclosing more 
information about possible risks and whether or not the corporation has taken any 
precautions to cover those elements of risk could contribute to this. In other words, 
disclosing information regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance could enhance the decision usefulness of annual reports. A listed corporation in 
The Netherlands is not required to disclose any information regarding a granted exclusion 
or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a concluded 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. Therefore, it is especially interesting to see 
whether corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX significantly differ in disclosing 
information concerning this subject. The most important way for corporations to disclose 
information is still through regulated financial reports (Healy and Palepu 2001). This leads 
to the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1 (a) Corporations listed on the AEX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their annual report than corporations 
   listed on the AMX. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (b) Corporations listed on the AEX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their annual report than corporations 
   listed on the AScX. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (c) Corporations listed on the AMX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their annual report than corporations 
   listed on the AScX. 
 
In The Netherlands, an exclusion of liability and indemnification clause can also be 
incorporated in the articles of association. Therefore the following hypotheses are 
formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (a) Corporations listed on the AEX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their articles of association than  
   corporations listed on the AMX. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (b) Corporations listed on the AEX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their articles of association than  
   corporations listed on the AScX. 
Hypothesis 2 (c) Corporations listed on the AMX voluntarily disclose more information 
   regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
   indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and 
   officers’ liability insurance in their articles of association than  
   corporations listed on the AScX. 
3.2. Research design 
The website of Euronext gives an overview of all national indices and which corporations 
are listed on these different indices. The corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX in 
2006 are shown in Appendix A. 
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There is no database in existence that contains the detailed information that is needed to 
conduct this research. Company.info was used to download all the annual reports. The 
articles of association are not included in this database. These were downloaded from the 
website of the corporation. In The Netherlands, an exclusion of liability and 
indemnification clause can also be laid down in an employment contract. This possibility 
will not be examined because a corporation does not provide any information regarding the 
employment contract of their directors. 
 
An independent t-test will be conducted to assess whether corporations listed on the AEX, 
AMX or AScX significantly differ in voluntarily disclosing information regarding a granted 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a 
concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in their annual report or articles of 
association. The independent t-test is applicable since it determines whether two 
distributions significantly differ from each other and different subjects are assigned to 
conduct the test (Field 2000). The statistical research will be carried out on SPSS. 
 
3.3.  Presuppositions 
Three presuppositions are made with regard to the empirical research. Firstly, all 
corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX have granted their directors an exclusion or 
limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and concluded a 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. No conclusions can be drawn without this 
presupposition. Not disclosing information regarding a directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance in the annual report or articles of association, for example, could otherwise 
mean that the corporation simply did not conclude a directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance. Nassau verzekeringen N.V. and AIG Europe N.V., two major players on the 
Dutch market for directors’ and officers’ liability insurances, state that the top five 
hundred corporations in The Netherlands, including all the listed corporations, have 
concluded a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (Van den Heuvel, 2007). 
 
Secondly, it is presupposed that if in the annual report or articles of association is stated 
that an exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability 
may be granted or a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance may be concluded by the 
corporation, this can be seen as sufficient evidence that an exclusion or limitation of 
internal liability and indemnification for external liability is granted or a directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance is concluded by the corporation. 
 
Lastly, it is a possibility that the annual report does not mention both the granted 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and 
concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. Sometimes only one of the two is 
mentioned. In that case, however, it is presupposed that both are mentioned. Without this 
presupposition it is very difficult to draw a meaningful comparison and come to an overall 
conclusion. The same, off course, applies to the articles of association. 
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3.4.  Limitations 
The empirical research of this thesis is subject to two limitations. Firstly, the annual 
report and articles of association are not the only sources of information disclosed by 
corporations. However, the most important way for corporations to disclose information is, 
in my opinion, through their annual reports. According to Lang and Lundholm (1993), a 
positive correlation exists between information being dispersed by annual reports and 
other types of information. This suggests that corporations coordinate their overall 
disclosure policy. In addition, Hail (2002) believes that, given their formalized structure, 
annual reports are more easily comparable among corporations than less formal 
communication channels. 
 
The second limitation is that a corporation, listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX, can also be 
listed on an index in another country. This especially applies, in my opinion, to 
corporations listed on the AEX. As a consequence, different rules and regulations could 
apply to these corporations. This limitation will be met by investigating which corporations 
are also listed on the NYSE and how many of them disclose the relevant information. 
According to their website, the NYSE is the largest equities marketplace in the world. The 
listed corporations represent approximately $25 trillion of total global market value per 
December 31, 2006. All corporations listed on the NYSE are compelled to apply the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced in 2002, but some 
corporations just had to apply to these new rules per January 2006. It was introduced to 
improve quality, transparency and reliability of financial reports of public corporations 
(Jain and Rezaee, 2005). 
 
 
4.  Results 
The annual reports and articles of association of the seventy corporations listed on the 
three indices are scrupulously examined. The results of this examination are shown in 
Appendix B, C and D. An independent t-test is conducted to determine whether the 
ascertained differences between the three indices are indeed significant. The null 
hypothesis is tested that there is no difference in voluntarily disclosing between the three 
indices. The confidence interval is set at 95%. Choosing a higher confidence interval means 
you can be stricter about your analysis but you run a higher risk of failing to detect a 
genuine effect (Blalock Jr. 1979; Field 2000). 
 
The two-tailed probability is used if no prediction can be made about the direction of the 
effect. In this case a prediction can be made about which group will have the highest 
mean. Dutch law does not compel a listed corporation to disclose any information 
regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for 
external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. The different 
theories and hypotheses discussed, lead me to believe that a larger corporation will choose 
to voluntarily disclose more information. In other words, it is probable the level of 
disclosure will show a declining trend since the corporations listed on the AEX, AMX and 
AScX represent approximately €536 billion, €40 billion and €20 billion per December 31, 
 120
2006.27 Since SPSS only produces the two-tailed significance, the obtained p-value needs to 
be divided by two to ascertain the one-tailed probability. The results of the t-tests are 
shown in Appendix E and F. Comparing the results for the level of disclosure concerning a 
granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability 
and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in the annual reports makes 
clear that there is only a significant difference between the means of the AEX and AScX. 
The one-tailed value of p is 0.018. There is no significant difference between the means of 
the AEX and AMX. In this case the one-tailed probability is 0.285. The means of the AMX 
and AScX also do not significantly differ from each other. The one-tailed p-value is 0.068. 
Comparing the results for the articles of association provides a similar picture. There is 
only a significant difference between the means of the AEX and AScX. The one-tailed p-
value is 0.024. There is no significant difference between the means of the AEX and AMX. 
The means of the AMX and AScX also do not significantly differ from each other. These t-
tests are non-significant because p = 0.112 respectively 0.235. 
 
A limitation of this research is that a corporation, listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX, can also 
be listed on an index in another country. As a consequence, different rules and regulations 
could apply to these corporations. This limitation is met by investigating which 
corporations are also listed on the NYSE and how many of them disclose the relevant 
information. The NYSE is the largest equity market in the world and the rules and 
regulations that apply to the corporations listed on the NYSE are perceived as one of the 
most comprehensive in existence today. Nine corporations were listed on the AEX as well 
as on the NYSE in 2006: ABN AMRO Holding N.V., Aegon N.V., Buhrmann N.V., ING Groep 
N.V., Reed Elsevier N.V., Royal Dutch Shell plc, Royal KPN N.V., Royal Philips Electronics, 
and Unilever N.V. None of the corporations listed on the AMX or AScX are also listed on the 
NYSE. According to Appendix B, only six of the nine corporations disclose the information 
concerned. This means that the rules and regulations that apply to the corporations listed 
on the NYSE do not prescribe the disclosure of this type of information. 
 
 
5.  Analysis and suggestions for future research 
 
5.1. Analysis 
After an analysis of the different outputs produced by SPSS it can be concluded that 
corporations listed on the AEX more often disclose information concerning a granted 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a 
concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance than corporations listed on the AScX. 
They voluntarily disclose this type of information more often in their annual report as well 
as in their articles of association. Additional research proves that this outcome is not 
influenced by the fact that some corporations listed on the AEX are also listed on the 
NYSE. 
 
                                             
27 www.euronext.com (last visited February 20, 2007). 
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In the second chapter a theoretical framework was presented to explain such differences 
in the level of disclosure. The political cost hypothesis predicts that some corporations 
have a higher public profile than others and are therefore subject to greater interest by 
the public, media, government, financial analysts and so on. According to Linsley and 
Shrives (2003), these corporations can enclose more additional information to avert 
unwanted attention. It can be argued that corporations listed on the AEX have a higher 
public profile than corporations listed on the AScX. 
 
In the capital market transactions hypothesis great importance is attached to investors’ 
perception of a corporation. Prior research predicts that corporations reliant on external 
financing are more likely to undertake a higher level of disclosure (Francis et al. 2005). 
Through greater disclosure, corporations attempt to lower their cost of both debt and 
equity capital by reducing investors uncertainty. This argument may also relate to 
corporation size (Çelik et al. 2006). Larger corporations make greater use of debt because 
of tax advantage. It can therefore be argued that corporations listed on the AEX undertake 
a higher level of disclosure. 
 
The decision to disclose information is also effected by the cost of litigation. This threat of 
litigation can have two effects. Legal action could be brought against managers for 
inadequate or untimely disclosures. This could encourage them to increase voluntary 
disclosure. Litigation could also reduce managers’ incentives to provide disclosure. The 
legal system therefore plays an important role in the decision to voluntarily disclose 
information. Large, wealthy corporations face a greater litigation risk since litigants seek 
out corporations that can potentially pay a high amount of damages (Kothari et al. 2009). 
The litigation hypothesis asserts that the incentive to disclose information is lower for 
corporations listed on the AEX. On one occasion the spokesperson of a corporation listed on 
the AEX told me they explicitly choose not to disclose any information on whether or not a 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance has been concluded by the corporation, because 
they felt this could only attract liability claims. 
 
The Signalling Theory suggests that some corporations wish to signal the capital market 
about having stronger risk management capabilities than others (Linsley and Shrives 2003). 
High quality corporations, in order to distinct themselves from low quality corporations, 
will have to voluntarily provide investors with credible information (Çelik et al. 2006). In 
this respect it is interesting to mention that an employee of a corporation listed on the 
AEX told me they released information in excess of that what is required by regulation for 
this exact reason. The corporation wants to emphasize that it is more transparent than 
other corporations. It also wants to enhance the usefulness of its annual report. 
 
The different theories and hypotheses give reason to believe that a large corporation will 
choose to voluntarily disclose more information. The level of disclosure would then show a 
declining tendency since the corporations listed on the AEX, AMX and AScX represent 
approximately €536 billion, €40 billion and €20 billion. The different outputs produced by 
SPSS only partially support this line of reasoning. Comparing the results for the level of 
disclosure concerning a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
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indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance in the annual reports makes clear that there is no declining trend. The results 
for the articles of association do show a declining tendency. It is interesting to note that 
the corporations listed on the AMX do not significantly differ in their level of disclosure 
from the corporations listed on the AEX despite the fact that they represent almost the 
same market value as the corporations listed on the AScX. A conclusive explanation cannot 
be found in the theories and hypotheses discussed. Apparently there are still more factors 
that influence the level of disclosure. 
 
5.2.  Suggestions for future research 
The first two suggestions for future research are related to the two limitations of the 
empirical research. Firstly, the annual report and articles of association are not the only 
sources of information disclosed by corporations. One suggestion is to examine more 
sources of information.  
 
Secondly, a corporation, listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX, can also be listed on an index in 
another country. Another suggestion is to investigate other influential indices in the world 
to determine their influence on this research. 
 
Disclosing more information regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability 
and indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance could enhance the decision usefulness of annual reports. The third suggestion is 
to determine the value users of annual reports attach to the disclosure of this information. 
 
Research results concerning the level of disclosure and the existence of differences 
between the three indices provide accounting policymakers with useful knowledge for 
designing disclosure rules. The last suggestion is to research the need to alter the rules and 
regulation in connection with the results of this master thesis. 
 
6.  Summary and conclusions 
First an overview is given of the legal grounds on which a director can be held liable 
according to Dutch law. A distinction can be made between internal and external liability. 
Internal liability can be seen as liability towards the corporation. External liability is 
liability towards third parties. A director is only liable if an irrevocable judicial judgment is 
pronounced or if he voluntarily accepts his liability. Directors may stipulate that their 
contracts include a clause providing for an exclusion or limitation of internal liability. This 
means directors are excluded in advance for claims of the corporation. Directors can also 
stipulate that their contacts include a clause providing for an indemnification for external 
liability. The aim of an indemnification clause is to compensate a director for the loss he 
suffered due to the disputes he is personally involved in because of the position he fulfills 
within the corporation. Central to a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance is to cover 
the personal liability of managing and supervisory directors. Besides this, such insurance 
can also be concluded by a corporation to cover the risk it runs after it has granted an 
exclusion or limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability to the 
directors. A listed corporation in The Netherlands is not required to disclose any 
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information regarding a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance. 
 
If corporations listed on the AEX, AMX or AScX significantly differ from each other in 
disclosing information regarding a granted exclusion of liability and indemnification clause 
and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, a possible explanation might be 
found in accounting theory. According to the political cost hypothesis, some corporations 
have a higher public profile and are therefore subject to greater interest by the public, 
media, government, financial analysts and so on. To avert this unwanted attention they 
can enclose more additional information. In the capital market transactions hypothesis 
great importance is attached to investors’ perception of a corporation. Through greater 
disclosure, corporations attempt to lower their cost of both debt and equity capital by 
reducing investors uncertainty. The decision to disclose information is also effected by the 
cost of litigation. According to the Signalling Theory, some corporations wish to signal the 
capital market about having stronger risk management capabilities than others. 
 
Comparing the results for the level of disclosure concerning a granted exclusion or 
limitation of internal liability and indemnification for external liability and a concluded 
directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in the annual reports makes clear that there is 
only a significant difference between the means of the AEX and AScX. Comparing the 
results for the articles of association provides a similar picture. 
 
The different theories and hypotheses give reason to believe that a large corporation will 
choose to voluntarily disclose more information. The level of disclosure would then show a 
declining tendency since the corporations listed on the AEX, AMX and AScX represent 
approximately €536 billion, €40 billion and €20 billion. The different outputs produced by 
SPSS only partially support this line of reasoning. Comparing the results for the level of 
disclosure concerning a granted exclusion or limitation of internal liability and 
indemnification for external liability and a concluded directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance in the annual reports makes clear that there is no declining trend. The results 
for the articles of association do show a declining tendency. It is interesting to note that 
the corporations listed on the AMX do not significantly differ in their level of disclosure 
from the corporations listed on the AEX despite the fact that they represent almost the 
same market value as the corporations listed on the AScX. A conclusive explanation cannot 
be found in the theories and hypotheses discussed. Apparently there are still more factors 
that influence the level of disclosure. 
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Appendix A: Listed corporations in The Netherlands in 2006 
 
 
AEX AMX AScX 
ABN AMRO Holding N.V. Aalberts Industries N.V. Arcadis N.V. 
Aegon N.V. ASM International N.V. Ballast Nedam N.V. 
Koninklijke Ahold N.V. Koninklijke BAM Groep N.V. Beter Bed Holding N.V. 
Akzo Nobel N.V. BinckBank N.V. Brunel International N.V. 
ArcelorMittal N.V. Koninklijke Boskalis Westminster N.V. Draka Holding N.V. 
ASML Holding N.V. Corio N.V. Eurocommercial Properties N.V. 
Buhrmann N.V. Crucell N.V. Exact Holding N.V. 
Koninklijke DSM N.V. CSM N.V. Grontmij N.V. 
Fortis N.V. Fugro N.V. Hunter Douglas N.V. 
Hagemeyer N.V. Heijmans N.V. Imtech N.V. 
Heineken N.V. LogicaCMG N.V. Laurus N.V. 
ING Groep N.V. Nutreco Holding N.V. Macintosh Retail Group N.V. 
Koninklijke KPN N.V. Océ N.V. OPG Groep N.V. 
Koninklijke Numico N.V. Ordina N.V. Pharming Group N.V. 
Koninklijke Philips N.V SNS Reaal N.V. Sligro Food Group N.V. 
Randstad Holding N.V. Stork N.V. Smit Internationale N.V. 
Reed Elsevier N.V. Tele Atlas N.V. Telegraaf Media Groep N.V. 
Rodamco Europe N.V. USG People N.V. Koninklijke Ten Cate N.V. 
Royal Dutch Shell plc Van der Moolen Holding N.V. Unit 4 Agresso N.V. 
SBM Offshore N.V. Koninklijke Vopak N.V. Van Lanschot N.V. 
TNT N.V. Wereldhave N.V. VastNed Offices/Industrial N.V. 
TomTom N.V. Koninklijke Wessanen N.V. Vastned Retail N.V. 
Unilever N.V.  Wavin N.V. 
Vedior N.V.   
Wolters Kluwer N.V.   
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Materiality of misstatements from the 
perspective of the users of the financial 
statements - Narrowing the expectation 
gap between users and auditors 
 
 
Doris de Rooij28 
 
 
Executive Summary 
Misstatements or omissions in the financial statements are considered material if they 
could influence the economic decisions of users based on the financial statements. 
This research presents an empirical research, which provides evidence that a relevant 
expectation gap regarding materiality of misstatements exists between users of the 
financial statements and auditors. This gap can mainly be explained by lack of 
communication. 
According to the respondents, the expectation gap can be narrowed by introducing a 
uniform guideline, which incorporates quantitative rules, and especially by disclosing the 
materiality threshold used by the auditor in the audit report. 
 
 
1. Introduction and research questions 
 
Introduction 
 ‘Information is material if its omission or misstatement could influence the economic 
decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements.’ 
(NIVRA 2007, NV COS 320.3). 
 
As long as misstatements do not violate the true and fair view the financial statements 
give of the financial position of a company, they are considered immaterial. It is the 
responsibility of the auditor of the financial statements to be reasonably sure that the 
financial statements are free from material misstatement. 
 
Because the user is the one, who makes decisions based on the annual financial 
statements, in theory it should be the user of the financial statements, who decides what 
is material and what is not material. However, users of the financial statements are not a 
homogenous group. Shareholders, creditors and clients have different information needs 
and preferences and therefore consider other things as being material to their decisions. 
                                             
28 This research was supervised by E. A. de Knecht RA. Doris de Rooij is currently working as a controller 
at TNT Post. 
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Therefore, in practice the auditor decides on materiality thresholds for the audit of the 
financial statements. The auditor is the confidant of the financial statement users who 
audits the financial statements of a company on behalf of the users. 
 
The auditor assesses the level of misstatement above which economic decisions of users of 
the financial statements will be affected. Next to his professional judgment of the 
perceived threshold of users, rules and guidelines support the auditor executing his 
materiality decisions. Real consultation of the user of the financial statements is unusual. 
 
Although the definition of the term explicitly addresses users’ economic decision-making, 
in practice, users are not involved in the concept at all. 
This gives reason to suspect that the implications of the concept of materiality are not 
known, or not fully known to users of the financial statements. 
Economic scientific literature refers to the existence of an expectation gap between 
auditors and users of the financial statements, if what the users perceive the auditor does 
is not in line with what the users expect the auditor does (Porter 1993, 49). This gap can 
also exist where it regards materiality. 
 
Research question 
A suitable way to discover what users need regarding materiality and how to narrow the 
possible expectation gap is to consult the users themselves. 
 
Therefore, the main question in this research is: 
 
‘Does a relevant expectation gap exist between users of the financial statements and 
auditors concerning materiality of misstatements, and if so, in which way do the users 
want to narrow this gap?’ 
 
In order to arrive at an answer to this main research question, several sub topics will be 
outlined in this paper. 
 
In this chapter, the concept of materiality of misstatements and its relevance were 
introduced. 
Chapter 2 explains the relation between users and auditors by describing the origination of 
the audit of the financial statements from the point of view of the agency theory and by 
describing in which way materiality levels are determined.  
The expectation gap is introduced in chapter 3. 
In chapter 4, the issues concerning materiality that might contribute to an expectation gap 
are structured into possible measure to improve the concept of materiality to users. Based 
on an instrument that is specially designed for this research, hypotheses are derived that 
forecast what measures users want to introduce to narrow the expectation gap. 
Chapter 5 outlines the design of the empirical part of the research that is executed among 
users of the financial statements. 
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Chapter 6 presents and analyses the results of this empirical research, which contain 
information regarding the knowledge and opinion of users regarding materiality and the 
measures they would like to introduce in order to improve the concept of materiality. 
The last chapter – chapter 7 – presents the answer to the main research question. Finally, 
recommendations for future research and for audit practice are presented. 
 
This scientific research aims at providing insight in the composition of the expectation gap 
regarding materiality. At the same time, measures that might narrow the expectation gap 
are presented to the users of the financial statements. Recommendations result from this, 
which might contribute to the narrowing of the possible expectation gap regarding 
materiality. 
 
 
2. The user of the financial statements, the auditor and materiality 
 
The Framework of the IASB 
It is commonly accepted that well-functioning capital markets are a key to economic 
development and growth. The financial statements of a company are a valuable economic 
decision-making tool for users of the financial statements and therefore, the financial 
statements contribute to the well functioning of the capital markets (Hoogendoorn and 
Mertens 2001, 3/10). This is one of the reasons, why companies need to prepare financial 
statements. According to the Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial 
Statements (Framework) of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), is ‘the 
objective of financial statements to provide information about the financial position, 
performance and changes in financial position of an entity that is useful to a wide range of 
users in making economic decisions’ (IASB 2005, Framework, paragraph 12). 
The Framework also describes what qualitative characteristics information should possess 
in order to be useful. These are: Understandability, relevance, reliability and 
comparability (Framework, paragraph 24). When preparing the financial statements, the 
management of the company should at all times keep these qualitative characteristics in 
mind. These elements of useful information are also used in assessing the usefulness of the 
measures for improving the concept of materiality (see chapter 4). 
 
The agency theory and the audit of the financial statements 
Financial statements have to be put up for company-stakeholders. However, management 
of the preparing company can have goals that deviate from the goals of the users of the 
financial statements, or unintentional mistakes can be made when preparing the financial 
statements. Users cannot just rely on the financial statements to present a true and fair 
view of the company’s income and assets and liabilities. This is an agency problem (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). 
 
A solution to solve or diminish the agency problem of potentially unreliable financial 
statements presented by the management of the company, is the introduction of a 
monitor. This is the auditor. The auditor assesses on behalf of the principal (the 
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shareholder) whether the agent prepared financial statements that are in line with the 
applicable rules and regulations and present a true and fair view of the company. 
 
In the Netherlands, the auditor is the legally required external monitor that represents the 
interests of all the users of the financial statements (Santen et al. 2006, 48). 
 
Audit rules 
The audit of the financial statements originates from the need to have an independent 
party assessing the reliability of the financial statements. Materiality is a concept that 
relates of the audit of the financial statements. The choices of the auditor regarding the 
materiality thresholds have influence on the financial statements and subsequently on 
users’ decision-making. Therefore, in which way to handle the concept of the materiality 
of misstatements has been a matter of continuous discussion. 
 
Rules and guidelines are available in audit standards, in audit literature and in audit 
manuals of audit firms. In the Netherlands, the rules for auditors regarding the audit 
engagement are incorporated in the so-called Nadere voorschriften Controle- en overige 
standaarden (NV COS), which are drawn up by the NIVRA. 
 
Most of the applicable rules regarding materiality are included in NV COS 320 – Audit 
Materiality (NIVRA 2007). Paragraph 4 of this audit standard states that ‘the objective of 
an audit of financial statements is to enable the auditor to express an opinion whether the 
financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an 
applicable financial reporting framework’ (NIVRA 2007, NV COS 320.4). In the Netherlands 
this is the framework of the IASB. 
 
To achieve the goal of an audit the auditor successively plans and designs an audit 
approach, executes the audit procedures based on the audit plan and evaluates the results 
of the audit (Arens et al. 2007, 160). 
 
Evaluation materiality 
Throughout the audit process, the auditor uses different materiality levels for different 
purposes. The most relevant materiality level to the user is the materiality level that is set 
by the auditor at the end of the audit and on which he bases his opinion whether the 
financial statements represent a true and fair view or not. This is the so-called evaluation 
materiality. The determination of this materiality level consists of selecting a materiality 
benchmark and a percentage to quantify the materiality level (Arens et al. 2007, 250). Net 
income before taxes is frequently considered the most sensitive predictor of future cash 
flow for a company and a critical item of information for users. That is why auditors often 
choose income as a benchmark (Arens et al. 2007, 250; Zuber et al. 1983, 43). The 
determination of a percentage depends on among other factors on the benchmark chosen. 
When the audit is fully executed, the auditor has to evaluate, based on the evidence 
gathered, whether the financial statements present a true and fair view of the financial 
position of a company. Financial statements may be materially misstated (or: alter users' 
economic decision-making) due to the effect of an individual omission or misstatement, or 
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due to the aggregate effect of a number of omissions or misstatements that are not 
individually considered material. 
 
 
3. The expectation gap 
 
The expectation gap 
If what the users perceive the auditor does is not in line with what the users expect the 
auditor does, an expectation gap exists between users and auditors (Porter 1993, 49). 
In the first place, this expectation gap exists there were society (or the user of the 
financial statements) has unreasonable expectations of the auditor (unreasonable 
expectations gap). An auditor cannot fulfil all of society’s needs because of limited control 
methods and control techniques and because a cost-benefit analysis needs to be taken into 
account. Secondly, sometimes the auditor does not live up to society’s expectations, 
because he is limited or not required to do so by certain regulation (deficient standards 
gap). These two parts of the expectation gap together are also called the communication 
gap (Pheijffer 2005, 44). 
A third cause of the expectation gap is a deficient performance by the auditor (deficient 
performance gap). The auditor does not always seem to be able to recognize what the 
reasonable expectations of society about the auditor’s performance are, or he simply fails 
in doing his job. 
 
Porter (1993) modelled the expectation gap as follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – The Audit Expectation-Performance Gap 
 
An expectation gap regarding materiality seems to exist. Several studies indicate that 
users demonstrate lower materiality thresholds than auditors (deficient performance gap) 
(Cho et al. 2003, 75; Holstrum and Messier 1982, 58; Højskov 1998, 6). Many users expect 
that an unqualified audit report implies that an auditor has performed a hundred percent 
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check and guarantees the preciseness of the financial statements (unreasonable 
expectations gap) (Den Dekker 2005, 25; Gowthorpe and Porter 2002). The gap that is 
caused by unreasonable expectations of users is also referred to as the ‘knowledge gap’, 
because it results from users having not enough knowledge with respect to the auditors’ 
existing responsibilities (Gowthorpe and Porter 2002). 
In her research, Brakenhoff states that one third of the users of the financial statements 
are not informed about the concept of materiality (Brakenhoff 2002, 37). 
The existence of an expectation gap regarding materiality, might contribute to a reduction 
of the perceived value of the auditor’s opinion as regards to the true and fair view of the 
financial statements of a company. This is not in the interest of users and auditors of the 
financial statements. Therefore, it is important to know whether a relevant expectation 
gap regarding materiality exists and if so, how to narrow it. 
 
 
4. Solutions to narrow the possible expectation gap 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, based on issues commented in audit literature and scientific economic 
literature that might contribute to the existence of a gap regarding materiality, measures 
(or: ‘solutions’) are presented that might solve materiality issues.  
In the second part of this chapter, an instrument is presented, based on which the 
solutions can be weighed in terms of desirability for the user of the financial statements. 
From this, hypotheses regarding the desirability of the measures are derived, which will be 
investigated empirically. This will contribute to getting insight in what needs regarding 
materiality the user might have and what measures need to be taken in order to reduce 
the expectation gap. 
 
A uniform guideline 
An often-heard shortcoming of the audit standards concerning materiality, is that they do 
not provide an unambiguous basis for the quantification of materiality (Majoor 2006, 50). 
The only information concerning materiality that users can derive from the audit report is 
the phrase ‘the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects’. This does not 
contribute to much clarity and does not provide much information (Koopmans 2003, 15; 
Majoor 2006, 50). 
 
If it is possible to formalize materiality practice into one uniform standard for the whole 
audit profession, the user has something to hold on to in determining the amount of 
immaterial misstatements or omissions that might be left in any financial statement. 
 
Therefore, in the empirical research, the subsequent statement regarding a uniform audit 
standard is presented to the respondents of the survey: 
 
A uniform guideline should be developed based on which all auditors are obliged to 
determine the materiality threshold. 
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Currently, no rules or guidelines exist in which a method for the quantification of the 
materiality threshold is incorporated and on which the auditor needs to base his 
materiality decision. It is possible for the auditor to use for example existing quantitative 
rules of thumb or the audit firms’ audit manuals. 
When developing a uniform guideline, the quantitative materiality level will be 
determined. The auditor is only allowed to deviate from this level if he motivates this. In 
any way, the auditor should apply his professional judgment, especially regarding 
qualitative elements. In the audit report will be reported in which audit standard of the 
NIVRA the condition is incorporated. 
 
Abolish materiality 
Many users of the financial statements have the supposition that the audited financial 
statements contain no omissions or misstatements. They assume and expect that during 
the audit, the auditor checks every item accurate to the euro (Den Dekker 2005, 25; 
Gowthorpe and Porter 2002). An unqualified opinion does only state that a user can 
reasonably rely on the information presented in the financial statements, not that it does 
not contain any errors or omissions of immaterial importance. On this point, an 
expectation gap seems to exist. 
 
Although the auditor cannot give full insurance on the financial statements being fully 
correct, there exists discussion on to what extent the auditor should audit the financial 
statements. The cost aspect is of importance, but next to that the opinion exists that 
reputation damage could harm a company a lot more, if material errors become known 
after the issuance of the financial statements.  
 
In the empirical research, the subsequent statement regarding abolishing materiality is 
presented to the respondents of the survey: 
 
Materiality of misstatements should be abolished. 
An example of a rule of thumb that is currently applied by auditors is a materiality 
threshold of 5% of pre-tax income. The auditor uses the established materiality level in 
planning the audit work that needs to be executed. The audit procedures to verify the 
financial statements are partial. They contain sampling of the segments. 
A materiality of zero implies the auditor checks every item of the financial administration 
of the company that is contained in the financial statements (a full audit). All the 
identified misstatements need to be adjusted in the financial statements. In this situation, 
the financial statements might still contain misstatements that the auditor is not capable 
to detect, neither by means of a full audit. As a result of this measure, the audit would 
become much more expensive. 
 
Correct all discovered misstatements 
Many users of the financial statements are in the supposition that the financial statements 
contain no omissions or misstatements (Den Dekker 2005, 25; Gowthorpe and Porter 2002). 
This implicates they expect that all the detected misstatements are corrected. What is 
even less known, is that the auditor often advises management to correct immaterial 
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misstatements discovered during the audit, but that it is up to the management to decide 
whether they want to do that or not. 
 
In the empirical research, the subsequent statement regarding the correction of discovered 
misstatements is presented to the respondents of the survey: 
 
All detected misstatements should be corrected, whether material or not. 
This measure requires that all the misstatements the auditor has identified during the 
audit, need to be corrected in the financial statements by the management, whether they 
are material or not (an exception holds for very small misstatements of for example < 1% 
of the materiality level). The audit is not aimed at identifying all the misstatements in the 
financial statements, as is the case with abolishing materiality. 
 
Disclosure 
The materiality of errors chosen by the auditor affects the annual financial statements. 
Depending on the choices, the financial statements may differ. The user has to execute his 
economic decisions based on the financial statements, but no information is presented in 
the audit report or any other place in the financial statements about the materiality level 
the auditor has determined (Koopmans 2003, 15; Majoor 2006, 51). The consequence is 
that the user cannot simply compare the financial statements of companies, especially not 
when different audit firms have audited them. Moreover, the user is not informed about 
the possible magnitude of deviation. 
 
In the empirical research, the subsequent statement regarding the disclosure of materiality 
thresholds is presented to the respondents of the survey: 
 
The materiality level that is applied by the auditor should be reported in the audit 
report. 
In the audit report accompanying the audited financial statements, the auditor reports the 
applied materiality level and communicates a short explanation of the way in which the 
threshold is determined. 
 
Shareholder input 
As has become clear from chapter 2, during his audit the auditor determines the different 
materiality levels. When executing this, the auditor should base his decisions on the 
possible effect of a certain materiality level on the economic decision-making of users of 
the financial statements. Because the auditor is allowed to use professional judgment, no 
real obligation for the auditor exists to consult the user. It seems paradoxical that the 
users, for who the financial statements are prepared and audited, cannot influence the 
materiality deliberations made by auditors. 
 
Therefore, in the empirical research, the subsequent statement regarding the input of the 
shareholder is presented to the respondents of the survey: 
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The shareholder should have a voice in the materiality level the auditor needs to 
apply. 
Shareholders (possibly assisted by their financial advisors) should have the opportunity to 
yearly anonymously express the magnitude of the materiality level that is desired to the 
company’s auditor, based on which the auditor should determine an average desired 
materiality level. Based on qualitative factors and his professional judgment, the auditor 
may adjust the materiality threshold downwards. Adjusting the materiality level upwards is 
not allowed. 
 
No relevant expectation gap 
Does materiality really matter to the user? There might be a gap, but the gap might not be 
relevant. Solutions that provide the user more insight in materiality all come at a cost 
(e.g. cost of working out the details) and are a hassle to implement. 
 
In the empirical research, the subsequent statement regarding not changing the concept of 
materiality is presented to the respondents of the survey: 
 
The way materiality of misstatements currently is designed, is good as it is. 
As a user of the financial statements, you are satisfied about the way materiality is 
handled in practice by the auditor and of the degree to which you are informed about the 
concept. According to you, considering the possibilities presented before and your opinion 
regarding materiality of misstatements, no measures are needed. 
 
Predictive instrument and hypotheses 
While the importance of the different components of the expectation gap to users is not 
known, it is hard to predict how users perceive the concept of materiality as it is and what 
measures users might want to introduce in order to improve the concept, thereby 
narrowing the expectation gap. An instrument is developed to guide in predicting the 
users’ preferences. The qualitative characteristics of information (see chapter 2) and a 
cost-benefit consideration are incorporated in this instrument. Next to that, another 
variable ‘influence on users’ perception’ is added. Each component represents a 
characteristic that a measure might, or might not have. 
This table indicates the relative preferences of each of the measures by the users. From 
this table, the hypotheses are derived that state whether the measure is valued by the 
user. These predictions can be helpful in interpreting the results of the empirical research 
and if they align with respondents’ opinion, strengthen the conclusions of the empirical 
research. 
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Table 4.1 - Relative contribution of solutions to several characteristics of information29 
Compara- Influence
bility on users
Uniform guideline 1,4 0 0,6 1,4 0,6 4
Abolish materiality 0,4 -0,2 1,1 0,8 1 3,1
Correct all misstatements 0 0 1 0,4 0,6 2
Disclosure 0,6 0,4 0,6 1,2 1,6 4,4
Shareholder input 1 0,8 -0,4 -0,6 1,2 2
No change -0,4 0,2 -0,2 -0,4 0,1 -0,7
Sub-totalUnderstan-
dability
Relevance Reliability
 
 
 
Table 4.1 - Continued 
Easy Cheap Total
Uniform guideline 1,6 1,6 7,2
Abolish materiality -0,6 -2 0,5
Correct all misstatements 1 -0,6 2,4
Disclosure 0,4 0,4 5,2
Shareholder input -1,6 -1 -0,6
No change 0,8 0,8 0,9  
 
The hypotheses that are derived from this table read:  
 
H1: Users want the uniform guideline measure to be implemented. 
 
H2: Users want the disclosure measure to be implemented. 
 
H3: Users do not want the ‘correct all discovered misstatements’ measure to be 
 implemented. 
 
H4: Users do not want the abolish materiality measure to be implemented. 
 
H5: Users do not want the shareholder input measure to be implemented. 
 
H6: Users do at least want one measure to be implemented in order to narrow (part of) 
 the expectation gap regarding materiality. 
 
 
5. Design of the Empirical Research 
 
Units of analysis 
The research is executed amongst a variety of users of financial statements of listed 
companies. The biggest share of these users (83%) consists of shareholders and creditors. 
                                             
29 The table is compiled as follows: 5 independent auditors provided each of the characteristics of each of the 
measures a value of -2, -1, 0, 1, or 2, dependent on the relative contribution or reduction of each of the 
measures to the specific characteristics. The averages of these scores are included in the table. The auditors 
had to reason from the point of view of users when assessing the values of each measure. 
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Professional representatives of creditors and shareholders are equated with creditors and 
shareholders, while they represent the interests of shareholders and creditors. 
 
The remaining respondents are persons that use the financial statements for a variety of 
purposes that do not contain considering, taking, keeping, or abandoning a financial 
interest in a company. 
 
Questionnaires 
The instrument that is suitable to conduct the research is a questionnaire, which can 
provide information about both knowledge and attitude (Baarda and De Goede 1995, 144). 
Two questionnaires (part one and part two) are developed. The first part consists of a 
questionnaire with questions about the respondent and his position and general open-
ended questions about his knowledge and his perception of materiality of misstatements. 
From part one, the aptitude of the respondent, his or her knowledge of the subject 
materiality of misstatements and qualitative information will be derived. The purpose of 
this is to express an opinion on the existence of an expectation gap together with the 
results of the second part of the research. The biggest part of the second questionnaire 
consists of closed-ended questions (statements) about the desirability of the different 
materiality measures. The measures are briefly described and the respondent needs to 
assess the lacking details himself. The respondent needed to choose the desirability of a 
certain measure out of five response categories often referred to as a Likert scale (Babbie 
2007, 170). Before conducting the actual research, the draft questionnaires were 
submitted to a pilot study. 
 
Data collection 
From the database of Company.info several lists of Dutch companies were derived in which 
professional representatives of financial statement users might work. These companies 
included among others banks, investment companies and pension funds. This method is 
called random availability sampling. 
 
Approximately 85 companies have been approached personally by telephone. Thirty 
subjects agreed to cooperate. Personal questionnaires by mail or e-mail were sent to 
them.  
 
Next to the personal approach by telephone, thirty companies and/or persons have been 
sent an e-mail unannounced in which the request was made to fill out the survey or to pass 
the survey to a suitable person. 
 
Finally, an important part of the respondents (N=27) were reached via the network of the 
author. This part contained first line respondents and next to that, the author was 
introduced or the research of the author was introduced to network contacts of people 
directly linked to the author. This sampling method is called snowball sampling (Baarda 
and De Goede 1995, 127; Babbie 2007, 184). The respondents were distributed 
questionnaires via mail or e-mail. 
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Response 
In the end, 46 qualifying persons (N=46) took part in the whole survey, from which 38 
qualify as investor, creditor or professional representative and eight as other users of the 
financial statements. 
 
Table 5.1 - Response per category of respondents that was sent part one of the survey 
 
Amount sent Valuable response Response rate
Telephone acquisition 30 16 53%
Mail acquisition 30 3 10%
Snowball acquisition NA 27 NA
Total 46  
 
Qualitative and quantitative analysis of results 
The results of the research are assessed in two different ways. 
All the information that is obtained from the open-ended questions is assessed 
qualitatively. Next to that, also the information from the closed-ended questions is 
assessed qualitatively. A thorough analysis of the possible deeper meanings of the 
information is executed. 
 
In addition, the quantitative information from the statements containing the materiality 
measures are analyzed using a quantitative statistic program (SPSS, version 15.0). The 
answers of the respondents on the statements are coded as follows: 
 Strongly agree  = 1 
 Agree  = 2 
 Neutral  = 3 
 Disagree  = 4 
 Strongly disagree = 5 
The ordinal scale variables are subjected to non-parametric tests. From this, the 
hypotheses that have been formulated which reflect the expectations of users’ opinion in 
which way to narrow the gap, can be confirmed, or rejected with a higher reliability. For 
all the statistical tests in this research, the results are considered statistically significant if 
the p-value is less than 5% (p < .05). 
 
Limitations 
As can be deduced from the approach just described, the population sample that is taken 
is not a random sample of the population, for a large part nonprobability samling is used 
instead, because it is practically impossible to determine the size of the whole population 
of users of the financial statements. Consequently, it is not possible to access a random 
sample of the whole population. 
The attempt is made to include ‘randomly chosen’ respondents by phoning to the 
companies that were included in the lists from the Company.info database. Obviously, in 
case of snowball sampling, a random sample is out of the question. 
The representativeness of the samples using snowball sampling is questionable (Babbie 
2007, 185). However, snowball respondents were not informed about the research in 
advance and did not have more information in advance than any arbitrary respondent did. 
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Therefore, it is deliberated that the respondents approached via the snowball-method 
constitute an as valuable contribution to the survey as any other respondent with no ties to 
the author does. 
 
 
6. The results of the empirical research 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the results of the empirical part of this research will be presented. In the 
next paragraph, the knowledge of respondents regarding the concept of materiality is 
assessed. After that, the vision of respondents regarding materiality and their opinions on 
whether to improve the concept of materiality or not, are presented. 
 
Knowledge regarding the concept of materiality 
The first objective of the research is to determine whether an expectation gap concerning 
materiality exists. An important element of the answer to this question is to know whether 
respondents of financial statements are aware and informed of the concept. 
 
In the first part of the survey, questions are posed whereof the answers provide insight 
about the knowledge and attitude of respondents concerning materiality. 
The results whether respondents of the financial statements are informed and aware of 
the existence and the implications of the concept of materiality are mixed, but it can be 
concluded that for at least one third of the respondents (35%) a lack of knowledge exists. 
 
Ways in which the respondents want to improve the concept of materiality 
All the respondents had to express their opinion on six different statements that 
represented the different possible measures regarding materiality as introduced in chapter 
4 of this research. 
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A uniform guideline should be developed based on which all auditors are obliged to 
determine the materiality threshold 
 
Bar chart 6.1 
A uniform guideline should be developed based on which all auditors are 
obliged to determine the overall materiality threshold*
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* Two respondents answered ‘Don’t know’. 
 
In the audit standards that currently exist, no prescriptions of in what way to determine 
the quantitative materiality threshold exist. The figures show that the majority of 
respondents would like to end this situation by introducing a new uniform standard with 
quantitative thresholds included.30 The auditor should refer to this guideline in the audit 
report. 
 
Several reasons exist why respondents are attracted to this measure: 
 Clearness and transparency; many respondents indicated they would support a clear 
standard to which is referred to in the audit report, because this would make the 
concept more clear to users as well as to auditors. 
 The increase of uniformity among auditors in determining materiality, would increase 
the uniformity of financial statements and with that the comparability. 
 The standard would introduce more objectivity, based on which users can more easily 
rely on the reliability of the financial statements. 
 
Opponents argue: 
 The auditor is best capable of judging materiality. 
 Some matters are just impossible to capture in rules. For example, in which way can be 
dealt with differences in branches and in size of companies? 
                                             
30 In this statement, the term uniform guideline is used and not audit standard. This can be considered as a 
flaw in the design of the research. The uniform guideline measure is intended as a uniform audit standard. 
Based on the answers, it could be determined that most respondents of the empirical research considered the 
guideline to be a prescriptive audit standard. Therefore, the term ‘uniform guideline’ and ‘uniform standard’ 
are used interchangeably. 
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 Despite of the uniformity in the quantitative assessment of materiality, this guideline 
would still leave room for professional judgment. 
 
Both the proponents and opponents have valid reasons for being in favor or against this 
measure, but the tendency is unarguably that the majority of the respondents is in favor of 
this measure. The results of the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test significantly show that 
respondents would have no objection against introducing this measure for improving the 
concept of materiality. That is why hypothesis 1, ‘Users want the uniform guideline 
measure to be implemented’, seems tenable. 
 
 
 
Materiality of misstatements should be abolished 
 
Bar chart 6.2 
Materiality of misstatements should be abolished
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This measure implicates a full audit. Most respondents recognized this as a very expensive 
option, with limited benefit. Practically half (49%) of the respondents rank this measure as 
least favorable measure. 
 
Conclusions regarding the expectation gap 
 
 The existence of a deficient standards gap appeared. In order to achieve transparency 
and uniformity, the existing audit standards need to be adapted. 
 The existence of an unreasonable expectations gap appeared. Respondents indicated the 
concept of materiality is not clear to them and therefore they need to be informed about it 
by means of a guideline that is known to them. 
 A modest deficient performance gap can be discerned. Some respondents indicate the 
guideline would introduce more objectivity, which indicates they are concerned about the 
subjective assessment of materiality, as it currently exists. 
 On the other hand, also proponents of professional judgment exist. This category would 
be of the opinion that the performance of the auditor becomes deficient if his professional 
judgment is suppressed. 
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The results of this statement support hypothesis 5, ‘Users do not want the abolish 
materiality measure to be implemented’. This conclusion is also statistically supported in 
the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test. 
 
 
 
All discovered misstatements should be corrected, whether material or not 
 
 Bar chart 6.3 
All discovered misstatements should be corrected, whether 
material or not*
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 * One respondent answered ‘Don’t know’. 
 
The opinions on this measure are much dispersed. Proponents present the following 
arguments: 
 An error should be redeemed at all times. 
 Discovered misstatements should be corrected to safeguard the reliability of the 
 financial statements. 
 
The measure seems to have a strong subjective appeal on respondents, for them correcting 
mistakes is a matter of principle. 
 
The opponents argue: 
 From a cost-benefit perspective, it is not desirable to correct immaterial 
 misstatements. 
 Because they do not influence the view of the company in the financial statements, 
 correcting misstatements that are not relevant is senseless. 
 
Conclusions regarding the expectation gap 
 
 Earlier results presented a lack of knowledge of 35% of the respondents regarding the 
concept. These respondents might not have been aware of the existence of a materiality 
threshold. Some comments support this assumption. Therefore, a reasonableness gap is 
subscribed to the results of this measure. 
 No deficient performance gap is encountered and neither a deficient standards gap. 
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These comments seem to appeal more to the relevance aspect of the measure and the 
costs of the measure and are more rational than emotional arguments. 
 
The results of the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test, do not provide a decisive answer to the 
question whether respondents would like to introduce the ‘correcting all misstatements’ 
measure. The result for this statement slightly bends in favor of introducing the measure, 
but this is not statistically significant so it cannot be concluded that respondents agree 
with this measure. 
 
Splitting the sample group in respondents that use the financial statements to base 
decisions on to buy, hold or sell stock and respondents that do not, does show a significant 
result. Respondents that use the financial statements for stock related decisions seem to 
be proponents of the statement and the others are opponents. An explanation for this 
result might be that (indirect) shareholders want the financial statements to be more 
precise, because stock prices can react unpredictable to the discovery of misstatements 
(even when they are perceived immaterial by the auditor) and small changes in stock 
prices might have huge consequences for (short term) shareholders. However, from the 
comments presented with this statement this reasoning cannot be extracted. Provisionally, 
hypothesis 3, ‘Users do not want the ‘correct all discovered misstatements’ measure to be 
implemented’, is accepted. 
 
 
 
The materiality level that is applied by the auditor should be reported in the audit report. 
 
Bar chart 6.4 
The materiality level that is applied by the auditor should be 
reported in the audit report*
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* One respondent answered ‘Don’t know’. 
 
Conclusions regarding the expectation gap 
 
 The results are inconclusive, but a deficient standards gap is looming. 
 No deficient performance or reasonableness gap is derived from these results. 
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This measure requires the auditor to report the applied materiality level in the audit 
report and to present a short clarification of the establishment. It was the most agreed 
upon statement in the research. It was the only measure with an extreme answer 
(‘strongly agree’) as the mode answer. 
 
Proponents state: 
 Having this knowledge has value to the user. It provides knowledge about the 
reservedness with which the financial statements should be assessed. 
 Transparency is important. 
 The measure provides users the possibility to assess the reliability of financial 
statements themselves. 
 It will bring more uniformity in materiality thresholds, which will make financial 
statements of companies more comparable. 
 If materiality levels become public, this might stimulate auditors to perform better. 
 
Some respondents point at difficulties reporting the materiality in the audit report. The 
materiality figure alone is not sufficient to derive valuable information from. The auditor 
needs to provide an adequate explanation of the realization of this figure, but an overkill 
of information is not desirable either. 
 
The results of the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test are significant. Together the results lead to 
the conclusion that hypothesis 2, ‘Users want the disclosure measure to be implemented’, 
is valid. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions regarding the expectation gap 
 
 Respondents indicate they want to be informed of the materiality threshold, which 
implicates they currently lack information that might be valuable for decision-making. This 
constitutes a communication gap. The deficient standards should be adjusted (require 
disclosure) which subsequently diminishes the reasonableness gap. 
 A deficient performance gap is not likely, but the need for information can possibly be 
interpreted as a need of the respondent to monitor the performance of the monitor. 
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The shareholder should have a voice in the materiality level the auditor needs to apply. 
 
Bar chart 6.5 
The shareholder should have a voice in the determination of 
the materiality level that is to be used by the auditor
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This measure is the only measure that implicates direct involvement of users of the 
financial statements (more specific: shareholders) in the determination of materiality 
thresholds. 
 
Respondents are not of the opinion that shareholders should have more influence. Reasons 
for this are: 
 Because auditors are the experts and most shareholders would not be able to make 
sensitive materiality valuations, this is a task of the auditor. 
 If shareholders can judge materiality, it will become an expensive and complex affair. 
 The auditor should operate independently and therefore should not be influenced by 
shareholders. 
 Shareholders are not the only stakeholders. The interests of other stakeholders are 
neglected by a measure like this. 
 
In the end, 74% of the respondents disagreed with the measure. This result is only slightly 
better than the result of the ‘abolish materiality’ measure. 
 
All together the hypothesis ‘Users do not want the shareholder input measure to be 
implemented’ (hypothesis 5), is considered accepted. This supposition is also statistically 
substantiated by means of a Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test. 
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The way materiality of misstatements currently is designed, is good as it is. 
 
Bar chart 6.6 
The way the concept of materiality of misstatements is 
currently designed, is good as it is*
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* Eight respondents answered ‘Don’t know’. 
 
A good score on this measure would implicate no relevant expectation gap regarding 
materiality exists. However, the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test indicates respondents do not 
favor the ‘no change’ measure and are therefore not satisfied and of the opinion that one 
or more measures should be introduced. 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The goal of this research was to provide an answer to the main research question: 
 
 
Conclusions regarding the expectation gap 
 
 The concept of materiality should be changed, so hypothesis 7 (‘Users do at least want 
one measure to be implemented in order to narrow (part of) the expectation gap on 
materiality’) is accepted. The acceptation of the hypothesis implies a relevant expectation 
gap exists. 
 
Conclusions regarding the expectation gap 
 
 No real expectation gap can be distinguished from the results of this measure. However, 
some suggestions are presented to monitor the auditor, which indicates the respondents 
are not completely confident the auditor executes the materiality decisions eminently (and 
which might indicate a small deficient performance gap). 
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‘Does a relevant expectation gap exist between users of the financial statements and 
auditors concerning materiality of misstatements, and if so, in which way do the users 
want to narrow this gap?’ 
 
In the first part of the survey, more than half of the respondents who claimed to have 
(some) insight in which way the auditor applies materiality in practice, indicated that in 
order to judge financial statements well it is important to have knowledge about 
materiality. It appeared that a considerable number (at least 35%) of respondents was not 
informed about the concept of materiality. 
In the second part of the survey, it turned out that many of the respondents, the ones that 
were knowledgeable of the concept beforehand as well as the ones that were not, are of 
the opinion the concept of materiality can be improved by introducing one or more 
measures. The statement ‘The way the concept of materiality of misstatements is 
currently designed, is good as it is’ is significantly rejected by the respondents, 43% of the 
respondents indicated to agree or strongly agree with changes regarding the concept. 
These results indicate that a relevant expectation gap regarding materiality exists between 
the respondents and auditors. 
 
Therefore, the first part of the main research question is answered affirmative: a relevant 
expectation gap between users of the financial statements and auditors concerning 
materiality of misstatements does exist. 
 
The elements that constituted the gap between respondents and auditors in this empirical 
research are also derived. 
The performance of the auditor regarding the determination of materiality thresholds did 
not bother the respondents, becoming clear from the rejection of the ‘abolish materiality’ 
and ‘shareholder input’ measure. In general, respondents seem to trust the materiality 
assessment the auditor executes. Therefore, it is concluded that the expectation gap 
regarding materiality is not significantly present on the deficient performance part of the 
gap. However, indirectly a small deficient performance gap exists, while respondents 
indicate the need to be able to judge auditor performance via a uniform guideline and 
disclosure of materiality levels. 
 
The materiality bottleneck turned out to concentrate on the deficient standards gap and 
on the reasonableness gap. Together these two parts of the gap are also known as the 
communication gap. 
 
A lack of communication being a considerable cause of the expectation gap is the most 
prevalent conclusion that can be derived from the results of the survey. Because they now 
do not know what materiality of misstatements is, or do not fully understand the concept, 
many respondents indicated they wanted to be better informed about the concept. The 
two measures presented in the survey that will provide the user with information regarding 
materiality, a uniform guideline and disclosure, turned out to be popular measures. 
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A uniform guideline, to which the auditor refers in the audit report, would contribute to 
clearness and transparency regarding materiality according to the respondents. Disclosing 
the materiality levels applied by auditors accompanied by a short explanation, would be 
even a better solution for providing information and transparency about the subject. 
 
Introducing a uniform guideline and/or the obligation to disclose materiality levels, would 
contribute in narrowing the deficient standards gap. Introduction of these measures would 
also narrow the reasonableness gap. 
 
While a broad range of users participated in the survey and the results are quite 
convincing, the final answer on the second part of the research question is: users of the 
financial statements in general want to introduce a uniform guideline and a disclosure 
requirement in the audit report. To this, the comment is added that the results of the 
disclosure measure were more convincing than the results of the uniform guideline 
measure. 
 
Recommendations for research 
This research pointed out that respondents want the concept of materiality to be 
improved. It is recommended to further investigate the measures that were preferred by 
the respondents in terms of disadvantages and benefits to users in general (also for the 
long term) and in terms of design. 
 
Next to that, it is essential that every measure will be researched from the point of view 
of all the different stakeholders related to the measure (preparers, auditors, users). This 
research was limited to the users’ point of view regarding the different measures. 
 
Recommendations for practice 
The respondents provided many reasons for their opinion to introduce the two measures 
that, according to their point of view, will improve the concept of materiality for users of 
the financial statements. The message of these respondents (that can be regarded as 
representatives of all users) should be heard and not ignored. 
 
A recommendation to the IFAC/IAASB (and the NIVRA) is to fuel the debate about the audit 
standards that might be interesting for users by actively approaching the user of the 
financial statements and assess their needs and opinion. Regarding materiality, the 
financial statement users of today do not seem to be a part of the concept of materiality 
anymore, despite the users being explicitly incorporated in the definition of materiality of 
misstatements of the IAASB. 
 
Clarifying the concept of materiality to users has the potential to improve the confidence 
of users of the financial statements in the audit profession and that should sound 
attractive in these days of reduced confidence because of several scandals. 
 
 
 
 158
References 
 
Arens, A.A., R.J. Elder, and M.S. Beasley. 2007. Auditing and assurance services: An 
integrated approach. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
 
Baarda, D.B., and M.P.M. de Goede. 1995. Basisboek methoden en technieken: Praktische 
handleiding voor het opzetten en uitvoeren van onderzoek. Houten: Stenfert Kroese. 
 
Babbie, E. 2007. The Practice of Social Research. Thomson Wadsworth. 
 
Brakenhoff, M. 2002. In: P. van Rietschoten, In de ‘jungle’ van de materialiteit. De 
Accountant (April): 34-37. 
 
Cho, S.Y., R.L. Hagerman, S. Nabar, and E.R. Patterson. 2003. Measuring stockholder 
materiality. Supplement to Accounting Horizons 17: 63-76. 
 
Dekker, J.J. den. 2005. Materieel belang: Onduidelijkheid omtrent begrip verduidelijkt. 
Faces 4: 25-31. 
 
Gowthorpe, C., and B. Porter. 2002. Audit expectation - performance gap in the United 
Kingdom in 1999 and comparison with the gap in New Zealand in 1989 and in 1999, 
Executive Summary. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, 
http://www.icas.org.uk/site/cms/contentviewarticle.asp?article=3521 (26 October 2007). 
 
Højskov, L. 1998. The expectation gap between users’ and auditors’ materiality 
judgements in Denmark. Paper presented at the Second Asian Pacific Interdisciplinary 
Research in Accounting Conference, 4-6 August, Japan: 1-23. 
 
Holstrum, G.L., and W.F. Messier Jr. 1982. A review and integration of empirical research 
on materiality. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 2(1): 58. 
 
Hoogendoorn, M.N., and G.M.H. Mertens. 2001. Kwaliteit van externe financiële 
verslaggeving in Nederland. Kluwer/Limperg Instituut-reeks. 
 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 2005. Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statements (Framework), in: International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRSs). United Kingdom: IASCF.  
 
Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(14): 305-360. 
 
Koninklijk Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants (NIVRA). 2007. Nadere 
voorschriften controle- en overige standaarden (NV COS), in: Handleiding Regelgeving 
Accountancy Deel 1. Amsterdam, http://www.nivra.nl/HRA/index.htm (8 September 
2007). 
 159
Koopmans, L. 2003. Van materieel belang. De Accountant 2003/4: 14-18. 
 
Majoor, B. 2006. Materialiteit: gemiste kans. De Accountant 2006/7: 50-51. 
 
Pheijffer, M. 2005. In: C. Dolk, Auditorium Accountant meets Audit Committee: 
Toehoorders of gesprekspartners. 
http://www.nivra.nl/dienstverlening/bibliotheek/pdf/scriptie_auditorium-
accountant_meets_audit_committee-cornelis_dolk.pdf (8 October 2007). 
 
Porter, B. 1993. An Empirical Study of the Audit Expectations-Performance Gap. 
Accounting and Business Research 24(93): 49-68. 
 
Santen, B.P.A., A. de Bos, and D. de Rooij. 2006. Praktische aspecten van corporate 
governance. Kluwer. 
 
Zuber, G.R., R.K. Elliott, W.R. Kinney Jr., and J.J. Leisenring. 1983. Using Materiality in 
Audit Planning: A Practical Way to Relate the Auditor’s Materiality Estimate to the Design 
of Audit Procedures. Journal of Accountancy 171: 42-54. 
 160
The endogenous character of executive 
compensation: Does corporate strategy 
affect the choice to adopt residual 
income-based incentives? 
 
Frank V. Sonneveld31 
 
 
Executive summary 
This study investigates whether firms following a prospector strategy are less likely to adopt 
residual income (RI) as their main performance measure than firms following a defender strategy. 
The rationale behind this research question is that previous research has shown that implementing 
RI-based incentives has some behavioral consequences that intuitively do not rhyme well with the 
objectives of a growing firm. The sample consists of 40 RI adopters, matched with 40 non-adopters, 
for each of which strategy is measured as a combination of three publicly available ratios. 
Although the empirical results of this study are inconclusive, he research has lead to renewed 
insights that should be of use to researchers in the future. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Residual income is a performance measure that has received a lot of attention in the past 
fifteen years. It is claimed to overcome the problems associated with traditional 
performance measures. These problems include (investment and operational) myopia and 
paying too little attention to the costs of capital involved to generate earnings. 
RI is calculated by removing from operating income a charge on employed capital. What 
remains is, according to proponents of RI-type of measures, the true value a firm has 
created. That is, the value it creates beyond the demanded cost of capital. Under this 
definition, RI can be used by any for-profit company, at any time, as it is simply the 
measure that best encompasses all the different aspects of value creation: finance, 
investments and operations (Bouwens and Speklé 2007). 
The most prominent assumption underlying the discussion in favor of RI, is that it is (most) 
closely aligned with stockholder value. One can therefore take in the advantages of a 
market-based measure, whilst leaving the disadvantages of uncontrollability and distortion 
aside. Various researchers, however, have concluded that RI does not explain stock returns 
as well as claimed (Biddle et al. 1997). 
Reluctant to believe RI thereby loses all of it’s benefits, I seek to find out why, then, firms 
apparently still decide to embrace this measure as their primary basis for incentive 
                                             
31 This thesis was supervised by Dr. J. Noeverman, Department of Accounting, Auditing & Control, Rotterdam 
School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam.  
Frank Sonneveld has graduated in Economics and Business at the Erasmus University Rotterdam (NL) and is now 
doing a second master programme in Banking and Finance at the University of Sankt Gallen (CH). 
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compensation. The answer to this question, I believe, lies in the behavioral consequences 
of adopting an RI-based performance measure. According to Wallace (1997), firms that 
adopt RI-based compensation increase their RI performance in the years following RI 
adoption, thereby confirming the adage ‘what you measure is what you get’. Firms do this 
by (1) decreasing investments, (2) increasing divestments, (3) increase payouts to 
shareholders, and (4) increase asset turnover. These results indicate the evolvement of 
more asset-conscious behavior when RI is adopted. 
The next step in my line of reasoning is the hypothesized notion that the choice to adopt 
RI is an endogenous one. That is: some firms are more likely to adopt RI-based measures 
than others. Considering the behavioral consequences of RI adoption as Wallace (1997) 
found them, I argue firms following a defender-type of strategy are more likely to adopt RI 
than are firms following a prospector-type of strategy. 
This argument molded into a research question looks as follows: 
 
Are firms characterized as following a defender-type strategy more likely to adopt 
residual income-based performance incentives than firms characterized as following a 
prospector-type strategy? 
 
I deliberately use the strategy typology defined by Miles and Snow (Miles et al. 1978), 
because of it’s widespread use among researchers and because it is well documented 
(Simons 1987). 
In my research, I create a strategy continuum ranging from defender to prospector. This 
method is appropriated from Ittner et al. (1997) and involves the measurement of three 
publicly available ratios which are then modified to weigh equally and compounded into 
one strategy measure. These ratios are: (1) research and development (R&D) expenditures-
to-sales, (2) market-to-book-assets, and (3) employees-to-sales. 
My sample consists of 40 firms that have adopted RI as their primary measure for incentive 
compensation in the last 13 years, matched with 40 control firms, identified through 
matching on standard industry classification (SIC) codes and total assets (to proxy for firm 
size). The result is a sample of 80 firms (40 firm couples). For availability reasons, I chose 
to investigate stock listed U.S. companies only. 
With this research I aim to make a valuable contribution to existing incentive 
compensation literature because research on the endogenous character of RI adoption is 
scarce. Although corporate strategy has for long been linked to management control 
systems (Otley 1980), it has rarely been applied to RI-based performance measurement 
systems. A confirming answer to my research question could lead the way for other 
researchers to examine whether RI adopting firms following a defender strategy (and thus 
match the profile of an RI adopter) perform better than firms adopting RI whilst following 
a prospector strategy. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the second part will provide summary of 
relevant prior literature. This will be extended in part three where I will present my 
hypothesis development. In part four I will set out how I designed my research. The results 
are then presented in part five, and analyzed in part six. This part will also contain a 
summary of the paper. 
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2.  Prior research 
 
2.1  Performance based compensation 
Performance based compensation finds it’s origin in agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Agency relationships arise because firms grow and are thereby forced to decentralize 
decision-making authorities (Jensen and Meckling 1992; Bouwens and Speklé 2007). 
Performance based compensation aims to re-align the interests of managers and their 
superiors. 
The ultimate goal for any for-profit organization is to maximize shareholder (or firm) 
value. It would therefore seem logical to reward employees when they create value for the 
firm. However, since measuring one’s contribution to firm value is rarely possible, 
alternative ways of rewarding employees have to be sought (Merchant and Van der Stede 
2007). 
Generally accepted finance literature states the value of any economic asset can be 
calculated by discounting all future cash flows the asset is expected to generate to present 
value (Berk and Demarzo 2007). The change in firm value over a certain period of time is 
called economic income. Building on the principle of discounted future cash flows, 
employees can create value for the firm by: (1) increasing the size of future cash flows, (2) 
accelerating the receipt of those cash flows (due to the time value of money), or (3) 
making the cash flows less susceptible to risk (to lower the discount rate) (Merchant and 
Van der Stede 2007). 
Seeing as managerial tasks are broad and varied, the list of possible performance measures 
on the basis of which managers can be evaluated and rewarded is extensive. Following 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2007), I classify these measures to fit into one of two broad 
categories: market measures and accounting measures. Measures in each of these two 
categories have their individual advantages and disadvantages. Regardless of what certain 
consulting firms might argue, there is no such thing as a perfect performance measure. 
 
2.2  Market- and accounting-based performance measures 
The first type of measure we discuss are those that are market-based. These measures are 
based on the direct value created for shareholders, also referred to as shareholder return. 
Shareholder return is calculated as the sum of dividends plus the change in stock price 
(Berk and Demarzo 2007). 
The popularity of stock-based compensation systems lies in the directness by which they 
relate to changes in shareholder value. Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) furthermore 
identify market measures of performance as being timely, precise and nearly impossible to 
manipulate. 
Of course there are also disadvantages to using market measures of performance. The 
biggest of which lies in the numerous amount of uncontrollable factors that influence stock 
prices. Additionally, it is generally only top management that can significantly influence 
stock prices as stock prices contain aggregated information from a whole organization. 
Accounting measures of performance have traditionally been the primary base for manager 
evaluations (Van der Stede et al. 2006). Two basic forms of accounting based measures are 
distinguished by Merchant and Van der Stede (2007): (1) residual measures such as 
operating profit or RI, and (2) ratio measures such as return on assets (ROA) or return on 
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investment (ROI). I will be giving ROI special attention as it is, in characteristics, closest to 
RI. 
Accounting measures of performance thank their popularity to a number of advantages 
which I will appropriate primarily from Merchant and Van der Stede (2007). First of all they 
are generally relatively congruent with the organization’s goal of value (profit) 
maximization (Lev 1989). Nonetheless, accounting measures of performance are subject to 
some of the same controllability issues as market measures. A big difference between the 
two types of measures, however, is that accounting measures can be calculated for 
individual business units lower down the organization, whereas stock prices are usually 
only available for corporations as a whole. 
Using accounting profits or any other accounting based performance measure, however, 
has its disadvantages as well. The most heard critique on accounting measures is that they 
focus on the past. They are said to be backward-looking (Kaplan and Norton 1992). The 
problem associated with this characteristic is that managers are not motivated to think 
proactively. 
 
2.3  Return-on-investment 
The one accounting measure I will address individually is ROI, because I consider it to be 
closest related to residual income – the measure this paper is about. ROI is a popular 
measure because it allows comparing of divisions of different sizes. A larger division is 
supposed to make more profit than a smaller division. Because ROI divides profit by total 
investments for the particular divisions, it controls for division size. 
Other advantages are that ROI clearly reflects the revenue, cost and investment tradeoff 
managers have to make and the experience most managers have with widely-used 
measures like this (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007). 
There are, however, important disadvantages to using ROI as a performance measure as 
well. The first disadvantage lies in the inherent difference between ratio and absolute 
measures. This is explained nicely by Balachandran (2006), who mentions maximizing a 
ratio measure can induce suboptimal investment behavior. A successful division manager 
might be reluctant to invest in a project that would lower his division’s ROI, even though 
the project ROI is higher than the company’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
Conversely, a manager of a less successful division may choose to invest in a project that 
raises average ROI, but does not yield a return equal to the company’s WACC. The result of 
this form of suboptimalization is that company capital is gradually allocated away from the 
most successful divisions to the least successful divisions (Merchant and Van der Stede 
2007). 
 
2.4  Residual income 
A measure that is supposed to combine the positive characteristics of both measures is 
residual income (RI). Over the past 2 decades it seems there has been increasing academic 
and practical interest in performance measures based on RI. This increased interest may 
be attributed to the New York consulting firm Stern Stewart & Co., that advocates a 
specific form32 of RI called economic value added (EVA) (Stewart 1991). 
                                             
32 Various other authors, as well as consulting firms have introduced slightly adjusted versions of RI, but EVA is 
the best known. These other adjusted versions of RI are cash-flow return on investments (CFROI) by Holt Value 
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The concept of RI has been introduced as early as 1890, by Alfred Marshall (Bouwens and 
Van Lent 2000), who defined it as net income minus a capital charge.  
In short, ROI is calculated by deducting from operating profit a charge on all capital 
employed. Schematically this looks like this (Bouwens and Speklé 2007): 
 
 
  Sales revenue 
-/-  Costs of operational activities 
-/-  Financing costs (Cost of capital x Capital employed) 
=  Residual income 
 
 
 
 
The result is a measure that takes into account the various areas that affect value: 
finance, investment and operational decisions are brought into one measure (Bouwens and 
Speklé 2007). Operational decisions surface in the profit part of the measure, investment 
and financing decisions in the cost of capital and the size of total assets parts. Managers’ 
decisions are thus directed to asset deployment (for example by increasing profits) and 
asset commitment (for example by decreasing the risk associated with the assets in place 
and by timing and determining the size of investments) (Stewart 1991). 
RI is supposed to combine the advantages of market- and accounting based performance 
measures. O’Hanlon and Peasnell (1998) show that discounted RI valuation yields the same 
results as discounted cash flow valuation. Since it has long been acknowledged stock 
markets base their value judgments on expected discounted cash flows, it would be logical 
to assume the market value of a firm and it’s RI are closely related (Bouwens and Speklé 
2007). The biggest advantage of RI-based measures over market-based measures of 
performance would then be that RI is less affected by external factors, and thus less noisy 
than stock prices. In addition, RI is more sensitive to managerial actions (Bouwens and 
Speklé 2007). 
These advantages, however are not specific to RI-based measures of performance 
(Bouwens and Speklé 2007). Other accounting-based measures, such as net income or 
return on assets, can be applied in the same situations. 
Proponents of RI type of measures claim RI, unlike traditional earnings, is closely aligned 
with the true value created by a company. Therefore, rewarding managers on the basis of 
this measure should best align manager and stockholder interests. The reasoning behind 
this is based on the age-old paradigm that a company creates wealth if it earns more than 
it’s cost of capital (debt and equity) (Biddle et al. 1997). Easton et al. (1992), however, 
provide convincing evidence that, especially over longer periods in time, accounting 
earnings and market value are related. Additionally, Biddle et al. (1997) show that RI and 
EVA are worse predictors of stock returns than traditional measures such as net income. 
 
 
3.  Hypothesis development 
 
3.1  Behavioral consequences of RI adoption 
The question raised by these findings is then why RI is still being used so widely. I can think 
of two possible explanations for this non-decreasing popularity: (1) companies aren’t 
                                                                                                                                           
Associates, Total Business Return by Boston Consulting Group, Economic Profit by McKinsey & Co. And 
Shareholder Value Added by LEK/Alcar (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007). 
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aware of the lack of information content of RI-based measures, or (2) other motives lead 
companies to adopt RI.  
Assuming organizations act rational, I reject the first explanation. I do not find it 
conceivable that firms (or in this case, compensation committees) choose to use RI/EVA 
based on the proclaimed correlation between RI and stockholder returns when an 
extensive list of literature exists on the absence of this relation (Easton et al. 1992; Biddle 
et al. 1997). This implies RI/EVA is adopted for reasons other than the proclaimed 
information content. Again, I consider two different reasons: (1) the somewhat cynical 
explanation of copycat-behavior and consultant-influence, and; (2) RI offers advantages 
other than the claimed informativeness on stockholder returns. 
Again, from the assumption of a rational firm, the first reason is rejected, implying RI has 
advantages we haven’t discussed before. This reason, I claim, lies in the behavior RI 
induces from managers. 
Wallace (1997) is one of the scarce researchers to examine management behavior after RI 
adoption. His findings support the adage ‘what you measure is what you get’. Firms 
adopting RI-based incentives for top managers increase RI relative to non-adopting firms. 
Furthermore, they decrease investments, increase divestments, increase payouts to 
shareholders, and increase asset turnover. These are all actions consistent with the strong 
rate of return discipline associated with RI. 
Balachandran (2006) extends the previous research by adding the factor of prior 
performance measures. His findings support Wallace’s (1997) investment-oriented 
conclusions, but only for firms who switched from earnings-based incentives to RI-based 
incentives. His findings show weak evidence that firms switching from ROI to RI actually 
increase investments. 
 
3.2  The value-based management framework 
Increasing interest in value-enhancing performance measures such as RI and EVA has led 
Ittner and Larcker (2001) to incorporate these measures into a value based management 
(VBM) framework. The idea behind this framework is to combine different aspects of 
management accounting (such as activity based costing and balanced scorecards) into an 
integrated framework to measure and manage businesses in the current perspective of 
creating superior long-term shareholder value. 
The six sequential steps of Ittner and Larcker’s (2001) VBM framework are the following: 
1. Choosing specific internal objectives that lead to shareholder value enhancement. 
2. Selecting strategies and organizational designs consistent with the achievement 
of the chosen objectives. 
3. Identifying the specific performance variables, or ‘‘value drivers’’, that actually create 
value in the business given the organization’s strategies and organizational design. 
4. Developing action plans, selecting performance measures, and setting targets based on 
the priorities identified in the value driver analysis. 
5. Evaluating the success of action plans and conducting organizational and managerial 
performance evaluations. 
6. Assessing the ongoing validity of the organization’s internal objectives, strategies, 
plans, and control systems in light of current results, and modifying them as required. 
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Over the years, researchers and consultants have placed RI/EVA in the first of these six 
steps: RI being the primary indicator for shareholder value enhancement (Malmi and 
Ikäheimo 2003). Placing RI at the top of the VBM framework implies it is the measure that 
best reflects long-term shareholder value enhancement. As we have seen earlier, however, 
this assumption appears to be false. RI and EVA do not seem to correlate with stockholder 
returns as well as is often claimed (Biddle et al. 1997). 
If RI, however, is adopted for the management-behavioral changes it is supposed to bring, I 
argue they do not belong at the top of the Ittner and Larcker (2001) VBM framework, but 
should be treated as ‘just another’ performance measure belonging to step three and 
below. RI-based measures should, then, be treated similar to other performance 
measurement systems (PMS’) such as the balanced scorecard or regular accounting 
(earnings-)based compensation. 
Taking another look at the VBM framework, we see strategic decision-making taking up the 
second step of the VBM sequence. Should RI-based performance measures belong at the 
top of the framework, as is usually argued (Malmi and Ikäheimo 2003), RI adoption should 
not be affected by corporate strategy. I argue, however, that RI/EVA should take it’s place 
among regular performance measures in step three and four. Following this line of 
reasoning, strategy should be a determinant in the choice whether or not to adopt RI-
based performance measures. 
 
3.3  Strategy typology 
In this research I use the strategy typology adapted from Miles and Snow (Miles et al. 
1978). Miles and Snow distinguish between three strategic types of organizations: 
defenders, analyzers and prospectors. Defenders operate in relatively stable product 
areas, offer more limited products than competitors, and compete through cost 
leadership, quality, and service. 
They engage in little product/market development. Prospectors, on the other hand, 
compete through new products and market development. Product lines change over time 
and this type of firm is constantly seeking new market opportunities. Analyzers are an 
intermediate hybrid, combining parts of both defender and prospector strategies (Simons 
1987). This spectrum from defender to prospector exhibits similar characteristics identified 
by other researchers. 
 
3.4  Hypothesis development 
When casting our minds back to Wallace’s (1997) findings concerning behavioral 
consequences of RI adoption, I find these findings to be intuitively misaligned with 
prospector-types of strategies. Furthermore, previous research on the relative 
informativeness value of performance measures have shown that companies (Ittner et al. 
1997) and business units (Govindarajan and Gupta 1985) following a prospector strategy 
are less likely to be evaluated by means of financial measures. 
My explanation for this hypothesis stems from an informativeness perspective. For (owners 
of) firms following a prospector strategy, efficient asset utilization is not a primary 
concern. Since RI is a measure with a strong focus on tight asset management, I consider RI 
to be a less informative measure for owners of prospector firms than for those of defender 
firms.  
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Formally put, my research hypothesis reads as follows: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms characterized as following a prospector strategy are less likely 
to adopt RI-based compensation for their top executives than firms characterized as 
following a defender strategy. 
 
 
4.  Research method 
 
4.1  Sample selection 
The sample in this study consists of 40 residual income-based compensation adopters and 
40 matched control firms. Strategy scores, as well as three control variables are computed 
for each of these 80 firms. Data from the five years prior to adoption is used to calculate 
average scores per firm (400 firm-year observations). This method of matching each 
adopting firm with one matched control firm is the same as that used by other studies 
examining determinants of certain management control systems adoptions (Wallace 1997; 
Kleiman 1999; Said et al. 2003; Balachandran 2006). 
Adopters of residual income-based incentives are defined as firms that use a residual 
income-based measure as their primary measure for annual cash bonuses to named 
executives33.  
The method by which adopters were identified involved extensive searches through proxy 
statements contained in the LexisNexis® Academic database. This method was 
appropriated from Ittner et al. (1997), who use the same method to identify firms using 
non-financial performance measures for executive compensation. The searches were 
performed using the keywords ‘economic value added’, ‘economic profit’ and ‘residual 
income’. 
After having finalized the adopter identification process at 40 firms, each of these firms 
were individually matched on the basis of standard industry classification (SIC) code 
followed by total assets. 
 
Table 4.1    
Definitive sample of adopting firms and matched control firms 
Year of 
adoption SIC # Adopting firm SIC # Control firm 
     
1995 3841 Bard, C.R. Inc. 3841 United States Surgical Corp.
1995 3826 Beckman Instruments Inc. 3826 Millipore Corp. 
1995 3600 Emerson Electric Co. 3674 Texas Instruments Inc. 
1995 4911 IPALCO Enterprises Inc. 4911 KU Energy Corp. 
1995 2711 Knight-Ridder Inc. 2711 Tribune Co. 
1995 3571 
Sequent Computer Systems 
Inc. 3571 Stratus Computer Inc. 
                                             
33 Named executives are a firm’s five most highly paid executives. Firms are required to disclose the names and 
total compensation values from these managers in their proxy statements (Balachandran 2006). 
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1996 2520 Kimball International 2531 BE Aerospace Inc. 
1996 3350 Olin Corp. 3311 Allegheny Technologies Inc. 
1996 1400 Vulcan Materials Co. 1400 English China Clays Plc. 
1996 3350 Tredegar Corp. 3350 Oregon Metallurgical Corp. 
1996 3140 K-Swiss Inc. 3140 Barry (R G) Corp. 
1996 2911 Quaker State 2911 Tesoro Corp. 
1996 3825 Tektronix 3825 Teradyne Inc. 
1996 3661 ADC Telecommunications 3661 Tellabs Inc. 
1996 3826 Hach Co. 3825 LTX Corp. 
1996 4213 KLLM Transport 4213 Heartland Express Inc. 
1996 2750 Donnelley & Sons 2750 Quebecor Inc. 
1996 2761 
New England Business 
Services 2761 Ennis Inc. 
1997 2834 Bausch & Lomb Inc. 2834 Alza Corp. 
1997 2520 Miller-Herman Inc. 2510 La-Z-Boy Inc. 
1997 7510 Ryder System Inc. 7510 Rollins Truck Leasing 
1997 7359 Xtra Corp. 7359 Weatherford Enterra Inc. 
1997 4955 Safety Kleen Systems Inc. 4955 OHM Corp. 
1998 4931 Montana Power Co. 4931 Allete Inc. 
1998 2750 Banta Corp. 2750 Paxar Corp. 
1998 3861 Eastman Kodak Co. 3861 Fujifilm Holdings Corp. 
1998 2540 Knape & Vogt MFG Co. 2540 Interlake Corp. 
1998 3310 National-Standard Co. 3310 Steel Technologies Inc. 
1998 5311 J C Penney Co. 5311 Macy's Inc. 
1998 3555 Baldwin Technology Co. 3560 Zebra Technologies Corp. 
1999 3612 SPX Corp. 3674 LSI Corp. 
2000 3721 Boeing Co. 3720 United Technologies Corp. 
2000 5661 Genesco Inc. 5661 Finish Line Inc. 
2000 3743 Trinity Industries 3743 Wabtec Corp. 
2000 6141 Credit Acceptance Corp. 6159 Financial Federal Corp 
2000 2670 Lydall 2670 Nashua Corp. 
2001 5093 Schnitzer Steel 5093 Newpark Resources Inc. 
2002 3390 Harsco Corp. 3312 Carpenter Technology Corp.
2004 7830 Marcus Corp. 7841 Hollywood Entertainment 
Corp. 
2005 2670 Playtex Products 2670 Cenveo Inc. 
 
 
I control for industry effects because prior research shows RI-systems are heavily 
concentrated in the manufacturing industry (Kleiman 1999). Industry is therefore 
considered to be of influence in the decision to adopt RI-based compensation.  
Size is controlled for because larger firms are considered more likely to be aware of 
stockholders’ expectations regarding return on equity, and are therefore considered more 
likely to adopt RI-based executive compensation. Firm size is measured by total assets. 
The definitive sample of adopting firms and matched peers is shown in table 4.1. 
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4.2  Variables 
Filling in the independent and control variables was the next step in acquiring the data 
needed for this research. For that I used the Compustat and Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) databases. Compustat was used to obtain the relevant information 
from financial statements of the sample firms. CRSP was used to calculate the abnormal 
returns, in order to be able to determine the correlation between historical abnormal 
returns and historical residual incomes of the sampled firms. 
 
4.2.1  Strategy 
In order to measure whether strategy is a determinant in the choice to adopt residual 
income, a strategy score is computed. Following Ittner et al. (1997), I use three ratios to 
proxy for strategy: Research and Development (R&D) expenditures-to-sales, market-to-
book-assets and employees-to-sales. I then aggregate these ratios into one strategy score 
per firm observation in which each ratio is weighted equally. I do this by calculating the 
average of the (equally weighted) individual factors. 
The ratio of R&D expenditures to sales is a measure for a firm’s tendency to search for 
new products. Because prospector firms are involved in more innovative actions, they are 
expected to spend more on R&D than defender firms (Hambrick 1983). 
According to Adam and Goyal (2008), the market-to-book assets ratio is the best proxy for 
growth or investment opportunities. Since prospector firms are considered to have better 
growth opportunities than defender firms, their market-to-book assets ratio should be 
higher (Said et al. 2003). 
The employees-to-sales ratio is included because defender firms are highly efficiency-
orientated. Therefore, they are assumed to have less employees per dollar of sales (Ittner 
et al. 1997). 
It was important to be as sure as possible that the way by which the strategy score was 
computed did not influence the results. I used a pragmatic approach to verify this, namely 
by computing the strategy score in different ways and checking whether my results 
changed. This did not appear to be the case. 
 
4.3  Control variables 
In addition to controlling for industry and size effects by matching firms, three control 
variables are added to the regression model: prior RI performance, leverage and the 
correlation between prior five-year residual income and prior five-year abnormal 
stockholder returns. 
The first control variable concerns prior RI performance. Wallace (1997) finds that the 
adage ‘what you get is what you measure and reward’ holds with RI-based compensation. 
Firms adopting RI-based measures significantly improve their RI compared to a matched 
sample of firms that don’t adopt RI-systems. Assuming firms are aware of this, low RI 
performance could be a motive to adopt RI-based compensation. Therefore, prior RI 
performance is expected to be negatively associated with RI adoption. 
Leverage, measured as total debt divided by total assets, is expected to be negatively 
associated with the likelihood of RI adoption. For more highly leveraged firms, a larger 
fraction of capital costs consist of interest payments. This decreases the need for an 
additional charge on equity (Garvey and Milbourn 2000).  
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Jensen (1989) furthermore argues a high level of debt provides its own incentives to 
manage capital efficiently as the high interest payments can be seen as a forced way of 
distributing (free) cash flow. This counteracts managers’ incentives to retain too large a 
proportion of free cash flow, which is also one of the effects of a RI adoption (Wallace 
1997). More highly leveraged firms would therefore not benefit from RI adoption as much 
as less highly leveraged firms would. 
Garvey and Milbourn (2000) find that a firm’s decision to adopt an EVA incentive system is 
contingent on the degree to which EVA explains stock prices (relative information 
content). Assuming this finding holds for the more general RI measure as well, I include a 
measure for relative information content in the regression model computed as the 
correlation between residual income and abnormal stock returns in the five years prior to 
RI adoption.  
 
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1  Preliminary tests 
Before testing whether the hypothesis can be accepted or rejected, I conduct two 
preliminary analyses. The first is to see whether my method of using three ratios to 
measure strategy is correct, the second is to exclude outliers in my sample. 
One of the underlying assumptions in my research is that the three ratios I use to measure 
strategy actually measure strategy. Although the same method has been used by various 
researchers in the past (Ittner et al. 1997; Said et al. 2003), I perform a factor analysis test 
to see how the three individual ratios are correlated. If all three ratios measure the same 
thing (strategy), their scores should be closely related.  
The correlation matrix of the individual strategy scores is shown in table 5.1. The findings 
indicate employees-to-sales does not correlate well with the other two ratios. In fact, the 
correlation is negative, although the results are not significant. The correlation between 
R&D expenditures-to-sales and market-to-book-assets ratios is stronger, and proves 
significant at the .000 level. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 Strategy score correlation matrix 
  R&D / Sales Market to book assets Employees / Sales 
R&D / Sales 1.000 .556 -.177 
Market to book assets  1.000 -.143 
Correlation 
Employees / Sales   1.000 
R&D / Sales - .000 .123 
Market to book assets  - .174 
Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
Employees / Sales   - 
 
 
These results are confirmed by the principle component analysis shown in table 5.2. Two 
components are extracted, as opposed to the hypothesized one component: strategy. The 
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first component is well correlated with R&D-to-sales and market-to-book-assets, whereas 
the second component is based mainly on a high correlation with employees-to-sales. 
The relevant question, then, is what these results mean for my research. If we assume the 
first component (the component closely related to R&D-to-sales and market-to-book-
assets) is corporate strategy, apparently employees-to-sales measures something else. 
With this in mind, I decide to run my tests two times: one time including the employees-
to-sales ratio and one time excluding it. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Strategy score component matrixa 
 Component 
 1 2 
R&D / Sales .858 .195 
Market to book assets .846 .260 
Employees / Sales -.429 .903 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted.  
 
As is the case in linear regression models, logistic regression can be significantly influenced 
by outliers. To prevent these outliers from distorting my results I chose to exclude them 
from the sample. A complicating factor specific to my type of research is the fact that my 
sample consists of 40 matched firm couples. Outliers should therefore not be identified by 
means of analysis of the absolute numbers (strategy scores), but as the relative difference 
between the strategy scores of two matched firms. 
This difference is calculated by measuring the strategy score of the adopter firm as a 
percentage of the strategy score of it’s matched control firm. This way I identify outliers 
by couple instead of by firm. Considering the difference in characteristics between the 
strategy scores calculated with and without employees-to-sales ratios, outliers are 
determined separately. 
Strategy scores calculated including employees-to-sales ratios are less spread out than 
those excluding employees-to-sales. A smaller difference between two matched firms is 
therefore tolerated for the analysis including employees-to-sales than for the analysis 
without employees-to-sales. For the former, outliers are defined as firm couples for which 
the adopter firm has a strategy score that is either less than 40%, or more than 250% (two 
and a half times in both directions) of the strategy score of it’s matched peer. Six firm 
couples, or twelve firms are identified as outliers. In the analysis excluding employees-to-
sales the percentages are at 25% and 400% (four times in both directions). Here, eight firm 
couples, or sixteen firms are identified as outliers. 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics for compounded strategy scores 
  Full sample Adopting firms Control firms 
Strategy score Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Median Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Median Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Median
1.38 .91 1.19 1.28 .64 1.22 1.49 1.11 1.12 Including 
employees-to-
sales N = 68 N = 34 N = 34 
1.34 1.40 0.88 1.15 .94 0.89 1.52 1.73 0.85 Excluding 
employees-to-
sales N = 64 N = 32 N = 32 
Control Variables 
(N = 80) 
     
Prior RI 
performance 
-42.26 136.04 -15.73 -32.56 135.16 -15.07 -51.97 137.93 -16.44 
Leverage 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.22 0.29 0.23 0.27 
RI - Stock 
price 
correlation 
0.24 0.51 0.34 0.23 0.55 0.34 0.25 0.48 0.32 
The outlier identification process described before has resulted in the descriptive statistics 
presented in table 5.3. 
 
5.2  Binary logistic regression 
The most important test used to test the relation between RI adoption and firm strategy is 
the binary logistic regression. Logistic regression is used to predict the likelihood of the 
occurrence of an event by fitting the data in a logistic curve34. Binary (or binominal) 
logistic regression is used when the dependent variable is dichotomous, as is the case in 
this study. The idea to use this technique came from reading research comparable to mine 
(Garvey and Milbourn 2000; Said et al. 2003; Hogan and Lewis 2005). 
                                             
34 Source: Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logistic_regression (Accessed on July 19, 2008). 
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Table 5.4 Binary logistic regressions for compounded strategy scores 
 Predicted 
sign 
Strategy including 
employees-to-sales ratio 
Strategy excluding 
employees-to-sales ratio 
      
  
Coefficien
t 
Odds ratio Coefficient Odds ratio 
-.388 .678 -.289 .749 
Strategy - 
(.209) (.184) 
      
Control variables      
.001 1.001 .001 1.001 Prior RI 
performance 
- 
(.469) (.487) 
-1.440 .237 -1.349 .260 
Leverage - 
(.287) (.337) 
-.403 .669 -.052 .949 RI – Stock price 
correlation 
+ 
(.423) (.919) 
1.084 2.956 .791 2.206 
Constant  
(.112) (.183) 
    
Chi-square  
3.590 
(.464) 
2.720 
(.606) 
Pseudo R-square 
(Nagelkerke) 
 .069 .055 
Sample size  68 64 
*, **, *** Significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
P-values between brackets. 
For an extensive discussion of the included variables see chapter four. 
 
The results, displayed in table 5.4, generally suggest the model is weak. The chi-square 
goodness-of-fit results indicate the step to include all four variables (from the constant-
only model) is not justified at a significant level (indicated by a p-value lower than .05)35. 
The Nagelkerke pseudo R-squared measures of 6.9% and 5.5% also indicate weak models. 
Nagelkerke’s R-square is comparable to the R-square in a linear regression model. It ranges 
from 0 to 1 and loosely indicates the percentage in the dependent variable explained by 
the four independent variables (Pelsmacker, De and Van Kenhove 2006).  
When looking at the results on the individual variable level, the image of a weak model 
persists. Although the direction of the strategy coefficients is negative as predicted, these 
coefficients are significant for neither of the two strategy constructs.  
Interpretation of the logistic coefficients is difficult. Therefore I include the odds ratio in 
table 5.4. Odds ratios are computed as the natural log base, e, to the exponent, b, where 
b is the logistic coefficient36. What remains after this calculation is the factor by which the 
                                             
35 Source: David Garson: Logistic Regression. http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logistic.htm 
(Accessed on July 19, 2008). 
36 Idem. 
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likelihood of the occurrence of the dependent variable changes with a single-unit change 
in the independent variable. For example, if strategy (excluding employees-to-sales) would 
increase by one unit, the likelihood of the firm being an adopter firm decreases by the 
factor .749. Thus, the lower the odds ratio, the more likely a firm is to be a non-adopter 
when the strategy score increases by one. In this example, an increase of one in the 
strategy score would lower the odds of that firm to adopt RI by 25.1% (1 - .749). 
 
 
Table 5.5 Wilcoxon signed-rank test for compounded strategy scores 
Control firm strategy – Adopter firm strategy 
Strategy including employees-to-sales 
(n = 34*) 
Strategy excluding employees-to-sales 
(n = 32*) 
Z P-value Z P-value 
-.932 .351 -.374 .708 
* Defined as firm couples 
 
 
5.3  Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
I then perform a test to compare medians of the adopting and non-adopting sample. 
Because the strategy scores in my sample are not normally distributed, I have to turn to 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank nonparametric test (Aczel and Sounderpandian 2002). The 
Wilcoxon test does not assume a normally distributed sample is only slightly weaker than 
the t-test, which is normally used when comparing the means or medians of two samples 
(Aczel and Sounderpandian 2002). It is often used when comparing two populations with 
paired observations. The test assesses the null hypothesis that the medians of two 
populations do not differ37. 
Results from the Wilcoxon test are summed up in table 5.6. The results are, like the binary 
logistic regression, insignificant. The medians of the two populations can not be concluded 
to differ. 
 
 
6.  Discussion 
 
6.1  Summary 
This study aims to answer the question whether the choice to adopt RI is an endogenous 
one in general, and whether corporate strategy is a factor affecting this choice in 
particular. The motivation behind this research question primarily came from a study by 
Wallace (1997), who found firms adopting RI noticed observable behavioral effects of this 
adoption. RI adopters seemed to (1) decrease investments, (2) increase divestments, (3) 
increase payouts to shareholders, and (4) increase asset turnover in the years following RI 
adoption, compared to a matched sample of firms who did not adopt RI. I argue from an 
informativeness point of view these behavioral consequences fit a defender-type strategy 
better than a prospector-type strategy. 
                                             
37 Source: David Garson: Significance Tests for Two Dependent Samples: McNemar, Marginal Homogeneity, Sign, 
and Wilcoxon Tests. http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/mcnemar.htm (Accessed on July 21, 2008). 
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The research methodology used in this study is equal to that used in comparable research 
(Wallace 1997; Ittner et al. 1997; Kleiman 1999; Said et al. 2003). From the LexisNexis® 
proxy statement database I identify 40 firms that have adopted RI as their primary 
measure of performance for top executives in the past 13 years. These firms are matched 
to an equally large sample of 40 peer firms. These matches are based on standard industry 
classification (SIC) code, and on total assets, which I use to proxy for firm size. 
For these 80 firms, I compute a strategy score as an equally-weighed average of three 
ratios, measured over the five years prior to RI adoption: (1) R&D expenditures-to-sales, 
(2) market-to-book-assets, and (3) employees-to-sales. These strategy scores form a 
continuum ranging from defenders (low scores) to prospectors (high scores). Additionally, 
three control variables are measured which are hypothesized to influence the choice to 
adopt RI. Each of these are also measured as an average over the five year prior to RI 
adoption: (1) prior RI performance, (2) leverage, and (3) the correlation between prior RI’s 
and prior abnormal stock returns. All financial data used in this study was obtained through 
the Compustat North-America annual database. 
After taking a closer look at the strategy construct, I had to conclude employees-to-sales 
might be measuring something different than the other two ratios do. Therefore, all tests 
are conducted twice: one time with a strategy score as explained earlier, and one time 
with a strategy score excluding the employees-to-sales ratio. The empirical results for both 
of these models show the image of a weak model, with no significant results any of the 
individual variables. 
 
6.2  Conclusions 
The results in this research ask for an explanation, of which I will present a couple here. 
Despite the fact that my hypothesis cannot be confirmed by my findings, I do not believe a 
conclusion is appropriate that states no relation exists between corporate strategy and RI 
adoption. A very conservative outlier policy has significantly reduced my sample size38. It is 
my belief that a larger sample size would have yielded results on which stronger 
conclusions could have been drawn. 
Another possible explanation can be found in the assumptions I made in this study. One of 
these assumptions is that firms act rational. I mean by this that I assume firms that adopt 
RI do not do this for it’s proclaimed (and proved wrong, Biddle et al. 1997) correlation with 
stock prices. This assumption is critical in the argumentation there are other advantages of 
adopting RI, mainly in the area of behavioral consequences. 
After seeing the results of this study, we can question whether my assumption of the 
rational firm was correct. The absence of a significant relation between corporate strategy 
and the choice to adopt RI can be explained if firms do adopt RI for the expected 
correlation with stock returns. Firms may also choose to adopt RI for other non-rational 
reasons such as imitational reasons or because of the influence of consultants. Behavior of 
imitation would also explain the strong wave-like structure of RI adopters in my sample. RI 
adoption seems to decrease strongly in the later years of my sample (after 2000). 
Malmi and Ikäheimo (2003) confirm in a field study that increasing shareholder value is 
often mentioned as the primary motive for RI adoption. Nonetheless, contrary to my 
                                             
38 From n = 80 to n = 68 (n = 64 for the model excluding employees-to-sales). A reduction of 15% (20%). 
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hypothesis, they observe that firms adopt RI to foster two different strategic orientations. 
Two of the six firms they investigated considered themselves to follow a growth strategy, 
comparable to the prospector strategy in my study. These firms see RI as an aid in their 
creation of value through growth. For the other four firms, efficient asset utilization was 
mentioned as the primary motive for RI adoption. These findings are inconsistent with my 
hypothesis that growth firms do not benefit from RI adoption. 
Remarkably, both growth firms in the Malmi and Ikäheimo (2003) study explicitly state that 
they have switched to RI after having experienced the drawbacks of ROI as they are 
discussed in paragraph 2.3 of this paper. This observation is consistent with the results of a 
study by Balachandran (2006), who discovered firms switching from ROI to RI showed a 
different change in managerial behavior than firms switching from earnings-based 
measures to RI. Whereas Wallace (1997) finds all firms adopting RI generally increase focus 
on efficient asset utilization, Balachandran (2006) finds this observation does not hold for 
firms switching from ROI-type of measures to RI. 
The combination of these three studies gives rise to a new explanation for the lack of 
significant results in my study. I hypothesize, inspired by the statements of the two growth 
firms in the Malmi and Ikäheimo (2003) study, that the limitations of using ROI as a 
performance measure are much more relevant for growth (prospector) firms than for firms 
emphasizing efficient asset utilization (defender firms). Therefore I mainly expect 
prospector firms to switch from ROI to RI. Had I had the chance to redo my research, I 
would have altered my hypothesis to incorporate the effect of previous performance 
measures. The hypothesis would, then, look more like this: “Prospector firms are more 
likely to make the switch from ROI to RI measures than are defender firms”. 
With hindsight we can conclude that in Wallace’s (1997) sample, firms switching from ROI 
to RI were under-represented compared to firms switching from earnings-based measures 
to RI. If my reformulated hypothesis is confirmed, we can also say prospector firms were 
under-represented in Wallace’s (1997) sample. In other words: Wallace’s (1997) findings 
may turn out to be contingent on strategy. 
 
6.3  Limitations 
It is important to note that there are limitations to the results of this research. The first 
being the way in which strategy is measured. Although the method is used quite widely 
among management accounting researchers, it remains an approximation of strategy. 
There may furthermore be a difference in realized and intended strategies (Snow and 
Hambrick; 1980), with the method used by me only measuring realized strategy.  
This research furthermore does not fully take into account the weight of the RI-system 
incentives relative to total compensation. Although I explicitly selected only those 
companies for which RI is the primary performance measure, the proportion of RI 
incentives to total compensation isn’t taken into account. One might argue any 
consideration (including strategy), when adopting a RI-based incentive system, is more 
critically assessed when larger proportions of executives’ compensations depend on the 
measure. The main motive behind the choice not to include RI incentive’s proportions of 
total compensation into account is that total compensation is difficult to extract from 
firms’ external reports. Especially the part of the compensation package that is paid in 
stock options is hard to express in dollar amounts. 
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6.4  Directions for future research 
My research gives rise to a number of directions for future research. The low explanatory 
power of the models indicate either endogenous factors are missing, or RI adoption is not 
endogenous at all. Future research can be conducted to see whether RI adoption is an 
endogenous choice and sequentially which are the factors that affect the decision to adopt 
RI. My suggestion would be to conduct exploratory research on firms’ motives behind RI 
adoption. Potential imitational behavior should not be ignored in these studies. 
Following the line of reasoning in the concluding paragraph of this chapter, I have formed 
a new (and improved) hypothesis concerning the endogenous character of RI adoption. I 
argue firms that switch from ROI to RI are more likely to be identifiable as following a 
prospector strategy than as following a defender strategy. Unfortunately the process of 
writing a master thesis does not allow me to actually conduct this research. Nonetheless, I 
believe my research has contributed to existing RI adoption literature in that it forms a 
part of the ‘academic circle’, hoping my results will open doors for future research to 
refine this research. 
In the process of identifying RI adopters I experienced that only a remarkably small number 
of firms have adopted RI in the recent years. The list of adopters I identified furthermore 
suggests a negative trend of RI adoption can be noticed. Future studies can try to 
concretize this preliminary observation and find an explanation for this apparent 
decreasing practical interest in RI-based compensation systems. This can, again, be linked 
with possible behavior of imitation. 
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Management control in joint ventures:  
an analysis based on transaction cost 
economics and game theory 
 
 
Joke A. Talman39 
 
 
Executive summary 
This paper addresses the question what determines management control in joint ventures.  
The model developed for this purpose draws on two existing frameworks.  The first, by 
Dekker (2004), shows how control in strategic alliances can be structured around two 
control problems, coordination of tasks and appropriation concerns, the latter stemming 
from transaction cost economics theory.  Dekker thereby differentiates between formal 
controls and the role of trust.  The second framework, by Zeng (2003), describes what 
drives the cooperative dilemma in joint ventures and is based on game theory.  The model 
developed in this paper substitutes Zeng’s cooperative dilemma for one of the control 
problems in Dekker’s framework.  The model is tested in a case study;  it appears that the 
extension with game theory helps explain the control mechanisms in the joint venture in 
more detail. 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
Joint ventures (JVs) make for an interesting paradox:  whereas the popularity of JVs is very 
high, the percentage of JVs that fail is very high too.  In a world of rapidly increasing 
global competition most multinational enterprises (MNEs) will have to participate in 
(international) joint ventures in order to remain competitive and strategically flexible.  
However, many joint ventures do not deliver the hoped-for results and fail.  The literature 
quotes a number of reasons why failure rates are high (e.g. Franko 1971;  Gomes-Casseres 
1987;  Pearce 1997). One of these reasons is management control problems (Sherman 1992;  
Groot and Merchant 2000;  Chalos and O’Connor 2004;  Porporato 2006).  The parent firms 
in a JV may well have differing interests.  Insufficient control over a JV can limit the 
ability of the parent to coordinate its activities, efficiently utilise its resources and to 
effectively implement its strategy. 
 
Interestingly, despite repeated remarks in the literature that management control is key to 
successful JV performance, it is an area that remains ‘under-researched’, (e.g. Groot and 
                                             
39 The research described in this paper was done under supervision of drs. R. van der Wal RA at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam.  The author works at the Shell Pernis refinery near Rotterdam as Reliability Manager.  
She holds an MSc degree in Chemical Engineering from Delft University of Technology, a PhD degree in 
Technical Sciences from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, and an MSc degree in Business 
Economics from Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
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Merchant 2000;  Kamminga 2003).  Given this situation, I propose the following principal 
research question:  What determines management control in JVs?  First, a literature review 
(chapter 2) demonstrates that whereas joint ventures have been looked at from many 
different theoretical perspectives, a holistic framework for analysis is still largely missing.  
Most studies only consider a certain aspect, such as justification for formation of JVs or 
performance of JVs, and findings are often contradictory.  Recently, various authors 
(Dekker 2004; Kamminga 2003; Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2007) have presented 
analysis frameworks that combine transaction cost economics (TCE) theory with a number 
of elements borrowed from organisational (relational) theories.  Another, much more 
limited group of authors have used game theory to investigate joint ventures (Parkhe 
1993a;  Zeng 2003).  Game theory, with its well-known prisoner’s dilemma, is especially 
suited to shed light on the continuous struggle of balancing cooperative and competitive 
behaviours of the partners in a joint venture.  In chapter 3 I will argue that combining two 
existing frameworks, one based on TCE and organizational theory and the other based on 
game theory, leads to a more detailed model to explain management control in joint 
ventures.  I test the theoretical framework, in chapter 4, on a case study to see whether it 
can explain the observed phenomena.  It appears that the model can be used as a 
diagnostic tool to see whether the design of the management control system is adequate 
given the particularities of a joint venture.  Finally, chapter 5 contains my conclusions as 
well as some recommendations for further research. 
 
 
2.   Prior literature 
 
2.1   Introduction to joint venture research 
In the literature on joint ventures a plethora of theoretical perspectives have been 
employed.  Perhaps the most used theoretical perspective to explain formation and 
development of an IJV is transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson 1985).  This theory 
focuses on governance structures for transactions.  It maintains that a transaction can be 
governed by one of three structural mechanisms:  a market form with price mechanism, a 
hierarchical form with bureaucratic governance mechanisms, or a hybrid form.  The 
governance structure for a certain type of transaction will be the one with the lowest 
transaction costs (assuming equal production costs);  transaction costs are, for example, 
costs of negotiation, of preparing and writing contracts, and of monitoring and enforcing 
those.  The actual choice for a specific governance structure depends on certain 
characteristics of the transaction taking place (asset specificity, the frequency and size, 
and the uncertainty of the transaction) and certain characteristics of human nature 
(bounded rationality and opportunism).  There are a large number of hybrid governance 
structures, which consist of a mixture of market and hierarchical characteristics;  
examples include long-term supply arrangements or joint ventures.  According to this 
theory, joint ventures occur because the sum of production and transaction costs 
associated with joint ownership is lower than that of sole ownership (in the case of a 
wholly owned subsidiary) or of market transactions.  The joint venture structure offers 
advantages in terms of avoidance of high uncertainty caused by market failure and 
avoidance of high overhead costs of establishing hierarchies (Child et al. 2005).  TCE 
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theory emphasises the rational aspects of a transaction.  It does not take into 
consideration any relational aspects:  for example, how developing trust between partner 
firms may reduce opportunism and lead to more information sharing. 
 
Apart from TCE theory, many other theories have been applied to the study of joint 
ventures.  These theories can be broadly classified into economic theories and managerial 
or organizational theories, and aspects investigated can be divided into organization, 
operation and performance of JVs (Child et al. 2005;  Robson et al. 2002).  A 
comprehensive overview is provided in table 1.  In a meta-analysis of JV literature Robson 
et al. (2002) focused on the aspect of JV performance.  They concluded that findings from 
different studies on determinants of JV performance were often contradictory, and 
attributed this to the absence of an overall framework of analysis.  Some authors have 
turned to developing such overall framework and in the following sections I will discuss one 
of them. 
 
 
Table 1:  Alternative theoretical perspectives to investigate IJVs – economic theories  
(adapted from Robson et al. 2002;  Das and Teng 2000;  Child et al. 2005) 
 
Economic theories 
Theory Underlying logic Focal aspects Areas of concern 
Transaction 
cost 
economics 
(TCE) 
The sum of production 
and transaction costs 
associated with joint 
ownership is lower 
than that for sole 
ownership of the 
venture or for market 
transaction 
The size and division 
of exchange and 
production costs 
incurred, mitigation of 
the hazards of partner 
opportunism, the use 
of administrative 
procedures for 
control, and the 
alignment of financial 
incentives 
No account is taken of 
the fact that IJVs are 
intrinsically strategic 
and can embody many 
different parental 
motives. 
Lack of attention to 
relational aspects of 
IJV partnership 
Agency 
theory 
IJVs act as agents 
through which parent 
organizations (the 
principals) aim to 
increase their business 
activities and success.  
The principals act to 
control costs they 
attribute to the 
agency relationship 
Governance 
mechanisms that limit 
the agent’s self-
serving behaviour:  
principal and agent 
agendas may differ, 
leading to future 
conflict;  this is 
exacerbated by 
cultural distance and 
avoided via parent-
initiated control 
mechanisms 
Agency hazards 
constitute just one 
difficulty amidst the 
many facing IJV 
managers. 
The assumption that 
IJV managers serve 
their own purposes 
before those of the 
parent firm may not 
be pragmatic 
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Resource-
dependency 
theory 
IJVs form to create 
bundles of strategic 
and social resources 
that serve as a source 
of competitive 
advantage and, in 
turn, superior 
performance 
Achieving positional 
advantages on the 
basis of inter-firm 
resource 
complementarity, the 
scarcity of valuable 
firm resources, the 
coalitional nature of 
organizations, and the 
resource interface in 
IJVs 
A comprehensive set 
of sources of 
advantage has not yet 
been isolated in the 
general management 
literature; little has 
been determined in 
the case of 
collaborative strategy. 
Difficulty in testing an 
IJV performance 
model for this 
dynamic perspective 
using cross-sectional 
data 
Market 
power 
theory 
Firms can improve 
competitive success 
by securing stronger 
positions in their 
markets through 
cooperative strategy 
Distinction of 
cooperative 
strategies:  offensive 
vs. defensive, scale 
vs. link;  link between 
cooperative strategy 
and national and 
industrial context 
Static perspective that 
does not take into 
account how the 
relationship may 
develop over time 
(e.g. development of 
trust, overruling 
rational choices) 
Transaction 
value theory 
Combination of 
transaction cost 
theory and resource-
based theory:  focus 
on joint value 
maximization for the 
collaborative 
transaction (not pure 
cost minimization or 
revenue maximization)
Aspects that TCE 
theory cannot explain 
because of its pure 
cost focus:  e.g. 
situations where 
greater joint value is 
derived from less cost-
efficient structures;  
increasing transaction 
specificity can raise 
transaction value and 
lower risk of alliance 
break-up (whereas 
TCE points to more 
safeguards needed to 
avoid break-up) 
Largely the same as 
for TCE 
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Real options 
theory 
Treatment of IJVs as 
real call options on 
the opportunity to 
invest in a foreign 
market:  the buyer of 
the option holds the 
right to make a larger 
investment at a fixed 
price at a later date 
(when uncertainties 
are expected to be 
clarified) 
Explanation for fact 
that many alliances do 
end up in acquisitions 
Theory was developed 
for equity joint 
ventures;  whether 
other cooperative 
strategies (contractual 
arrangements, non-
equity partnerships) 
have option value 
remains unaddressed 
Increasing 
returns 
theory 
By acquiring a large 
market share early on, 
firms can lock in their 
customers and 
dominate the market 
without decreasing 
returns setting in (e.g. 
Microsoft) 
Rationale for 
developing 
technological 
networks, research 
consortia etc. 
Especially relevant for 
knowledge-based 
industries, much more 
so than for e.g. 
natural resource-
based industries 
 
 
Managerial/organizational theories 
Theory Underlying logic Focal aspects Areas of concern 
Behavioural 
perspective 
(relational 
contracting) 
The development and 
successful evolution of 
IJVs depends largely 
on behavioural 
interactions and the 
presence of goodwill 
among the parties 
involved 
Relational and 
interactional 
characteristics – such 
as trust, commitment, 
cooperation, and 
forbearance – and 
processes within the 
inter-firm partnership 
Softer aspects should 
not always be placed 
before structural 
factors in developing 
IJV businesses, let 
alone be treated as an 
‘end’ rather than a 
‘means’. 
Problems exist in the 
quantification of 
relational variables, 
the extant research is 
too general and 
diffuse 
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Game theory Alliances can be 
viewed as games 
whereby the outcome 
depends on what each 
player involved 
chooses to do;  pay-
offs from cheating 
may be greater than 
those from 
cooperating, and thus, 
partners may not 
cooperate fully 
Iteration of 
transactions can 
improve the prospects 
for cooperation by 
encouraging strategies 
of reciprocity.  
Recognition of duality 
between cooperation 
and competition.  
Distinction between 
situations in which 
cooperative strategy 
may be rewarding and 
in which it may be 
undermined 
Simplifying 
assumptions are made 
that distance game 
theory somewhat from 
reality:  e.g. 
personalities of the 
players, their social 
ties, communication 
between the players 
etc. 
Bargaining 
power 
(political 
economy) 
A sponsoring firm’s 
level of control and 
performance in an IJV 
business is contingent 
on bargaining power it 
accrues from 
resources and 
capabilities 
The interplay of power 
between the partners, 
their resources, goals, 
decision making 
control, and 
perceptions of 
equality, and the 
concept of productive 
exchange 
Firms recognize that 
power play does not 
increase the size of 
the pie for each 
partner and enable 
the most to be made 
from the joint 
opportunity. 
Problems with the 
quantification of 
power/dependence 
Organization
al learning/ 
knowledge 
IJVs represent a 
conduit through which 
firms can obtain tacit 
organizational 
knowledge embedded 
in others.  Firms form 
partnerships to 
capitalize on 
opportunities to 
acquire particular new 
skills 
How organizational 
knowledge possessed 
by the partners and 
IJV is used and 
managed;  procedures 
for information 
transfer, 
transformation and 
harvesting 
Learning is not a key 
factor for many firms 
engaged in IJVs;  
hence, learning 
outcomes may have 
little effect on IJV 
business performance. 
Quantitative study on 
the topic has not been 
able to elucidate how 
learning processes 
unfold over time. 
Perspective of 
‘learning race’ 
stresses competitive 
aspects, but neglects 
cooperative aspects 
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Strategic 
management 
IJVs are motivated by 
strategic behaviour in 
response to 
environmental 
conditions, and their 
performance hinges on 
whether a mutual co-
alignment/fit between 
parent strategy and 
venture structure is 
achieved 
Formative and 
structural aspects of 
the IJV are 
attributable to a focal 
parent’s competitive 
position/strategy 
along with important 
traits of its industry 
Lack of attention to 
the interactive 
relationship existing 
between partner 
firms. 
Firm homogeneity is 
unrealistically 
assumed 
 
2.2   Management control in JVs 
Merchant (1998) defined management control as “all the devices managers use to ensure 
that the behaviours and decisions of people in the organization are consistent with the 
organization’s objectives and strategies”.  In the following sections I will first present a 
model that provides an overall framework of analysis of a joint venture and thereby links 
management control mechanisms to JV characteristics.  Then I turn to an alternative way 
of looking at a joint venture, viz. as a balance between cooperation and competition;  that 
again will provide insights into what management control mechanisms should be in place. 
 
2.2.1  Dekker (2004): framework based on TCE and relational aspects 
Dekker (2003, 2004) has developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of control 
structures in inter-organizational relationships, such as alliances or joint ventures, based 
on a combination of transaction cost economics and relational aspects.  The framework is 
shown graphically in figure 1.  Dekker’s framework is structured around two control 
problems, ‘appropriation concerns’ and ‘coordination requirements’.  In ‘appropriation 
concerns’ one directly recognizes TCE theory, with its three determinants of governance 
structure, viz. asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency.  Note that in joint ventures the 
frequency of transactions must be sufficiently high to justify the formation of a JV, and 
therefore this dimension can be omitted in the further discussion.  Dekker states that a 
second purpose of control in inter-organizational relationships is the coordination of tasks 
between the partners:  “Different logics of value creation, as determined by the strategic 
rationale of an alliance, result in different levels of interdependence, requiring different 
degrees of mutual adaptation and adjustment” (Borys and Jemison 1989).  Coordination 
and joint decision-making will become more important the more interdependent and the 
more uncertain the tasks of the inter-organizational relationship.  Other authors have also 
reported on the importance of interdependence and task uncertainty as determinants of 
governance structure (e.g. Kumar and Seth 1998; Casciaro 2003). 
The control problems can be addressed by different types of control.  Here, one recognizes 
the three types of controls developed by Ouchi (1979):  the formal control mechanisms of 
outcome and behaviour control, and social or informal control.  Dekker’s framework 
suggests how control problems influence the need of partner firms not only to design and 
implement formal control mechanisms, but also to invest effort in selecting a good 
partner.   
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Interdependence
Coordination 
requirements
Appropriation 
concerns
Task uncertainty
Asset specificity
Environmental 
uncertainty
Frequency*
Partner selection
Goodwill trust
Capability trust
Outcome control
Behaviour control
Antecedents Control problems Social control Formal control
* Frequency is always high In joint ventures, and as such, 
this variable can be omitted in their analysis  
 
Figure 1:  Framework for analysis of control problems in inter-organizational relationships 
such as alliances and joint ventures (Dekker 2004). 
 
Selection of a good partner is a means to mitigate potential control problems upfront;  
design and implementation of formal controls is a means to manage the problems once the 
problems appear.  Dekker argues that investing more efforts in finding a good partner 
reduces the need for formal control mechanisms. 
 
An important aspect of this model is the role of trust, presented as an element of social 
control.  Figure 1 shows two types of trust, capability and goodwill trust.  This distinction 
was first proposed by Sako (1992), who in fact differentiated between three types of trust:  
contractual trust, capability trust and goodwill trust.  Contractual trust, the lowest, most 
basic level of trust, relates to the expectation that the other party will fulfil its 
contractual duties.  Contractual trust must be present in any joint venture relationship.  
Capability trust relates to the expectation that the other party will be competent and able 
to fulfil its promises satisfactorily.  Goodwill trust, the highest level of trust, relates to the 
expectation that the other party will perform in the interest of the relationship (the JV), 
even if it is not directly in the interest of the other party – in other words, in case of 
goodwill trust the other party will abstain from behaving opportunistically.  In Dekker’s 
model, capability trust influences the control mechanisms that govern the problem of 
coordination of tasks; goodwill trust, on the other hand, influences the mechanisms that 
govern the problem of appropriation concerns (opportunism). 
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The relationship between formal controls and trust in JVs is the subject of a substantial 
body of literature (for example, Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995;  Das and Teng 1998;  
Parkhe 1998;  Tomkins 2001; Poppo and Zenger 2002;  Poppo et al. 2007;  Dekker 2004;  
Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman 2006), representing a variety of views.  Van der 
Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2006) summarize this literature neatly.  They conclude that 
there are four different views.  The first is that trust might be a necessary condition for 
control structures and practices to become socially constructed.  A second position is that 
control structures and practices are themselves sources of trust.  Management control 
technologies perform a function similar to the legal system:  as with legal systems, 
management control mechanisms are put in place to reduce the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour.  A third alternative is that (formal) control mechanisms can help build trust.  
The information exchange that is facilitated by the use of (formal) controls could create 
positive expectations about future contributions to the relationship and in this way build 
trust (Tomkins 2001;  Poppo et al. 2007).  Finally, the last view is that trust is an 
alternative to control structures and practices;  in other words, trust can replace the 
design and implementation of control structures and practices.  The building of trust might 
be an efficient solution for control problems where the costs of market-based or hierarchy-
based controls are high, for example in transactions with high asset specificity and 
uncertainty (Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2006;  Dekker 2004;  Das and Teng 
2001).  Dekker (2004) takes this last position that trust is an alternative to control 
structures and practices.  He further argues that a higher level of trust has two 
consequences (see also figure 1):  trust in a partner may have a direct effect on the need 
for formal control mechanisms (i.e. the higher the level of trust, the lower the need for 
formal controls), and it may have a moderating effect on the relationship between control 
problems and the use of formal control mechanisms. 
 
Dekker confirmed his theoretical framework with case study research.  I will come back to 
this in chapter 4 of this paper. 
 
2.2.2  Zeng (2003): framework based on game theory and its ‘cooperative dilemma’ 
An aspect that has thus far received little attention in the joint venture literature is the 
fundamental challenge for JV management to balance cooperation and competition among 
the partners.  In a joint venture the partners should cooperate to achieve the JV 
objectives and hence achieve the desired value creation (‘growing the pie’).  On the other 
hand, partners will – almost naturally – compete to divide the anticipated benefits 
(‘getting the largest slice of the pie’).  Much of the literature has emphasized either the 
cooperative or the competitive side.  Many authors have argued that JV management is 
about creating good relationships between partners and building trust (see for example the 
previous section (Dekker 2004), or Killing (1983)).  On the other end of the spectrum are 
those who have focused on the competitive side, often in the context of organizational 
learning, whereby one partner attempts to absorb capabilities of the other partner(s) 
(Hamel 1991).  Once that objective is fulfilled, it often means the end of the JV.  Zeng 
(2003) argues that these two perspectives – cooperation and competition – should be 
combined, as each perspective on its own emphasizes only one side of what he calls the 
‘cooperative dilemma’ of joint ventures.  The cooperative perspective stresses the role of 
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cooperation and trust to ensure the desired value creation, but neglects, for example, the 
hidden cost of cooperative behaviour.  The competitive perspective, on the other hand, 
overlooks the fact that a joint venture is a positive sum game, rather than a zero-sum 
game, as well as the fact that if all partners would behave in order to learn from the other 
partners this would have a detrimental impact on JV performance. 
 
Game theory offers a theoretical ground to further investigate the tension between 
cooperation and competition in joint ventures.  It provides a means to assess the likely 
consequences of competitive and cooperative behaviours in conditions where the benefits 
to one player depend on what the other players do.  A central theme in game theory is the 
prisoner’s dilemma:  a situation where the optimal joint outcome can only be achieved 
through trusting cooperation.  A joint venture can be regarded as an iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma (Phelan et al. 2005;  Parkhe 1993a, 1993b).  JV partners will generally be 
concerned not to lose, and hence reluctant to reveal information;  cooperation may 
therefore seem unlikely.  However there is also an incentive to cooperate since the game 
is generally a non-zero-sum game (e.g. because of economies of scale), and it is known 
that the game will be played not once but over an extended period of time, so that a firm 
that does not cooperate (i.e. ‘cheats’) can be punished for its behaviour in the next round.  
Therefore, partner firms have an incentive to act opportunistically in the short term, but 
may learn to cooperate in repeated encounters.  The immediate gain of the strategy of 
cheating is weighed against the sacrifice of future gains as a result of violating the 
agreement.  The longer the time horizon of a joint venture, the closer it gets to a 
repeated game. 
 
As indicated, only few authors have used game theory for analysis of JVs.  I will present 
the framework of Zeng (2003) as it contains most detail.  The starting point for his model 
is formed by the two most robust solutions for the prisoner’s dilemma:  changing the pay-
off matrix and extending the shadow of the future.  The pay-off matrix shows the potential 
rewards for cooperative and competitive behaviour.  The higher the pay-off for 
cooperation relative to competition, the more likely it is that the partners will cooperate; 
in contrast, spill-overs will lead to a smaller difference in pay-off between cooperation and 
competition.  The shadow of the future refers to the time frame for decision making in a 
game.  As described earlier, if a prisoner’s dilemma is played indefinitely, cooperation 
between the players will emerge.  This is because the players have the possibility – in 
future interactions – to reward or punish each other for previous behaviour (in contrast to 
a single game).  Thus, the longer this shadow of the future, the higher the pay-off will be 
from future cooperation and the more likely it is that partners will cooperate in the 
present.  Zeng developed a number of hypotheses about factors that might promote 
cooperation among joint venture partners.  These are listed in figure 2.  Zeng confirmed 
his hypotheses by means of statistical analysis on a large sample of joint ventures. 
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Figure 2:  Hypotheses about the cooperative dilemma based on game theory (left) and a 
graphical representation of the model structure (right), based on Zeng (2003) 
 
 
3.   Hypothesis development 
In this chapter I will argue that the framework developed by Dekker (2004) can be 
extended by using game theory.  The hypotheses about factors influencing the cooperative 
dilemma, as developed by Zeng (2003), in fact present a different way of looking at the 
control problem of appropriation concerns from TCE theory. 
 
Although in the previous chapter TCE theory was classified as an economic theory and 
game theory as an organizational/relational theory (table 1), the logic behind both 
theories has certain similarities.  First, it should be noted that both theories are based on 
similar assumptions on human behaviour, i.e. bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviour.  Second, in table 2 I demonstrate how the hypotheses from game theory, as 
developed by Zeng (2003), can be explained in terms of elements of TCE theory.  It 
appears that all hypotheses either link back to asset specificity or to (various aspects of) 
uncertainty.  Finally, two specific problems known from the prisoner’s dilemma in game 
theory – the problems of hold-up and spill-overs – can also be explained in TCE terms.  To 
maximize a partner firm’s share of the JV benefits, a firm can use bargaining power.  
However, the use of bargaining power is constrained by the ‘hold-up’ problem:  if the firm 
becomes (too) dependent on the other partners in the JV, it will lose its bargaining power 
and fall victim to potentially opportunistic behaviour by the other partners (Zeng 2003).   
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Table 2:  Hypotheses from game theory explained in terms of transaction characteristics 
from transaction cost economics  
 
Hypotheses from Zeng (2003)* Comments 
Changing the pay-off matrix 
H1: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, if they 
compete less with each other 
If the parent firms compete little, uncertainty from 
concerns about opportunistic behaviour is small 
H2: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the 
better its contributions to the joint 
venture are protected 
If contributions from parents are well-protected, 
uncertainty stemming from concerns about 
opportunistic behaviour of the other parents will be 
small or negligible 
H3: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the less 
dependent it is on its partner than its 
partner is on it 
If there is a good balance between contributions 
from the partners in a JV, asset specificity concerns 
become small (or rather:  such concerns are 
balanced/equal for all partners) 
Extending the ‘shadow of the future’ 
H4: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, if it 
relies on continuous contributions 
from its partner 
If continuous contributions from the parents are 
required, asset specificity concerns become small 
5: Partners are more likely to 
cooperate with each other, the 
longer the anticipated duration of 
the alliance 
If the intended duration of the alliance is long, this 
reduces uncertainty stemming from not knowing 
what the partner is up to 
H6: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the 
easier it is to evaluate the 
performance of its partner 
If it is easy to evaluate the performance of the 
partner(s), information asymmetries are small or 
negligible, which means in turn that uncertainty 
resulting from information asymmetries is small or 
negligible 
H7: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the more 
similar are their organizational 
cultures/structures 
If partners have similar organizational cultures and 
structures, uncertainty stemming from such 
differences will be small 
* Some of the original hypotheses of Zeng have been modified so that now they are all 
formulated in the positive sense, i.e. starting with “A firm is more likely to...” 
 
 
This can happen, for example, if one of the partners has invested in specific assets for the 
joint venture and cannot exit the JV without an important loss.  In other words:  the ‘hold-
up’ problem relates to the problem of asset specificity in TCE theory.  The other way to 
maximize a firm’s benefits from the JV is by using the knowledge acquired through the JV 
in other activities: this is the so-called ‘spill-over’ problem.  Spill-overs can be considered 
as one of the components of uncertainty in TCE theory (uncertainty about the – 
opportunistic – behaviour of the other partner firm(s)).  Thus a partner in a JV has various 
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options to take actions that undermine cooperation, for example withholding information 
or refraining from JV investments.  In general, it can be stated that a partner firm in a JV 
is less likely to cooperate with the other partner(s) the larger the asset specificity and the 
larger the uncertainty. 
 
Summarizing, Zeng’s cooperative dilemma provides a refinement of Dekker’s control 
problem of appropriation concerns.  The hypotheses as formulated by Zeng – when turned 
into statements – can be used to investigate the potential for a cooperative dilemma in a 
joint venture.  This ‘extended framework’, combining Dekker and Zeng, is presented in 
figure 3.  Dekker’s control problem of appropriation concerns has been replaced by the 
cooperative dilemma.  Rather than three variables (or even only two, since frequency is 
not a variable in the case of JVs), it now has seven variables.  Especially when 
appropriation concerns are high for a given JV, this extension with game theory can 
provide more granularity when investigating potential control issues.  The larger the 
dilemma, the more or more stringent control mechanisms are required to address the 
problem.  In addition, the larger the dilemma, the higher the need for formal control 
mechanisms (as opposed to social controls), since social mechanisms will not be able to 
address the problem. 
 
As far as trust is concerned, in the combined model, I shall assume that trust and formal 
controls are partly substitutes and partly complements.  In case of high capability trust, 
fewer formal controls will be required to manage the problem of coordination of tasks 
(trust as substitute);  but in case of high capability trust (but low goodwill trust), 
appropriation concerns still need to be covered by formal controls (trust as complement).   
 
It should be noted that in the research of Dekker, the focus is purely on explaining 
patterns of management control in JVs, given the organizational and environmental 
context in which the JV operates.  This also holds for other authors who have published 
research in this area, such as Groot and Merchant (2000) and Kamminga (2003).  Dekker 
does mention however that “underlying the theoretical framework is the assumption that 
aligning the alliance’s governance structure with its transaction and task characteristics 
will result in higher performance”.  In a later study of supplier-buyer relationships, Dekker 
tested this hypothesis (Anderson and Dekker 2005), and found, by means of statistical 
analysis, that the data indeed lent support to the hypothesis that alignment between the 
anticipated transaction hazards (i.e. control problems) and the management control 
structure corresponded with better performance compared to a situation of misalignment.  
Thus, the mentioned hypothesis that alignment between JV characteristics and 
management control mechanisms leads to better performance is plausible. 
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Figure 3:  Framework developed in this paper, extending the framework from Dekker 
(2004) with hypothesis derived from game theory by Zeng (2003) 
 
 
4.   Case study 
 
I will test the extended framework in a case study.  The research design is that of an 
explanatory case study (Yin 1989), i.e. the theoretical model described in the previous 
chapter is used to understand and explain the reasons for management control practices in 
joint ventures.  I will explore the same case study that Dekker used to illustrate his model 
and will thereby rely fully on the information provided by Dekker (2004)40.  I first provide a 
brief introduction to this case study, based on Dekker’s paper, followed by a description of 
findings from analysis with Dekker’s framework.  Finally I show how the model developed 
in this paper enhances the level of detail of Dekker’s original analysis. 
 
                                             
40 In my Master’s thesis I explore three different cases, of three international joint ventures – two 
manufacturing joint ventures and one in financial services.  The findings from these three cases confirm the 
extended framework and show that adding the perspective of game theory is beneficial to understanding 
management control in JVs.  However, because of confidentiality reasons, I cannot present these cases in this 
paper.   
I therefore illustrate the extended model by exploring the example provided by Dekker (2004).  Although 
Dekker’s case study concerns a supplier-buyer alliance, he indicates that “the structure of the alliance has 
much in common with a joint venture.  Joint financial investments are made, a separate organizational 
structure with a joint board and joint task groups is installed, specific tasks and resources are dedicated to it, 
and separate rules, regulations and costing and non-market pricing are used.” 
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4.1   Background 
Dekker’s case concerns a strategic alliance between two companies, NMA and RIB.  NMA is 
a Dutch company supplying components for railway safety.  RIB is an organisation 
responsible for construction, installation and maintenance of the Dutch rail infrastructure, 
and was formed when the Dutch Railways were privatized in 1995.  NMA is monopolist in 
The Netherlands.  RIB is its largest domestic customer and accounts for a significant share 
of NMA’s total turnover.  When RIB was formed, the new management recognized that 
many of its supply chains were inefficient, and an important goal for RIB became better 
control of purchasing costs.  As a test case, RIB initiated an alliance with NMA for half-
barrier installations.  NMA was chosen for several reasons.  First, significant cost 
reductions were expected by reorganizing the supply chain.  Second, because of the 
delivery risks for this type of product (monopolistic supply situation and serious 
consequences of inadequate delivery) a long-term supply relationship was deemed a good 
option.  Third, the alliance seemed a good route towards more market orientation and cost 
consciousness within the RIB organization.  And finally, RIB expected that NMA would be a 
good cultural fit given their long history of cooperation. 
 
The contract that was set up covered the various aspects of the cooperation in detail.  It 
included e.g. scope, goals, plans for achieving those goals, organizational structure, 
responsibilities of both parties, exchange of information, distribution and protection of 
intellectual property rights and a financial incentive system.  Several appendices to the 
contract covered very specific items such as product descriptions and prices, a quality plan 
and a programme of improvement for coordination of innovation activities.  These 
appendices were revised annually.  The goal of the alliance was defined as the joint 
innovation of half-barrier installation systems to realize additional cost savings and to 
enhance its quality and safety.  Some of the key elements of the management control 
structure were the following: 
 Organizational structure:  the alliance was set up as a separate organizational entity, 
with an alliance board (two members of each firm) and alliance staff.  The board set 
out an alliance strategy and was responsible for turning strategy into action by 
agreeing short-term goals and an improvement programme (see below). 
 Programme of improvement:  for each innovation proposal, the programme of 
improvement prescribed a planning and progress scheme (specifying steps such as 
definition of functional requirements, attainability study, development etc.), a budget 
scheme, an estimation of the expected cost reduction, and a quality plan.   
 Financial incentive system:  an ‘alliance fund’ was set up to ensure mutual 
collaborative behaviour in the innovation process, in other words, to ensure that the 
partners’ individual financial objectives were aligned with the alliance’s objectives.  
This was done by setting up a scheme such that all planned innovations were financed 
from a central fund, financial results were accrued and the residual was divided 
following a pre-set schedule. 
 Protection of proprietary knowledge:  NMA’s knowledge of the half-barrier installations 
was regarded a key factor for the success of the alliance.  Therefore the contract 
specified that NMA would place its knowledge and experience at the disposal of the 
alliance.  NMA was also assigned all intellectual property rights on the installations and 
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developments generated by the alliance.  In return RIB received a non-transferable 
license for the use of the technology. 
 
4.2   Analysis with Dekker’s framework 
Dekker showed that the control mechanisms in place can be explained on the basis of the 
two control problems, coordination of tasks and of appropriation concerns.  Table 3 
contains the various control elements present in the NMA-RIB case.  Below I discuss them 
briefly. 
 
Coordination of tasks was needed for the two alliance activities of supply of half-barrier 
systems to RIB and innovation.  The supply task required controls such as standard ordering 
procedures and demand forecasts.  The innovation task was more complex and 
characterized by higher uncertainty.  Control instruments to address this problem included 
a separate hierarchical organizational structure with a joint alliance board and joint task 
groups, with decision rights and responsibilities;  short-term goals for these task groups set 
by the board;  task planning, budgeting and progress evaluation of the programme of 
improvement;  and quality plans with annual auditing of their use.  Management of 
appropriation concerns was done among others via the alliance fund.  Although there was 
strong mutual dependency – RIB could not switch to alternative systems without incurring 
considerable cost and NMA could not switch to other buyers –, thus aligning the partners’ 
interests, RIB was concerned NMA would have little incentive to work actively on 
innovation of the half-barrier systems and would simply use the alliance to secure 
turnover.  NMA, in turn, was concerned it would not receive a fair share of the realized 
cost benefits.  Therefore the alliance fund was set up such that it provided benefits to 
both parties.  Furthermore the joint supervision of the alliance activities, with joint 
decision making and problem solving helped manage appropriation concerns.  Finally, the 
clear specification in the contract of intellectual property rights and how to handle them, 
contributed to minimizing NMA’s concerns about information spill-over to the alliance. 
 
As far as trust is concerned, the NMA-RIB case is not fully conclusive.  Dekker’s framework 
is built on the assumption that trust can be a substitute for formal controls.  However, the 
case shows that trust is certainly not fully exchangeable with control.  Even though the 
level of trust was very high (supported by facts such as RIB obtaining full insight into the 
cost structure of the half-barrier installations), there were many formal controls in place 
(e.g. a very complete contract).  In other words, a high level of trust does not necessarily 
lead to fewer formal controls.  On the other hand, a high number of formal controls does 
not need to be detrimental to the level of trust.  This lends support to the statement that 
trust is at least partially a complement to formal controls, rather than a substitute. 
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Table 3:  Formal and informal control mechanisms in the NMA-RIB alliance (Dekker 2004)* 
Outcome control Behaviour control Social control 
Ex ante mechanisms   
Goal setting: Structural specifications: Partner selection: 
- Strategic goals (CT) - Ordering and supply 
procedures 
- Long  joint history and 
cultural ‘fit’ 
- Short-term goals (e.g. for  (CT) Interactive goal setting (AC): 
cost reductions) (CT) - Demand forecasts (CT) - Joint governance design 
Incentive systems: - Functional specifications 
(CT) 
- Short-term goals 
- Alliance fund (AC) - Programme of innovations 
(CT) 
Reputation: 
 - Quality plans (CT) - Trustworthiness for other 
alliances 
 - Specification and division of Trust: 
 intellectual property rights 
(AC) 
- Long-lasting relationship 
 Organizational structuring: - Reputation RIB 
 - Alliance board (CT) - Open book agreement 
 - Task groups (CT) - Intentional incomplete 
contracting 
   
Ex post mechanisms   
Performance monitoring Behaviour monitoring: Shared decision making & goal 
setting 
- Open book accounting 
(AC) 
- Pre-action review of 
innovation  
- Joint alliance board (CT) 
 ideas (AC) - Joint task groups (CT) 
Rewarding: - Board monitoring (AC)  
- Benefit sharing - Auditing use of quality plans 
(CT) 
 
   
* CT indicates that the mechanism governs primarily the control problem of ‘coordination of 
tasks’,  
and AC the control problem of appropriation concerns 
 
 
4.3   Analysis with the extended framework developed in this paper 
I now analyse Dekker’s case based on the framework developed by Zeng (2003).  Table 4 
explains the seven parameters derived from game theory for the case of the NMA-RIB 
alliance.  The table shows clearly that the control mechanisms in the NMA-RIB alliance 
were designed such those areas where potential control problems could arise, were 
covered adequately.  Two potentially problematic areas were ensuring continuous 
contributions from both partners, and being capable to evaluate partner performance in 
the alliance.  These were addressed with additional control measures.  An alliance fund 
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was set up to ensure that both partners would contribute to (and benefit from) the primary 
objective of the alliance, i.e. cost reduction;  a programme of innovation was set up with a 
specific, tight governance structure to ensure the other objective of the alliance was being 
worked by both partners.  Furthermore, both parties gave insight into their work practices 
(e.g. product specifications) and cost figures (e.g. open book accounting), and several 
issues were worked together in the joint venture;  this enabled both parties to evaluate 
each other’s performance. 
 
Extending Dekker’s framework with game theory – the hypotheses developed by Zeng 
(2003) – thus helps in explaining in more detail the control mechanisms in place, and 
matching them to underlying control problems.  In the case of the NMA-RIB alliance, 
Dekker found that the control mechanisms could be explained based on the control 
problems of coordination of tasks and appropriation concerns and their underlying 
antecedents.  The extended model shows that replacing the problem of appropriation 
concerns by the cooperative dilemma and its determining factors can explain the control 
mechanisms in place better and in more detail.  It also confirms that the control 
mechanisms match the control problems and therefore it is likely that this alliance 
functions successfully.  This link between a match of control mechanisms with alliance 
characteristics and alliance performance could, however, not be substantiated in this case 
due to the lack of sufficient data. 
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Table 4:  Hypotheses from game theory applied to the NMA-RIB alliance 
Changing the pay-off matrix 
H1: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, if they 
compete less with each other 
NMA and RIB were not competing at all, they 
operated in different (product) markets  Æ  
positive impact on cooperation 
H2: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the 
better its contributions to the joint 
venture are protected 
In setting up the JV (and the JV contract), 
specific attention was paid to aspects of 
intellectual property so that NMA did not 
need to be concerned about information spill-
over  Æ  positive impact on cooperation 
H3: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the less 
dependent it is on its partner than its 
partner is on it 
There was a mutual dependency between 
NMA and RIB: NMA was the only supplier to 
RIB, whereas RIB was the most important 
customer of NMA.  In other words, NMA did 
not depend more on RIB than RIB depended 
on NMA  Æ  positive impact on cooperation 
Extending the ‘shadow of the future’ 
H4: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, if it 
relies on continuous contributions 
from its partner 
RIB was concerned NMA would use the 
alliance to simply secure turnover, and NMA 
was concerned to earn a fair share of the cost 
savings and to realize sufficient turnover.  
Therefore, specific measures were taken, i.e. 
the programme of innovation and the alliance 
fund   
Æ  positive impact on cooperation 
5: Partners are more likely to 
cooperate with each other, the 
longer the anticipated duration of 
the alliance 
When setting up the alliance, the partners 
had a long time horizon in mind  Æ  positive 
impact on cooperation 
H6: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the 
easier it is to evaluate the 
performance of its partner 
Specific measures taken by the alliance 
included intensive exchange of data as well as 
personnel, and ‘open book accounting’, 
enabling each partner to evaluate the 
performance of the alliance and of the other 
partner  Æ  positive impact on cooperation 
H7: A firm is more likely to 
cooperate with its partner, the more 
similar are their organizational 
cultures/structures 
One of the reasons of RIB for selecting NMA 
was the long history of cooperation and a 
good cultural fit between the organizations  
Æ  positive impact on cooperation 
 
 
5.   Conclusions 
From a confrontation of an actual case with the theoretical framework, it has become 
clear that the extended model has proven adequate in explaining the observed control 
patterns as well as the observed control problems.  Whereas the two original control 
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problems, coordination of tasks and appropriation concerns, appear sufficient to explain 
the observed (formal and social) control mechanisms, replacing the problem of 
appropriation concerns by the cooperative dilemma from game theory adds further to the 
analysis – it provides an additional layer of granularity.  The hypotheses derived from game 
theory are useful to further investigate the situation in terms of potential opportunism, 
and at the same time they provide indications of how potential concerns can be addressed:  
how to change the pay-off matrix and how to extend the shadow of the future in favour of 
more cooperation at the expense of competition.  As such, the extended model can serve 
as a diagnostic tool to assess the joint venture management control mechanisms in place 
and provides more detail and clearer indications of how to close control gaps than the 
original model by Dekker. 
 
The work presented in this paper also has some shortcomings.  Dekker (2004) already 
mentioned that the role of trust and especially the relationship between trust and formal 
controls needs further attention;  the extended model presented in this paper does not 
add any further insights on this point.  Further work could take the form of a longitudinal 
study, to look at the development of trust and how it impacts other control mechanisms.  
Furthermore, the link from a good match between management control pattern and joint 
venture characteristics to joint venture performance remains to be substantiated further.  
Again, further work could consist of a longitudinal study or a statistical analysis of a 
sample of different joint ventures. 
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Fast growth in control 
 
Designing Management control systems for fast growth 
 
 
Zulay Rico 
 
 
Executive summary 
The focus of this paper is on the influence of the fast growth of organizations on the design 
process of management control systems. What are the management accounting and control 
problems that a fast growth organization encounters that can be ascribed to this growth. 
What are the circumstances arising from the fast growth of the organization that directly 
influence (re)design of the management control systems for the organization, and how can 
control help organizations with absorbing the negative effects of fast growth. The 
following paper outlines an explorative study into the subject.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Growing organizations, especially fast growing organizations, are important for the 
economy of a country. A growing organization has a need for human resources, 
encouraging employment. According to a survey by the government of the Netherlands fast 
growing organizations are also interesting due to their innovative character and they 
contribute to economic growth. Growing organizations all encounter problems caused by 
this growth. Increased borrowings; increased staff; increasing clientele; reduction in cash 
flow; more bureaucracy and naturally the added stress caused by all these problems (Albo 
2006). There are a lot of fast growing organizations were management simply isn’t 
prepared for the task of managing a fast growing organization facing all these problems 
(Blom 2007). The role of a manager is different in an organization with 50 employees than 
in an organization with 200 employees. New organizational structures will arise to support 
management in its tasks, but these new structures also bring complications with them and 
the need for adjustments.  
 
In 1965 Anthony defined Management Control as “the process by which managers ensure 
that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of 
the organization’s objectives: management control is the process by which managers 
influence other members of the organization to implement the organization’s strategies”. 
Even though extensive research on the subject of management control through the years 
changed the definition of control in organizations, Anthony is a good starting point for 
explaining the objectives of management control in organizations. One of the tensions that 
Simons describes is the tension of balancing profit, growth and control (Simons 1999): 
‘Managers of high-performance companies constantly seek profitable growth. To do so, 
they are continually innovating. Innovation may take on many forms. It may be developing 
new products or services, or it may appear as new ways of doing internal tasks related to 
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order-processing and manufacturing. Over time, successful innovation finds its way into 
sustained profitability and growth.’ However, according to Simons an excessive emphasis 
on profit and growth can lead to danger, for instance employees may engage in behaviours 
that put the business at risk. And a rigid structure and control system will limit the future 
of company. 
 
1.1  Outline of the paper 
The following paper is an explorative study into the subject of fast growth and the design 
process of management control systems in an organization. The first part of the paper, the 
introduction, will provide a short insight into the origin of the paper and a short outline of 
the paper. The second chapter will provide more insight into the theoretical framework of 
the paper, research on organizational growth and management control systems is reviewed 
for this chapter. The third chapter will provide more insight into the formulated research 
hypothesis and the methodology used to explore the subject. In the fourth chapter the 
theoretical framework and the hypothesis are combined into a conceptual framework used 
for the analysis in the fifth chapter. At the end of the paper in Chapter 6 the answer to the 
research hypothesis will be formulated.  
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
For the theoretical framework the subject of the paper is divided in two categories: 
organizational growth and management control. The subject of organizational growth is 
extended with research of fast growth organizations and the subject of management 
control includes the design process of the management control systems (MCS) in an 
organization.  
 
2.1 Organizational growth 
There are four aspects of organizational growth that have an impact on the growth and the 
organization: the type of growth; the growth phase; the organizations structure and its 
development; and the growth rate of the organization. Organizational growth can be typed 
as internal or external. And we can further classify internal growth as being organic or 
intentional, through product or market development. External growth is obtained through 
mergers and acquisitions. The Greiner growth phases framework describes how growing 
organizations move through five distinguishable phases of development, each of which 
contains a relatively calm period of growth that ends with a management crisis. 
Organizational research has presented a specific group of characteristics that make it 
possible to “define” the structure of these different organizational types; this is presented 
through Mintzberg’s basic structures and the structure development framework. For this 
paper we focus on organizations that grow fast, this can be measured through an increase 
in employees of revenue.  
 
2.2 Fast growth organizations and control 
Fast growth organizations are more innovative, experience more market- and product 
development, are more aggressive in their transformation strategies, and invest more 
profit in research and development of new products than other organizations. The type of 
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growth is part of the strategy, an intentional growth that is pursued from inside the 
organization. Fast growth organizations all grow in size and age, but most of them are 
relatively new in the business and small in size. The fast growth organization will find itself 
in the first two growth phases of the Greiner growth phase framework, growth through 
creativity and direction. But fast growth organizations tend to go through these phases a 
lot quicker than normal growth organizations. The structure is defined by the parts of the 
organization that are important in the decision making process and crucial for the 
organization. Fast growth of the organization will result in certain bottlenecks that an 
organization will have to overcome to continue growing. The bottlenecks are: 
employment; management and organization; processes and systems; capital and 
subsidization; market and competition; and law and regulation. The organizational growth 
aspects and bottlenecks will have an effect on the control in the organization.  
 
Employment
Management and Organization
Processes and Systems
Capital and Subsidization
Phase 1 Growth through creativity, leadershipcrisis
Phase 2 Growth through direction, autonomy crisis
Phase 3 Growth through delegation, control crisis
Phase 4 Growth through co-ordination, red tape crisis
Phase 5 Growth through collaboration, ??? crisis
Simple structure – Machine bureaucracy
Machine Bureaucracy – Division Organizations
Ad-hocracy – Professional Bureaucracy
Internal: Organic, Product or Market Development
External: Mergers, Acquisitions
 
 
Figure 2-1 Organizational growth aspects influencing management control 
 
 
2.3 Management control systems 
The definition of management control used in this paper is: management control is the 
process by which managers assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and 
efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization’s objectives’ Machin, 1983. Simons 
and Merchant both list controls in the organization, however having a different opinion 
regarding the need for control. Where Merchant makes a distinction between strategic and 
management control; Simons defines control as a means for implementing business 
strategy. This contrast in opinion translates its way to their classification of controls in an 
organization. Merchant’s classification is directed towards personnel actions and Simons 
classifies controls by the type of strategy. Reviewing the Rabbit-Hill framework and the 
McKinsey 7s structure it can be concluded that not only organizational aspects, but also 
environmental aspects influence the design process of MCS. The Rabbit-Hill framework puts 
organization engineering at the core of the framework, influenced by the organizational 
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components and the strategy formulation process. McKinsey’s framework describes the 
factors of the organization that together determine how the organization works.  
 
2.4 Influencing the control process 
The organizational aspects that will influence the MCS design process are further discussed 
in light of organizational growth and are classified in four categories: 
 Organizational components: the environment, handled theories and nature and 
experience. 
 Structure and Size: the structure and its development and the size of the organization. 
 McKinsey’s soft Ss: staff, style, skills and shared values.  
 Strategy formulation: informal and formal procedures resulting from the strategy 
formulation process.  
Reviewing research on the influence of growth on the aspects of the organization 
influencing the MCS design process confirms that the use and role of control systems may 
change following the growth of the organization. Previous research has given us some 
possible consequences of growth on these organizational aspects influencing the MCS 
design in the organization. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Organizational aspects influencing management control 
 
 
3. Hypothesis development and research design 
Growth of the organization, in particular fast growth, can have a great influence in the 
design of MCS for that organization. The following research hypothesis is researched for 
this paper: 
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To what extent and in which way is fast organizational growth a significant factor in 
designing the organization’s management control systems. 
 
Not only the direct effect of growth will have an effect on the control process, but growth 
will most likely also influence the other factors playing a role in the design process.  For 
this paper I will try to filter out the influence of fast growth on its own.  
 
 Research methodology 
For this paper the research methodology is that of the explorative study. Exploratory 
research comprises the exploration of a topic, or the start of the researcher to familiarize 
with that topic. This approach typically occurs when a researcher examines a new interest 
or when the subject of study itself is relatively new (Babbie 2001).  
 
Exploratory research is most typically done for three purposes (Babbi 2001): 
1. to satisfy the researcher’s curiosity and desire for better understanding 
2. to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study 
3. to develop the methods to be employed in any subsequent study 
The purpose of the exploratory research is to provide more insight into a topic that is not 
really substantiated by rigorous theories or precise expectations. 
 
By researching previous research the theoretical framework is developed for further 
analysis of the research hypothesis in the paper. The second part of the paper will consist 
of creating an outline of the theoretical framework for the research conducted. The main 
focus of the research is on Organizational Growth and Management Control; and this is the 
foundation of the theoretical framework for the paper. The function of the theoretical 
framework is to create a conceptual framework for analysis of the empirical research. This 
conceptual framework is used for the analysis of the case study. Focussing on fast growth 
and MCS the analysis will give us an insight in the main theme of the paper: the influence 
of fast growth in the management control process of designing the MCS.  
 
 Research boundaries 
One of the boundaries of the exploratory research is that it will only go as far as exploring 
the subject of the research. There is no specific solution to a problem formulated. The 
outcome of the exploration can only go as far as a recommendation for future research.  
Without extensive field research it will be hard to filter the effects of growth from other 
environmental characteristics that influence the strategy and design of MCS in 
organizations. Other environmental influences can be the innovative character of the 
industry that the organization is operating in, or the normal growth factor of the industry. 
Political and social opinions may also influence the strategy of an organization and its 
implementation.  To still be able to formulate enough statements about the influence of 
fast growth in an organization other research of the fast growth organization is introduced 
in the paper to support its theoretical framework.  
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4. Conceptual research framework 
The aspects of growth and control presented in the theoretical framework are combined 
and presented in a conceptual research framework. The focus of the conceptual research 
framework is the influence of fast organizational growth on the aspects of the planning and 
control cycle in the organization and the combined responsibility and process structure and 
the implemented means and measures. The conceptual research framework presents how 
the aspects of fast growth will most likely influence the control process of the organization 
by influencing the control aspects. The translation of the management control inputs to 
the process of designing the responsibility and process structure and combined the means 
and measures implemented to assure control are highly influenced by the type of growth 
the organization wants to achieve. The conceptual framework for research classifies fast 
growth for each type of growth: organic growth, product or market development, or 
mergers and acquisitions. The bottlenecks facing the fast growth organization are included 
in the framework since these are expected to influence not only the need for management 
control in the organization but also the design process of the MCS.  
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Figure 4-1 Conceptual research framework 
 
How the different elements of this framework are brought about is illustrated in the 
following paragraphs.  
 
4.1  Organic growth 
One of the influences of organic growth on the strategy formulation of the organization is 
the type of growth strategy: should the organization raise its prices, reduce the costs, or 
sell existing products and services to existing customers. The growth strategy will have an 
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impact on the organizational structure, by instigating a need for a structure or a change in 
the existing structure or by the natural development of the existing structure through the 
growth of the organization. Fast organic growth does not necessarily imply a change in the 
organization, just a goal for the organization and the employees already working there. 
But when organic growth picks up the workload can put a strain on existing employees and 
there is a need for new skills and staff, the organization should be aware that this puts a 
strain on the shared values and style of the organization. The organizational components in 
an organization that grows organically are very dependent on the type of organization, but 
growth will definitely have an influence to the characteristics of the growth phase of the 
organization.  
 
 Changes in the R&P structure: when an organization chooses for organic growth the 
changes are expected to come from the increase in workload, changes in the attention 
span of management, changes due to the hiring of new employees. And the structure of 
the organization will eventually develop if the organization keeps on growing in size. 
These developments are also expected to change the R&P structure of the 
organization. 
 The means implemented to accompany the strategy of organic growth don’t necessarily 
have to change due the organizational growth. These can stay the same if the 
organization is already relying on good means, but they will have to change if they 
prove to be insufficient. The means that are implemented by the organization depend 
on the strategy and other organizational components; they can for instance help 
management to detect changes in the organization by analyzing information in the 
organization.  
 Changes in the implementation of measures: a small organization can easily rely on 
personnel and cultural controls to achieve control. However as the organization starts 
to grow and wants to keep growing in control, the organization will most likely also 
have to rely on action and result controls. New employees, a change in attention span 
by management, these can all add to the pressures of trusting that everyone is going in 
the right direction based on cultural control or rely on action controls.  
 
4.2  Product or Market Development 
Product or market development is a very high risk strategy and can be originate from a few 
different growth strategies: sell new products and services to existing customers, sell 
existing products and services to new customers, and sell new products and services to 
new customers. The last strategy being the highest risk since it involves implementing two 
new dimensions in the organization. The strategy of product and market development will 
most likely have an influence on the structure of the organization by requiring an 
expansion of the organizational structure to accommodate the new business dimension. 
The organizational components are most likely to be influenced when the development 
requires the organization to expand the structure. To assure that the development is going 
as planned in the strategy the organization should have the right skills and these skills have 
to be treated well to create a creative environment to nourish the growth of the 
organization.  
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The expected implications for the management control design process as a result of 
product or market development are: 
 Changes in the R&P structure: if the development process in the organization is a new 
process, implemented to achieve growth and part of a strategy this new part will most 
likely affect the R&P structure of the organization. The organization will definitely 
have to determine the responsibilities and processes for this new structure. 
 Changes to the implementation of means: the means in the organization should reflect 
what the organization expects to gain from the product or market development. The 
means should reflect the type of strategy chosen by the organization.  
 Changes in the implementation of measures: especially if the product or market 
development process is not something that is accomplished by the strategic apex of the 
organization should they have measures in place to assure that the organization’s 
strategy is implemented and the goals for development are being met.  
 
4.3 Mergers and acquisitions 
Merge with another organization, or acquire an organization including employees, or 
acquire the business without the employees are most likely not the main strategy but these 
are a result of the strategy of having a bigger market share, or going into a new line of 
products, to broaden product offerings, enter new geographic markets, access emerging 
technology or intellectual property, and expand into new distribution channels. The 
structure development as a result of merging is largely dependent on the reason of the 
merger, the strategy of the organization and the merger as a result of this strategy will 
have an impact on the structure of the organization changing after the merger. The 
influence on the organizational structure as a result of the acquisition is largely dependant 
on the type of acquisition, just acquiring the assets of the organization or the entire 
organization including personnel. The effect to the soft Ss of the organization is also 
present, especially when the merger or acquisition brings new employees and a different 
organizational culture in the mix. Merging with another organization will have an effect on 
the soft Ss, if there is a merging of employees this will most likely have an impact on the 
shared values, style, staff and skills of the organization. The organizational components of 
the organization will change if the merger or acquisition results in the organizations after 
merging being different than before merging.  
 
The expected implications of fast growth for the management control design process as a 
result of mergers or acquisitions are: 
 Changes in the R&P structure: depending on the reason for the merger or acquisition, 
and the type of merger or acquisition, the R&P structure of the organization will 
change. The influence of fast growth on this process is most likely to result from the 
decision of merging or acquiring. Changes in the structure are most likely expected to 
change the R&P structure. And changes in the soft Ss will put a strain on the existing 
r&p structure.  
 Changes in the implementation of means: implications of mergers and acquisition for 
the means depend on the strategy of the organization. If the strategy for growth is 
determined the organization can address the type of means to be implemented in the 
organization. 
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 Changes in the implementation of measures: the type of merger or acquisition can 
require a different approach of the R&P structure.  
 
 
5. Analysis 
The following chapter of the paper will combine the conceptual research framework with a 
case study of a fast growth organization (Panelsix) and other examples of fast growth 
organizations in order to analyze the research hypothesis. The case study consists of an 
interview with a managing partner of a fast growth organization and is executed in light of 
the research hypothesis.  
 
5.1 To what extent will growth have an influence on control 
The extent of the influence of fast growth on the design process of MCS in the organization 
in this paper is translated to the influence of growth on the different aspects of the 
control design process. The different aspects of the management control process are 
described in light of the conceptual research framework, and these changes are, where 
possible, described through the implementation of control. This implementation, 
evaluation and maybe even modifying of controls, is the way in which organizational 
growth is expected to influence the control process. To complement this analysis the 
findings of the case study are included where they can provide more insight. 
 
5.1.1 Strategy formulation and implementation process 
The strategy of an organization is an important part of the design process of the MCS. The 
influence of fast growth on the strategy formulation process will have an impact in 
different ways: 
 Determining the strategy of the organization: there is no specific strategy that will 
result in fast growth and fast growth organizations do not have the same strategy. 
What is however very common amongst fast growth organizations is that they have a 
strategy that focuses on the growth of the organization. If someone goes into business 
because he doesn’t want to work for a boss but wants to freelance this will not result 
in a growing organization. When this person wants to build an organization it will have 
to adapt the entrepreneurial spirit. An organization can only grow fast if the will is 
there and if it has the potential to grow fast. However this doesn’t mean that all 
organizations with the potential to grow fast will automatically do so, since there are 
other challenges to the growth than the challenge of not knowing how to grow.  
 Translating the strategy of the organization into goals: it is one thing to say we are 
going to be the biggest by next year, or we want to sell a lot of products by the end of 
a certain period. This description however can be translated to the actual business in a 
number of different ways and could result in an organization under performing when it 
comes to the management’s expectations. To prevent an unclear vision the strategy 
has to be translated into measurable goals, and these goals have to be translated into 
short-term and long-term goals. The MCS are implemented in the organization to assure 
that the goals of the organization are being met. Therefore it is important that if an 
organization wants to grow fast that it is able to formulate exactly how it wants to 
achieve this growth.  
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 Communicating: communicating the strategy of the organization to the employees and 
getting everyone exited about the strategy of the organization is important in reaching 
the goals of the organization. In the growth literature management and organization 
can be seen as a bottleneck when they are not able to communicate the goals of the 
organization to employment. And when they are able to communicate the strategy and 
develop it into goals for the organization this is seen as a success factor in the fast 
growth. Thus we can conclude that making sure that you communicate your strategy to 
the rest of the organization is very crucial for the leaders of any organization. 
 Dealing with emerging strategies: it is important that an organization is aware of the 
emergent strategies that arise during everyday business. These emergent strategies 
have to be managed as they will influence the deliberate strategy of the organization.  
 
5.1.2 Organizational Components 
The organizational components definitely have an influence in the design process of the 
MCS of the organization. However the influence of growth on the organizational 
components is not something to necessarily ensue once the organizational growth is 
reached, at least not on all components. Some components are expected to be drivers of 
this organizational growth; these components are part of the characteristics of fast growth 
organizations. And some components are not actually affected by fast growth: 
 Organizational components not naturally influenced by fast growth: the environmental 
components and the nature of the organization are not specific drivers for fast growth 
and these components are not naturally affected by the fast growth of the 
organization. Even though these components are a very important influence in the 
control process, it is not pointed out that they are in any way different or specific for 
the fast growth organization.  
 Organizational components driving fast growth: some of the organizational components 
are embedded in the characteristics of the fast growth organizations presented in 
chapter four. These characteristics are part of the drivers of the fast growth 
organization, for instance the type of strategy in the organization.  
 Organizational components affected by fast growth: the experience of the organization 
is definitely a component that is affected by fast growth. The more phases of growth 
the organization passes the more this will have an impact on the experience of the 
organization, and this is a direct result of the growth of the organization.   
 
5.1.3 Size and Structure Development 
A major issue in fast growth organizations is the change of the structure as a result of the 
organizational development and in some organizations the failure of determining the 
organization structure results in uncertainty. 
 Determining the structure: For an organization to have control over its responsibilities 
and processes it first has to determine the structure of the organization. Unfortunately 
even though the structure of the organization is of great importance in the design 
process of the MCS there are many fast growth organizations that don’t have the time 
of feel the need to determine the right structure for their organization. 
 Communicating the structure: it is very important to communicate the structure of the 
organization to new employees. When fast growth results in a great number of new 
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employees in a short period it is important that it is communicated in the organization 
where these new employees will fit in the structure of the organization.  
 Developing the structure: An organization no matter how small will have an 
organizational structure, whether this is documented or not. But the fast growth of the 
organization can result in an unclear structure with little or no possibilities to 
delegate. When it is unsure who is responsible for what in the organization it is simply 
not possible to determine the measures that have to be implemented in the 
organization. 
 Adapting to change: The difficulty in the structure determining process for the fast 
growth organization is that this structure is susceptible to change. Therefore 
determining the structure should include the growth aspiration to make it easier for 
the organization to adapt to the change as a result of this fast growth.  
 
The conceptual research framework doesn’t really detail into the size of the fast growth 
organization. In the research conducted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs the fast growth 
organizations are classified as small and middle-sized organization and this is included in 
the description of the characteristics of the fast growth organizations. But an organization 
like Yahoo is not exactly a small organization since Yahoo had approximately 14.000 
employees at the beginning of 2008. And a potential fast growth organization like Panelsix 
has only eight fulltime employees. Needless to say that the ambition of fast growth is not 
just reserved for the small to middle-sized organizations.  
 
5.1.4 McKinsey’s Soft Ss 
The employees of an organization are affected by fast growth no matter what the type of 
growth, and adjusting to the changes in the organization is a process that everyone 
experiences in their own way. However one thing is sure and that is that employment is an 
important issue in a fast growth organization. As one of the founders of Innocent Drinks 
puts it so nicely the trouble with employment is having to make a choice: take risks and 
hire or hold out for the ‘right’ employees and compromise on growth (Reed 2007).  
 
 Awareness of the impact of the soft Ss: when it comes to the influence on the soft Ss 
aspects of control the organization should be aware of the impact the growth has on 
them. Not only management, but everyone in the organization should be aware of the 
staff and skills that are present in the organization. The culture is very much 
determined by the people working for the organization; this is expressed through the 
shared values and style of the organization and is one of the identities of the 
organization to outsiders. If the fast growth organization wants to attract new 
employees it has to be aware of the organizational culture and image it portrays to the 
possible new employees.  
 Communicating the desired position of the soft Ss:  an organization that has a set of 
Soft Ss in place that wants to grow fast has to communicate the status quo of the soft 
Ss to new employees that are hired into the organization. And the changes to the status 
of the Soft Ss that are a result of fast growth should be subject of communication since 
it could be the cause of dissatisfaction with people that have been working for the 
organization since the beginning.  
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5.2  Which way will growth influence control  
The first part of the analysis shows that the strategy formulation, the development of the 
structure and the size of the organization, the organizational components and the soft Ss 
are all affected by fast growth. These organizational aspects of control are the input for 
the MCS design process, and therefore the influence of growth on these aspects is bound to 
have consequences for the design process. These control aspects will have an influence on 
the outcome of the design process by affecting the responsibility and process structure in 
the organization and the implemented means and measures mix in the organization. The 
following paragraph will describe how this influence is manifested in the process of 
designing the MCS for the organization.  
 
5.2.1 Responsibility and process structure 
When it comes to how fast growth will influence the R&P structure of the organization 
there are two elements that can be affected, the design and the evaluation. The R&P 
structure has to be designed to assure the right implementation of the strategy and initial 
structure of the organization and support the organizational components combined with 
the soft Ss. The second element of the responsibility and process structure is that the 
development of the structure and the strain of the fast growth on the soft Ss are to be 
taken into account when evaluating the process. 
 Strategy: The influence of the fast growth strategy should be taken into account when 
designing the R&P structure and the organization should be aware of the specific 
consequences for the R&P structure of the type of growth that will result from the 
strategy.  At the beginning of this paragraph it described how the type of growth will 
have an influence when it comes to the strategy formulated and how this is reflected in 
the present responsibility and process structure. 
 Organizational components: the fast growth organization should be aware of how the 
type of growth changes the organizational components by adding new processes and 
people to the structure. And if this change requires an evaluation of the R&P structure 
of the organization. In addition to monitoring the effects of the type of growth the fast 
growth bottlenecks M&O and P&S, which are related to the nature and experience of 
the organization, should as well be taken into account when designing the R&P 
structure.  
 Size and Structure development: the most direct effect of growth on the R&P structure 
would be the result of the structure development the organization is expected to go 
through as a result of growth. The R&P structure is largely determined by the primary 
process of the organization and this is most likely not to change due to fast growth. 
However when growth changes the internal structure of the organization this is when 
growth is also expected to have an effect on the responsibility and process structure of 
the organization. The Greiner growth framework illustrates how organizations go 
through different stages of evolution and revolution, and change and develop, as they 
grow in size and age. 
 Soft Ss: the hiring of new employees has an effect on the shared values, staff, skills 
and style of the organization. In light of this effect the R&P structure has to be 
evaluated to assure that the right structure is implemented to satisfy the needs of the 
soft Ss. The growth of the organization can also be the cause of a change in the soft Ss. 
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These changes could affect the R&P structure and should be regularly evaluated to 
assure that the implemented R&P structure is still sufficient enough to support the 
growth of the organization and assure that the realization of the soft Ss are satisfactory 
for the organization.  
 
5.2.2 Means and measures mix 
Means can help a fast growth organization by assuring that the strategy of the organization 
and its goals are being reached. The strategy, the organizational components, the 
development of the structure and the soft Ss will all have an influence on the 
implementation of means and on the success of the means implemented. The formulation 
of the strategy will be the biggest factor in this design process, since the means are 
implemented to accompany this organizational strategy. The decision of implementing a 
budget, or a balanced scored card or any other means is not a guarantee for fast growth, 
but it can help the organization with the process of performance measurement and 
strategy implementation. The levers of control by Simons are an example of means for the 
organization to assure strategy implementation and fast growth is expected to pull its 
weight on all four of these levers.  
 Boundary systems are explicit statements embedded in formal information systems that 
define and communicate specific risks to be avoided. An organization like Panelsix can 
for instance apply the boundary systems to educate new employees on the organization 
and to structure the responsibilities in the organization. Managers can use these 
systems to underline the desired state of the soft Ss. In times of fast growth this can 
help the awareness of employment when it comes to the culture.   
 Belief systems are an explicit set of organizational definitions that senior managers 
communicate formally and reinforce systematically to provide basic values, purpose, 
and direction for the organization. Managers can use these systems to communicate the 
desired state of the soft Ss to the organization. In times of fast growth this can help 
the awareness of employment when it comes to the culture of the organization.   
 Interactive control systems are formal information systems that managers use to 
personally and frequently involve themselves in the decision activities of subordinates 
and to focus on strategic uncertainties. These interactive control systems can be very 
valuable for a fast growth organization. Management can use these formal systems to 
guide the emergent strategies and ensure continuing competitive advantage to assure 
fast growth.   
 Diagnostic control systems are formal information systems that managers use to 
monitor organizational outcomes and correct deviations from preset standards of 
performance. When a managers time becomes limited as a result of the fast growth of 
the organization diagnostic control systems can help management to delegate some of 
its responsibilities to others in the organization.  
 
Measures address how and with what means the planning and control function in the 
organization is implemented. The controls described by Merchant are used to avoid three 
issues in the organization: lack of direction, lack of motivation and personal limitations. 
The characteristics of fast growth organizations combined with the organizational 
components are all very much the same: entrepreneurial organization, simple structure, 
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big on trust and shared values. In the first phase of growth management can very much 
rely on personnel and cultural controls. But if an organization wants to achieve high growth 
it will have to monitor this growth, implement the strategy and stay on top of it. An 
organization that wants to achieve fast growth has to implement some type of result and 
action controls to stay on the right course and keep on monitoring fast growth.  
 Personnel and cultural controls: the organization takes steps to ensure that employees 
will control their own behaviours or that the employees will control each others’ 
behaviour. Selection and placement, training, provision of necessary resources, 
creation of a strong organizational, group based rewards. The personnel and cultural 
controls are the initial consideration in an organization. The starting points for 
implementing measures in the organization are the personnel and cultural controls 
introduced by Merchant. 
 Result controls: results accountability, influence the employee’s actions because they 
cause employees to be concerned about the consequences of the actions they take. 
The combination of rewards linked to results informs or remind employees what result 
areas are important and motivate them to produce the results the organization 
rewards.  
 Action controls: the most direct form of control involves ensuring that employees 
perform (or do not perform) certain actions known to be beneficial (or harmful) to the 
organization. Behavioural constraints, pre-action reviews, action accountability, and 
redundancy are all action control that an organization can put into place to assure 
control.   
 
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
In the analysis the conceptual research framework is compared with real life examples of 
fast growth organizations in order to examine the influence of fast growth in the 
management control systems design process. To examine the hypothesis it is divided in two 
segments: 
 The extent of the influence of fast growth on the management control systems design 
process. 
 The way growth will influence the design process of the management controls systems 
in the organization. 
The hypotheses questions if fast growth is a significant factor in the design process of the 
MCS in an organization. A significant difference is described as a difference that is not just 
an outcome of the choice of respondents in this analysis, but the difference would also 
occur when chosen a different group of respondents. One of the boundaries of this paper is 
that it is not possible to formulate a statistically representative conclusion of the research 
conducted; this will result in a difficulty in proving if the outcome of the analysis is 
significant for the fast growth organization. However when comparing the conducted 
research with previous research of management control systems and organizational growth 
research I can definitely conclude that fast growth will have an impact on the control 
situation of the organization. Future research will determine the significance of this 
impact.  
 
 218
The extent of the influence of fast growth on the management control systems design 
process goes as far as the influence on the different organizational aspects that affect the 
need for controls in the organization.  
 Strategy: there are different aspects of the strategy that are affected by fast growth of 
the organization. The strategy of the organization and fast organizational growth are 
related when it comes to determining the strategy and translating the strategy in goals 
for the fast growth. Communicating this desire to grow fast by defining the goals for 
the rest of the organization and dealing with emergent strategies is an important factor 
when aspiring fast growth. 
 Organizational components: the characteristics of the fast growth organization are 
directly related to the organizational components. One way fast growth will influence 
these aspects is through the bottlenecks of management&organization and 
processes&systems. The fast growth bottlenecks could require an organization to 
research and re-evaluate the organizational components.  
 Size and structure development: determining and developing the structure of the 
organization will be a large influence on the evaluation of the responsibility and 
process structure. It is of great importance that this structure be communicated to the 
organization and adapted for the right fit in the organization. As the organization grows 
it should be aware of the stages of revolution and evolution since these could point out 
possible control issues.  
 McKinsey’s soft Ss: the shared values, style, staff and skills of the organization will 
change in a fast growth environment. Adding new people to the structure will require 
an organization to re-evaluate the state of the soft Ss. The fast growth organization 
should be aware that fast growth could change the soft Ss of the organization if the 
desired state of soft Ss is not communicated to the rest of the organization. 
 
The way fast growth will influence the design process of MCS in the organization is 
explained through the possible changes and need for adaptation in the responsibility and 
process structure of the organization, accompanied by the implemented means and 
measures mix. The responsibility and process structure of the organization is accompanied 
by the means and measures mix of the organization to assure the control. Different types 
of growth may require a different approach of the means and measures mix in the 
organization.  
 Responsibilities and processes structure: the influence of fast growth on the aspects of 
control is directly reflected in the need to design, implement, and evaluate the R&P 
structure of the organization. The types of growth are expected to each have their own 
set of implications for the R&P structure and the organization aspiring fast growth 
should frequently evaluate the effects of growth on the R&P structure. If the R&P 
structure is not sufficient enough to support the growth of the organization it requires 
adapting to the process.  
 Means and measures mix: Means are very dependent on the type of organization and its 
strategy. The most important part of implementing means and measures in the 
organization is the communication and formulation of the strategy of the organization. 
A well formulated strategy should describe the goals for the organization and how 
these goals are to be achieved. The most important part of implementing measures in 
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the organization is the translation of the strategy into goals for the organization 
combined with the other control aspects of the organization.  
 
If the organization knows what type of growth it wants to achieve and how it wants to 
achieve it can design the process of management control best suited for the organization. 
If the management of the organization will implement controls in the organization to 
assure the implementation of the strategy is largely dependent on the type of organization 
and of the management and owners of the organization combined with the need for 
controls. But one thing that is sure is that if the organization is aware of the changes in the 
organization as a result of the fast growth and if the organization is aware of the need for 
control it will definitely benefit from implementing management control systems. A good 
realization of the responsibility and process structure and the combined means and 
measures mix will provide a certain amount of assurance that the organization is in 
control. And the awareness of the changes in the control requirements due to the fast 
growth effect on the control aspects can help with the decision what means and measure 
are the best fit for the organization.  
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The Implications of Integrating 
Governance, Risk and Compliance in 
Business Intelligence Systems on 
Corporate Performance Management 
 
J.J. (Jos) Madlener 41 
 
 
Executive Summary 
The last decade organizations have understood more and more the importance of enforcing 
achievement of the goals defined by their strategy through metrics-driven management. 
The data warehousing process in Business Intelligence Systems, though supporting bottom-
up extraction of information from data, currently fails in the top-down enforcing of the 
organization strategy. Corporate Performance Management includes the data warehousing 
process, but it also requires a component capable of monitoring the time-critical 
operational processes to allow tactical and operational decision-makers to tune their 
actions according to the organization strategy. Integrated Governance, Risk and 
Compliance is proposed one of these components by providing an organization new 
capabilities of risk management and creating enterprise value by utilizing technology to 
efficiently and effectively manage risk across the organization.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Context 
Lately the business climate is putting organizations under different stress than they have 
experienced for a long time. Today’s ever-changing business climate is complex and 
difficult to predict. At the same time the current economic state is forcing board and 
executives to look for profit and eradicate losses in the organization, make hard decisions 
about where to allocate resources and dealing with an increasing demand for their 
accountability. Also new legal and regulatory mandates have organizations scrambling for 
faster and more detailed information about the results and performance of the 
organization so that they can report financials with confidence (Kopcke 2003).  
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In the ever-changing climate of business the capability to adapt is a worthy asset (Thierauf 
2001). Intelligence is the ability to understand the relationships of presented information 
in such a way to guide actions to adapt an organization strategy (Thierauf 2001; Vriens and 
Philips 1999). Business Intelligence (BI) then encompasses the whole process of collecting, 
processing and interpreting information for an organization strategy (March and Hevner 
2007; Vriens and Philips 1999). Business Intelligence Systems (BIS) give organizations the 
ability to take data from multiple data sources and transform it to singular and definitive 
information (Loshin 2003; Moss and Atre 2003). This information lets decision-makers show 
data, gain context, understand trends and anomalies to answer to performance 
management questions (Cognos 2007).  
 
A growing number of organizations have recognized that the management reports 
generated with BIS by themselves are no longer sufficient. The generated management 
reports must be tightly coupled with their strategic and operational planning processes to 
let managers set and share the strategy of the organization. This can be achieved with 
fully integrated Corporate Performance Management (CPM) systems that bring together 
enterprise planning and financial management applications with comprehensive BI 
functionality. CPM is called the second era in BI (Kopcke 2005; Golfarelli et al. 2004). 
 
1.2 Research problem and questions 
As organizations use their ability to adapt to cope with the ever-changing business 
environment, they require unprecedented visibility into the dials and levers that affect 
their performance. Only through these insights can organizations achieve the level of 
individual and group accountability that is at the heart of improving the previously 
mentioned results and meeting the reporting requirements. One of the currently new 
levers driving organizational performance is the Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) 
concept (OCEG 2007).  
Initial interest in GRC was driven by the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) act, but currently the 
perspectives of organizations in all industries on the components of governance, risk and 
compliance are maturing. These components are linked and aligned, and together provide 
a possibility to improve the quality of information, necessary for risk and compliance 
management. Resulting risk intelligent organizations evolve from managing risk as a 
transaction or compliance activity to adding business value by improving the operational 
decision-making and strategic planning. 
 
Although lately there has been a lot of research in the area of the subjects BI, CPM and 
GRC, the knowledge of the relations and the implications of integrated GRC is insufficient. 
With the arrival of the second era of BI and with GRC presumably providing the component 
to allow decision-makers to improve operational decision-making and strategic planning it 
is of common interest to do research on the implications of integrating GRC in BIS and on 
the resulting added value for CPM.   
 
This leads to the following research question that is addressed in the study: 
RQ: What are the implications of integrating Governance, Risk and Compliance in 
Business Intelligence Systems on Corporate Performance Management? 
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1.3 Outline 
This article consists of six sections and an appendix as illustrated in figure 1-1. 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Outline article 
 
The first section gives a brief outline of the research context, problem statement and 
outline of this article. The second section contains the prior literature. It provides an 
introduction in BIS, CPM, GRC and the relations between these concepts. The third section 
contains the research design, section four provides the results of the research and section 
five the analysis of the results. The last section, section six, contains the conclusions based 
on the research. 
 
 
2. Prior Literature 
 
2.1 Business Intelligence 
Nylund (1999) traces back the developments associated with BIS to Proctor & Gamble’s 
effort to build a Decision Support System (DSS) that linked sales information and retail 
scanner data and to the discipline that Gartner Group analyst Howard Dresner dubbed 
“business intelligence” in the late 1980’s. Dresner put into the context of BI “all the 
technologies that help business make decisions based on fact. Using fact rather than 
intuition was key to intelligence”. In this context intelligence is the ability to understand 
the interrelationships of presented facts in such a way to guide action to one or more 
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desired goals to develop and maintain a organizational strategy (Thierauf 2001; Vriens and 
Philips 1999). BI then encompasses the whole process of systematically collecting, 
processing and interpreting information with respect to a organizational strategy (March 
and Hevner 2007; Vriens and Philips 1999). 
BIS are useful at different organizational levels within an organization. BIS are mainly used 
by strategic managers and executives who make decisions that guide the manner in which 
business is done. BIS provides managers information and helping them to make decisions 
from semi-structured and unstructured information, which is generated in underlying 
systems (see figure 2-1). Although BIS and Executive Information System  (EIS) look similar, 
there is a big difference. BIS find answers to questions that decision-makers do not know 
to ask (Moss and Atre 2003). At first this seems excessive. After all, an EIS can also provide 
intelligence and insights by sorting out vast amounts of data. But the traditional analysis 
techniques rely on the analyst to know what to look for in the data. The analyst creates 
and runs queries based on hypotheses and the executive relies on the business views built 
into the EIS tool. As problems become more complex, more data-dependant and involve 
more variables the EIS tools fall short. BIS can support these very complex investigations 
(Moss and Atre 2003). 
BIS are also used at the operational level to support operational decision-making. At this 
level BIS provide more detailed information about aspects of a process compared with 
information provided to the strategic level. BIS are represented as the black box in figure 
2-1. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: IS at the various organization levels support different types of decisions 
(adapted from Laudon and Laudon 2004) 
 
 
2.1.1 Definition Business Intelligence 
From here we assume that the utilization of BI as IS can be seen as a way that leads to 
better insight on the internal and external organizational environment and assists in 
strategic decision-making by providing valuable information. To provide better insight the 
organization needs to get new information by collecting data about these environments of 
the organization. BI is all about available information. In the context of BI a distinction for 
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information is made between data, information and knowledge and intelligence 
(Rodenberg 1999). Creating intelligence is the ultimate goal of the BI process, because it is 
in this context that any real value is derived. Figure 2-2 shows the distinction for 
information in a pyramid of abstraction. 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Pyramid of abstraction (Loshin 2003) 
 
Reviewing the literature on BI gives several interesting insights and slightly different 
definitions on the subject (March and Hevner 2007; Hamer 2005; Thierauf 2001; Rodenberg 
1999). Notable, all the definitions are based on collecting, interpreting, analyzing and 
disseminating information as knowledge to users, who can act upon it. A definition by 
Loshin (2003) covers all the relevant information on BI given in the current literature: 
“Business Intelligence are the processes, technologies, and tools needed to turn data into 
information, information into knowledge, and knowledge into plans that drive profitable 
business action. Business intelligence encompasses data warehousing, business analytic 
tools, and content/knowledge management.” 
 
2.1.2 Business Intelligence System 
Now knowing what BI includes, the time has come to discuss the technologies and tools of 
the system supporting BI. Figure 2-3 shows a high level architecture for implementing BIS. 
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Figure 2-3: A high-level view of the information flow (Loshin 2003) 
 
The BI-cycle starts with the collection of data from data sources, necessary to fulfill the 
need of information. This collected data is being interpreted and analyzed in the following 
step to transform it to information.  
 
The data from data sources is loaded into a staging area. An Extract, Transform & Load 
(ETL) process extracts the data from the data sources, transforms the data from the 
heterogeneous platforms into a standard format for the Data Warehouse (DW) and loads 
this data into the DW (Moss and Atre 2003). This process involves the extraction of 
information from data. 
 
The DW is a “subject-orientated, integrated, time-variant, non-up-datable collection of 
data used to support management decision-making processes and business intelligence” 
(Inmon 2002). The purpose of a DW is to establish a primary source of data that feeds the 
analytical environment within an organization (Kimball et al. 1998). Providing one source 
of data helps creating one version of the truth within its context that can be accessed in 
real-time.  
 
From the DW the data is loaded into the analytical environment to populate analytical data 
marts and Online Analytical Processing (OLAP) servers. By loading the data into the 
analytical environment, the information can be analyzed and transformed to knowledge. 
Data marts are subject-orientated subsets of the data warehouse along with the analytical 
interfaces and tools that provide interface to the user (Loshin 2003). The data mart is fed 
with small amounts of subject-oriented data from the DW for a specific department or 
group within an organization.  
OLAP presents data sources loaded from the DW (or data mart) in a way that allows an 
employee to view comparative indicators across multiple dimensions of the data. These 
indicators are summarized in a way that allows an employee to drill-down on any 
particular value or dimension (Loshin 2003). By drilling down on the data greater detail can 
be exposed. The reporting of information can be in the form of dials and charts, 
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spreadsheets and other interfaces depending on vendor and design choices of the 
organization (Cognos 2007). This information is used to support decision-making.  
 
2.2 Corporate Performance Management 
It is recognized that performance itself doesn’t come with a simple definition. From an 
organizational view it is generally assumed that an organization that is performing well is 
one that actually will fulfill its objectives or will effectively implement an appropriate 
strategy (Otley 1999; Lebas 1995). Performance is looking for future potential, but based 
on knowledge created from data accumulated about the past. An overview of 
organizational performance is provided in figure 2-4. At the highest level all organizations 
are in business to achieve objectives. The activities to drive toward the objectives are 
guided by boundaries. These can be mandated or voluntary.  
 
 
Figure 2-4: The big picture of organizational performance (adapted from Mitchell and 
Switzer 2007) 
 
2.2.1 Performance Measurement 
In the context of the article a quote by Lord Kelvin, “if you cannot measure it, it does not 
exist” (Lebas 1995), can be read as ‘you cannot manage what you cannot measure’. In 
order to manage a strategy an organization needs to use indicators to measure the 
achievement of objectives. These achievements are adversely impacted by obstacles 
(risks). Risk-taking is fundamental to an organization’s creation of value. Bernstein (1998) 
describes the place of risk in the system of performance as “the capacity to manage risk, 
and with it the appetite to take risk and make forward-looking choices, are key elements 
of the energy that drives the economic system forward”. 
 
Traditional performance measurement systems have concentrated on the development of 
indicators mostly related to financial dimensions, excluding the non-financial dimensions 
due to the limited ability to measure these dimensions. Kloot and Martin (2000) show that 
the success of organizations is based on multiple dimensions, which change both over time 
and stakeholders. Dimensions are often differentiated as the results of a strategy or the 
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determinants of the success of the strategy. These dimensions suggest that there should be 
a strong linkage between the strategic plans and the performance measures.  
In order to have a meaningful performance measurement process, an organization has to 
have clear objectives, formulated from the strategy. For any type of organization strategy, 
setting clear objectives is vital since objectives provide a mechanism for control. That is, 
they provide direction and ensure adjustments can be made if objectives are not met. Two 
widely used techniques for objective setting are CSF (Rockart 1982) and the Balanced 
Score Card (BSC) (Kaplan and Norton 1992). 
 
2.2.2 Definition Corporate Performance Management 
The introduction of laws such as SOX and Basel II which require organizations to increase 
the transparency for managing financial and customer information and focus on good 
governance have greatly increased the significance of performance management systems in 
organizations the last decade. The second reason is the trend to improve control and 
profitability by the creation of approaches like the BSC. Organizations have understood the 
importance of enforcing achievement of the objectives defined by their strategy through 
metrics-driven management.  
   
The current DW process within BIS supports bottom-up extraction of information from data 
necessary for decision-making, but lacks a capability for top-down enforcing of the 
organization strategy (Kopcke 2005; Golfarelli et al. 2004). A growing number of 
organizations have recognized that the management reports generated with BIS by 
themselves are no longer sufficient. The generated management reports must be tightly 
coupled with their strategic and operational planning processes to let managers set and 
share the strategy of the organization. This can be achieved by CPM (Kopcke 2005). The 
definition of CPM has been consistent since Gartner Research introduced the term in 2001 
(Viaene and Willems 2007; Cognos 2005): 
 
“CPM is an umbrella term that describes all of the processes, methodologies, metrics and 
systems needed to measure and manage the performance of an organization.” 
 
CPM emerges from the current BI framework. CPM includes DW, multidimensional analysis 
and OLAP, but it also requires a reactive component capable of monitoring the operational 
processes to allow tactical and operational decision-makers to adjust their decisions and 
following actions according to the strategy of the organization (Kopcke 2005; Golfarelli et 
al. 2004). The aim of CPM is to integrate a number of applications into a single 
environment that includes all the necessary elements of performance management.  
 
2.3 Governance, Risk and Compliance 
Initial interest in Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) was driven by the SOX act, but 
currently the perspectives of organizations in all industries on the components of 
governance, risk and compliance are maturing. Organizations are expanding their 
initiatives to embrace an integrated view on risk and compliance (Deloitte 2007; SAP 
2006). The reason is that today’s ever-changing business climate is complex and difficult to 
predict. At the same time organizations face unprecedented numbers of legal and 
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regulatory mandates, and increasing demand for board and executive accountability. 
Through these, obstacles and boundaries are created which have an adverse impact on 
achieving the objectives of the strategy.  
 
The purpose of GRC is to provide sustainability, consistency, efficiency and transparency 
for the multiple governance, risk and compliance processes in the organization. This can 
be achieved by the cooperation among the roles responsible for GRC as well as leveraging a 
common framework and technology infrastructure. This involves the movement to an 
integrated organizational structure where GRC can be centrally overseen, but 
accountability is distributed to the organizational levels where it belongs (McClean and 
Rasmussen 2007). By becoming involved in an integrated strategy and employing an all-
embracing GRC solution organizations can leverage common information, processes and 
systems to help them integrate governance, risk and compliance processes with 
performance management. McClean and Rasmussen (2007) name integrated GRC as the 
upcoming governance platform for defining, maintaining and monitoring risk. Without an 
integrated GRC strategy an organization is more vulnerable as the complexities and 
interdependencies of risk increase.  
 
2.3.1 Definition Governance, Risk and Compliance 
To effectively support decision-making and manage an organization all three components 
within GRC are needed, the components are linked and aligned (Rasmussen 2007; SAP 
2006). For example good governance is achieved by proper risk and compliance 
management. GRC is not just about one role in the organization that is responsible for 
everything related to governance, risk, and compliance. The following definition of GRC as 
a whole is adapted from Forrester Research (Rasmussen 2007) and approved by Deloitte:  
 
GRC is multiple processes working together in a common framework, collaboration or 
architecture to provide an organization overview of the information, processes, controls 
and evidence needed to effectively govern, manage risks and adhering to prevailing laws 
throughout the organization.  
 
Next to governance, risk and compliance there are more processes playing critical roles in 
GRC. To understand the complete portfolio of processes related to GRC a summary is 
shown in figure 2-5. 
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Figure 2-5: Spelling out GRC (Mitchell 2007a) 
 
2.3.2 Maturity integrated GRC 
Technology is assuming a key and enabling role in the process of integrating GRC and IT 
projects, priorities and processes are being increasingly driven by GRC considerations. This 
movement to an integrated organizational structure brings along uncertainty. IT strategies, 
architecture decisions and applications have not approached governance, risk and 
compliance considerations in an integrated manner yet. Organizations have typically dealt 
with governance, risk and compliance needs in a fragmented and isolated fashion, manual 
and not sufficiently integrated with performance management (Dittmar 2007; Mitchell 
2007b). The technology is not adequately used to support governance, risk management or 
compliance, but is critical to GRC because IT can be the enabler of high quality 
information necessary for decision-making. The fragmented state of an infrastructure 
without integrated GRC is shown in figure 2-6. 
 
 
Figure 2-6: Fragmented state without integrated GRC (Deloitte 2007) 
 
In this fragmented state information, processes and systems all live separate, silos-based 
lives within the organization. The result is a tangle of controls and practices buried inside 
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functional or geographic silos with numerous isolated activities. Silos within operations 
often create complexity and duplication of efforts and it leaves major gaps uncovered 
(Mitchell 2007b; SAP 2006). By the effective use of IT and architected solutions to embed 
GRC in mainstream processes and decision-making, organizations can create an enterprise 
wide, program based approach instead of a silos, project based approach. This possible 
future approach is visualized in figure 2-7. 
 
 
Figure 2-7: Future comprehensive state with integrated GRC (Deloitte 2007) 
 
Figure 2-7 shows that a common integrated platform for GRC can offer organizations a 
framework for high quality information necessary for performance, compliance and risk 
management. This makes an organization more agile and flexible. Aligning the IT assets to 
support proactive risk management and compliance can offer much more direct and cost-
effective means for an organization. But strategic adoption of IT for GRC takes time, as the 
integrated GRC Maturity Model in figure 2-8 makes clear. 
 
 
Figure 2-8: Integrated GRC maturity model (Deloitte 2007) 
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2.4 Relation BI, CPM and GRC 
Despite investments in technology (to name BIS) to provide valuable information for 
decision-making some organizations still are not able to meet the information 
requirements to monitor risk, make informed decisions, drive strategic planning and 
ultimately drive future performance. Improved Information Quality (IQ) would allow 
managers to make better decisions (Dittmar and Vogel 2008; Lattner 2006).  
Risk is a function of the complexity of doing business and the business environment. The 
complexities increase as the business or environment becomes more dynamic. It is 
important for organizations to look how they respond to these changes. Risk can be closely 
related to organizational performance, while these changes in complexity change or create 
new obstacles having an adverse impact on achieving objectives (Azvine et al. 2007). 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) are actions undertaken based on the measurement of 
the achievement of business objectives. ERM can provide reasonable assurance of the 
extent to which objectives are achieved (COSO 2004). GRC extends traditional ERM by the 
integration of risk management in processes for better internal control (Buith 2008). 
 
By utilizing technology to efficiently and effectively manage risk across the organization 
managers can become more intelligent about risks (Laurent 2006). This means embracing a 
broader and central overview of risk. Attaining this higher level of risk management is 
called Risk Intelligence (RI) (Dittmar and Kobel 2008). Resulting RI organizations move from 
managing risk as a transaction or compliance activity to adding business value by improving 
operational and tactical decision-making and strategic planning according to the 
organization strategy (Stiffler 2006). This capability of monitoring time-critical operational 
processes to allow decision-makers to tune their actions according to the strategy is 
required by CPM. 
Figure 2-9 visualizes the relation between the GRC, IQ and the link to enterprise value. 
This figure is an adaptation of figure 2-4, visualizing the big picture of organizational 
performance.  
 
 
Figure 2-9: GRC and enterprise value are linked 
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The overall relation of BI, CPM and GRC as explained in this chapter is summarized in 
figure 2-10. 
 
 
Figure 2-10: CPM emerging from BI 
 
 
3. Research Design 
 
3.1  Research Method 
GRC is a relatively new concept in practice; therefore it turned out to be difficult to 
conduct a research to validate the prior literature empirically and propose the added value 
of integrated GRC on CPM. Hardly any organizations have started integrating GRC yet in 
their current infrastructure. The majority of the organizations are still in their orientating 
phase or just discovered the importance of GRC. Due to these maturity levels of integrated 
GRC in BIS it is hard to collect existing statistic or analytical evidence about the 
implications of integrated GRC. In order to validate the theory and propose the added 
value of integrated GRC on CPM an adapted application of the Delphi research method is 
used. 
The Delphi method in general may be characterized as a “method for structuring a group 
communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, 
as a whole, to deal with a complex problem” (Linstone and Turoff 2002). But according to 
Linstone and Turoff (2002) there are many different perspectives on the Delphi method 
and there is a diverse range of applications. For this article the application of the Delphi 
method as a systematic interactive forecasting method for obtaining forecasts from a panel 
of independent experts is good applicable due to the fact that GRC is a relatively new 
concept. The research question does not lend itself to precise analytical techniques, but 
can benefit from subjective judgments on a collective basis during a workshop. Next to 
that the time schedules of the experts necessary for the workshop and the costs make 
frequent group meetings infeasible. 
The technique can be adapted for use in face-to-face meetings, and is then called mini-
Delphi or Estimate-Talk-Estimate (ETE). The Delphi method has been widely used for 
business forecasting. 
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3.2 Research Design 
The technique is adapted to an ETE for use in a workshop. During this workshop the Delphi 
method is used for forecasting the implications of integrated GRC on the organizational 
processes. The workshop is conducted during a yearly kickoff meeting of GRC as integrated 
service offering for Deloitte on the 27th of June 2008 in Amstelveen, the Netherlands.  
The workshop is composed of statements which are based on the prior literature. The prior 
literature explained the background of BIS, CPM, integrated GRC and summarized the 
relations. The statements are a summarization of points of interest within the prior 
literature giving an implication of the impacts on the internal organizational processes. 
The statements, classified by groups of interest, are shown in figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1: Statements workshop 
 
Usually a research based on the Delphi method undergoes four distinct phases (Linstone 
and Turoff 2002). The first phase is characterized by exploration of the subject under 
discussion, wherein each individual can contribute additional information. The subject 
under discussion, integrated GRC, has already been explored by the group of experts due 
to their daily practices.  
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The second phase involves the process of reaching an understanding of how the group 
views the issue, meaning where the experts agree or disagree. For this the experts were 
asked to anonymously give a rating on their agreement on the statements by the use of 
CLiCKAPAD, a radio frequency voting keypad. The rating outcome for each statement 
illustrates the level of agreement on a statement based on an expert’s function and job 
title. The ratings to be chosen from are: 
 Strongly Disagree; 
 Somewhat Disagree; 
 Neither Agree or Disagree; 
 Somewhat Agree; 
 Strongly Agree. 
 
Thirdly each statement is discussed after all the statements have been rated. This way a 
lot of additional information is gathered from the point of view of the experts. During this 
phase the underlying reasons for the differences are evaluated. For this the experts with 
deviated answers are asked to share their explanation. This offers the possibility of a 
discussion. 
The last phase, phase four, is the final evaluation. During this phase the experts can 
anonymously rerate a statement based on all previously gathered information. It is 
believed that during this process the range of the answers decreases and the group 
converges towards the "correct" answer. This brings along another benefit, it increases the 
integrity of the answer (Babbie 2004). 
 
3.2.1  Respondents 
The original research design had three different respondent groups: academics with a 
scientific understanding of the GRC concept, end-users of BIS with integrated GRC and 
business experts on GRC. A consequence of GRC being a relatively new concept was to find 
people who were available and willing to participate in the workshop.  
The original setup had to be adopted in such a way that just the business experts on GRC 
were able to validate the prior literature by the statements put up in the workshop. In 
order to prevent answers with a narrow point of view, the visions of a mixture of twelve 
business experts on GRC were used during the workshop. The functions present within 
Deloitte were Consulting, ERS and TAX. Due to this their vision and the implications of 
integrated GRC for their clients is different.  
 
 
4. Results 
 
Figure 4-1 presents the results of the conducted workshop. The figure shows the frequency 
of provided ratings per statement. The rating outcome for each statement illustrates the 
level of agreement assigned by the experts to the specific statement. A rating of: 
1. Stands for “Strongly Disagree”; 
2. Stands for “Somewhat Disagree”; 
3. Stands for “Neither Agree or Disagree”; 
4. Stands for “Somewhat Agree”; 
5. Stands for “Strongly Disagree”.  
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Figure 4-1: Workshop results 
 
Next to the frequency of provided ratings the mean and Standard Deviation (SD) of the 
total results are included per statement. Especially while the Delphi method is focused on 
achieving a consensus, it requires a measure of the amount of dispersion of the data. 
Figure 4-2 shows a scatter chart with the mean of every statement. This figure provides 
insight in the average rating of agreement of a statement by the experts compared to the 
other statements.  
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Figure 4-2: Scatter chart means rating of agreement 
 
 
5. Analysis 
 
5.1 Integrated approach  
The results of this group show an interesting trend. At the start of the workshop the SD’s 
of the ratings are quite big, but during the workshop the SD’s mitigate. This can be 
explained by the fact that the understanding of the concept ‘integrated approach’ by the 
different experts was different. After the first round of voting some extreme ratings came 
up and a discussion resulted in three different views on an integrated approach: 
 Overcoming a fragmented, silod approach; 
 Embed GRC processes in day-to-day activities; 
 Integrated approach by the functions ERS, Consulting and TAX on the subject of GRC. 
 
According to the current literature the first two are valid views, but the last one was a 
complete misunderstanding. After explaining the core of the research this view was 
removed for further use in the workshop. The other two were both named as being part of 
an integrated approach. The overall trend of the SD’s show that the understanding of an 
integrated approach grew during the workshop by the help of the explanations of the 
facilitator and the discussions between the experts. 
 
To give an example of how these different views on an integrated approach would work 
out the discussion on statement five proves very useful. The experts who see an integrated 
approach as overcoming a fragmented, silod approach voted on the left side of the 
distribution. Every manager is able to realize an integrated approach in his own silo. The 
experts who combined the concept of an integrated approach with the second view would 
 241
vote on the right side of the distribution. To embed GRC in day-to-day activities a central 
overview would be necessary to avoid redundancy or duplication of efforts. Only top 
management has these capabilities.  
 
5.1.1 Automated internal controls 
As discussed above the concept ‘integrated approach’ was subject to different views by 
the experts. The concept of ‘automated internal controls’ on the other hand was generally 
understood and accepted by the expert group and not subject to any different view. This 
had a positive effect on the ratings by the experts, noticing the smaller SD’s. Another 
reason for the smaller SD’s is the more unambiguous agreement on the implications of 
automated internal controls. 
 
By comparing the results from this group with the first group a lot of consensus shows on 
the ratings of agreement. The implications of both an integrated approach and automated 
internal controls are generally somewhat agreed on as there is hardly any difference 
between the means, but due to a more unambiguous rating the SD’s for this group are 
generally smaller. 
 
Statement five already provided an interesting discussion based on the understanding of 
the previous concept, statement twelve provides one on the rating of agreement compared 
to the rating of agreement on statement five. These are the only two statements in the 
first two groups where the ratings are on the negative, disagreement, side of the 
distribution and where the difference between the two means is significant. The expert 
group mostly somewhat disagrees on the statement five and mostly somewhat or strongly 
disagrees on statement twelve. It can be concluded that to realize core parts of GRC the 
influence of top management is not unique. 
 
5.1.2 Added value 
The SD’s of statement fourteen until sixteen show a good consensus on the rating of 
agreement. Especially the SD of statement fifteen provides good insight on an important 
added value of GRC according to all the experts. It is more interesting to look at the 
differences in the ratings of statements thirteen and seventeen. These statements have 
more deviated ratings resulting in larger SD’s. The overall trend of the ratings in this group 
is comparable to the trend in the first two groups. 
 
The voting on statement seventeen results in a discussion about what is the most 
important motive behind GRC programs. Experts who voted on the negative, disagreement, 
side of the distribution state that not legal and regulatory mandates the most important 
motives are, but the ability to add value to the organization by doing business more 
effective and efficient. During the discussion it became clear that the different functions 
are still often focused at the boundaries established by external forces. These compliance 
requirements drove the initial interest in GRC according to the literature, but include only 
one part of figure 2-9 as opportunity to create enterprise value. Using this information on 
the maturity model in figure 2-8 the focus of these experts is at the first two levels, the 
same state as the current market operates in. Only a couple of experts point to the 
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opportunities to reward risk by becoming more risk intelligent. These experts are focused 
at maturity level three and four of the maturity model, providing an valuable integrated 
approach with better RI, compliance and performance management.  
 
5.1.3 Summarization 
These statements are a summarization and combination of the previous presented 
statements in the first three groups. Taking the mean and SD’s in notice the group of 
experts mostly agree on the statements. This shows a better understanding of the concepts 
and the positive learning curve during the workshop. The consensus, as compelled by the 
Delphi research method, is reached.  
After explaining the concept of an integrated approach during the voting on the first group 
of statements the experts mostly somewhat or strongly agree to the need of improving the 
IT infrastructure to support the integrated approach. By improving the IT infrastructure the 
need for high quality information necessary for decision-making can be fulfilled. Next, by 
the effective use of IT and embedded GRC processes organizations can overcome a 
fragmented, silod approach. 
 
Statement nineteen lines up a summarization of considered aspects during the previous 
statements. Looking at the ratings of agreement in the previous groups, the mean and SD 
of this statement join in well. The experts generally agree on the required knowledge and 
skills and they do this unambiguous. 
 
5.2 Recommendations for further research 
This research provides insights in the implications of integrated GRC in BIS on CPM. These 
implications have been validated by the use of a workshop with only experts in the field of 
GRC. This due to the lack of knowledge outside the initiating organizations. But the market 
is rapidly becoming aware of GRC. During the research at least three books on GRC are 
published in April and May 2008 for the public market and the first results of an integrated 
approach on GRC are expected. A recommendation for further research could be to test 
and validate the statements by the use of academics having an interface with the field of 
GRC and end-users of BIS with integrated GRC. One of the questions that need to be 
addressed then is if the statements prove to be complete. 
 
Another recommendation for further research could be investigating on how to accomplish 
the integration of GRC in BIS. To read and write about possible future implications of 
integrated GRC is one thing, but to manage how to integrate GRC in BIS and how to take 
care of the implications also requires a technical point of view. The integration of GRC 
requires time and technical improvements due to the complexity of the systems. For 
example systems communicate by different means of communication and interfaces. 
Furthermore an integrated approach also brings along the challenge of the alignment of 
the GRC strategy and implementation between these various systems. Another point of 
interest for this extended research could be the security of an integrated approach. 
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6. Conclusions 
The prior literature on BI, CPM and GRC showed the basics and relations between these 
concepts and proposed possible, future implications of integrated GRC in BIS for 
organizations. The results from the empirical research show a certain degree of agreement 
on these proposed implications.  
 
The first two groups of statements, mainly focused at an integrated approach and on 
automated internal controls, show a lot of consensus on the rating of agreement. The 
implications of both an integrated approach and automated internal controls are generally 
somewhat agreed on as there is hardly any difference between the means, but due to a 
better understanding of the concept the SD’s for the second group are generally smaller. 
These two groups embrace the first twelve statements. According to the scatter chart in 
figure 4-2 all these statements are placed between a somewhat disagreement rating and a 
somewhat agreement rating, with the latter containing the major group of ratings. 
The third group of statements, mainly focused at the added value of integrated GRC, 
shows that the experts generally agree on the added value of GRC, but during discussions it 
became clear that the opportunities of added value are not carried by all the experts yet. 
They are not all looking at the possible steps in maturity for clients, for example rewarding 
risk by creating RI organizations. The scatter chart in figure 4-2 show that the statements 
embraced by the third group are placed between a neutral rating and a strongly agreement 
rating. Especially the added value of GRC making organizations more alert to risks and 
opportunities is one of the statements overall strongly agreed on. 
The fourth group of statements, mainly focused at summarizing the global needs and 
implications of integrated GRC in BIS presented by the first three groups, shows the 
general agreement of the need and added value of integrated GRC and provides insight in 
the agreement of the required knowledge and skills when integrating GRC. This conclusion 
is visualized by the scatter chart in figure 4-2 where all the statements from the fourth 
group are placed between a somewhat agreement rating en strongly agreement rating. 
 
It can be concluded that the present experts generally agree on the implications put 
forward by the current literature. The implications of an integrated approach and 
automated internal controls provide an organization possibilities to improve the 
performance of the organization by creating added value. This is mostly the result of 
possible improved IQ, improved quality of performed activities and more alert reactions to 
risks and opportunities. An integrated approach and automated internal controls are 
important due to the overlap in activities, controls and responsibilities, created complexity 
and duplication of efforts. The breadth and extent of the implementations are still under 
discussion. 
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